This study mainly aims at introducing the Hurûfât (Askerî Rûznâmçe) Registries for the importance of Ottoman social history with the case of the Kazâ-i Kudüs-i Serif (District of Jerusalem) to the science world which are protected in the Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Directorate General of Foundations. These registries were arranged according to the administrative structure of the time and the names of the districts are arranged in an alphabetical order. The records in the registries include assignment records of the ruling class which were called as ‘askerî within the social structure of the Ottoman State. This study based on 25 Hurûfât Registry records of administratively the District of Jerusalem and covering the years 1102-1834/ 1690-1834. With the analysis of the assignment records of ser’î courts, guilds and city organizations in relation to names of the appointees, the method of appointment, terms of office, the reasons of leaving, we will try to reveal the Ottoman social structure during the 18th century in a local base, that is the District of Jerusalem. In this context, we will also witness how the local notables were tied to the imperial state within a framework of common interests through posts and entitlements to waqf stipends.

The Zephyr of Balm Trees in Those Who Became the Muftis of al-Sh?m (‘arf al-bash?m f? man waliya fatw? dimashq ash-sh?m) is a unique biographical dictionary focused on the muftis of the province of Damascus beginning with the first mufti instated by Selim I in (922/1516) and ending with the author, a mufti himself, Muhammad Khalil bin Ali bin Muhammad bin Murad al-Husayni al-Dimashqi (d. 1206/1791). The focus of this paper will fall less on the biographical entries themselves rather than on the dictionary’s peculiar introduction which in Muradi’s own words “comprises benefits that relate to the fatwa and the mufti." In this introduction Muradi details quite thoroughly a mufti’s ideal qualities and ideal role in society. Additionally, he spells out in great detail the manners and codes of conduct that both the mufti and the mustafti must follow in their interaction with one anther. While manners and codes of conduct are not an unusual genre, several aspects render this introduction of particular importance. First, it is quite unusual for biographical dictionaries of the Ottoman era to include a lengthy introduction, especially one that is longer than any of the individual biographical entries within text. Second, the introduction seems to implicitly provide the reader with a measure of the ideal mufti, one that can be applied to the biographies of the muftis included in the dictionary. In composing this work therefore, Muradi does not seem to have been concerned simply with providing the biographies of the province’s muftis but rather intended to assess them according to his measure of the ideal mufti. Reading Muradi’s views on his predecessors becomes particularly telling when it is compared with other sources of the time, most important of which is that of the famous damascene barber, al-Budayri. The contrast between Muradi’s idealistic views of the muftiship with that of al-Budayri’s often negative remarks of holders of the post, affords us a invaluable view of the urban classes’ awareness and critique of the ‘politics of the notables.’

The paper presents a new approach for analyzing the characteristics and transformations of an important Middle Eastern institution, the elite family. Powerful families provided the foundation for most of the area's elites, and still are a component in socio-political arenas. A common misconception of elite families in the Fertile Crescent is that they were monolithic and passive actors whose fate was determined by external forces. The paper takes issue with this approach and argues that elite families are complex organizations. Hence, their behavior and ability to adapt to changing realities, and therefore to maintain their status, should be analyzed by focusing on three parameters. The first is the organization's aims, the specific character of which (pursuing economic strength, political power, or both) shaped the other two parameters, structure and strategy. Structure was reflected by the distribution of power within the family and the density of its internal ties. Strategy was reflected by the topology of the family's connections to external bases of support, and also in the composition of these bases. The paper uses case studies of two Palestinian elite families, the Ja?abaris from Hebron and the al-Masris from Nablus, to examine comparatively how they have developed, and how they have coped with the historical shifts experienced by the Palestinians throughout the 20th century. The paper demonstrates how a systematic tracing of changes in the families' internal and external networks can be used as a prism for extracting three historiographical outcomes: The first reveals the strengths and weaknesses in each of the two families' organizations and explains how these impacted their ability to cope with changes. The second identifies transformations at the families' characteristics (aims, structure and strategy) over the years. The third reveals broader historical processes through the story of each family. Without ignoring the particularity of the Palestinian case study, the paper aims for a broader discussion about the elite family as a pan-Middle Eastern institute. The paper wishes to contribute to the long-standing discourse on 'Politics of Notables’ by encouraging individual exploration of the diverse networks that supported elite families. This should help explain why some families managed to maintain their status while others did not. The sources for this study include wide range of documents, newspapers and oral testimonies. The study combines tools and concepts from the fields of family history and network analysis.

The classic theories of democratic representation argue that democratic accountability results from politicians’ success in delivering collective goods such as economic growth, jobs, monetary stability, or overall distributive outcomes and social benefit systems. The findings of this paper on the democratic accountability in Iranian provincial politics challenge this classic view. The interviews with some members of Iranian Parliament, local officials, and local activists show that clientelistic accountability is dominant in the relationship between citizens and the members of Parliament in provincial Iran. The primary mechanism of this clientelistic linkage is the politicized disbursement of private goods such as jobs, low interest rate loan, permit for industrial activities and other tangible goods to the electorate through the local bureaucracy. The secondary way of maintaining this linkage is through the allocation of club goods that provide benefit for the local constituencies and impose costs on the national level such as hard infrastructures. The preliminary result of this analysis indicates that the members of Majles who have been in the office in several terms utilize this secondary method to gain electoral support. The long period of incumbency of these members of Parliament helps them to establish a connection with central bureaucracy which plays a significant role in allocating such goods through the programmatic policymaking. In sum, a coalition between the executive administration particularly the local bureaucracy and the members of Parliament has forged the clientelism in provincial Iran. This fact primarily stems from the process of state building in Iran which was based on the hyper concentration of resources and decision making institutions in Tehran. Thus, by holding relatively free elections after 1979 revolution, the members of Majles in provincial areas serve as a link between the central bureaucracy and resources in the one hand and the local bureaucracy and constituencies on the other hand. The interviews show that clientelism has been exacerbated by the formation of revolutionary welfare organizations which created informal networks influencing the clientelistic behavior in Iranian local politics. Therefore, the process of state formation after revolution also intensified clientelism in Iran. It appears that modernization theory and state- and class-centered perspective have difficulty in explaining the clientelism in Iran. Instead, the theories highlighting the critical role of state formation in interaction with the pattern of social mobilization can provide a better explanation for the presence of clientelism in provincial Iran.