The lack of empirically-tested causal mechanisms is often the central gap in a number of research agendas. This is concerning for the state of the field, since many theories hinge on hypothesized or assumed causal mechanisms, rather than empirically-tested ones. Of course, it is often difficult to empirically test causal mechanisms in order to prove the causal story of a given theory. This is usually the case because the theory works at a certain level of abstraction (i.e. group or state-level) whereas the causal mechanisms posited should be working at the individual level. For that reason, researchers often prioritize the part of the causal story that is most accessible, and forego providing as much evidence for the causal mechanisms at work.
Thankfully, innovations in methodological approaches have provided researchers with new ways to assess both the larger observable implications of theories, while also providing evidence for causal mechanisms. Specifically, the advent of experimental methods into political science has allowed researchers to provide empirical evidence for causal mechanisms at the individual level. This is a particularly important step for our field since, as studies on social science methodology can attest, such individual-level evidence is crucial to proving a causal story exists (Elster 2003). In the field of Middle East studies, such methods have been able to provide invaluable insight in recent years (Bush & Jamal 2015, Corstange & Marinov 2012, etc). This panel seeks to present the next wave of such experimental work.
The papers included on this panel present research on a wide range of countries: Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Turkey. The experiments utilized within these papers also range methodologically from survey experiments to ascertain preferences, to laboratory experiments focused on behavioral outcomes. These papers present crucial research that can inform larger theoretical debates, such as the influence of international factors on domestic-level outcomes, the effect of information on individual preferences, and the role of authoritarianism on social cooperation.
What is the effect of international involvement on state-society relations? Previous work has argued that international involvement can disrupt the “feedback loop” between the regime and society, as political elites become insulated from their domestic audiences. This paper examines whether international involvement does in fact affect state-society relations by focusing on changes in preferences for democracy. To test this theory, this paper uses an original survey experiment in the Palestinian territories, conducted at both the elite and public level. The public level component utilizes a representative sample of 1200 Palestinians, and the elite level component utilizes survey experiments conducted with decision-makers within the Palestinian Authority. Using this comparison, this paper finds that preferences for democracy do in fact diverge when the role of international involvement is highlighted specifically. Such evidence suggests that international involvement causes a principle agent problem within the domestic regime, and thus a divergence in the interests of regime participants and the society they purport to represent.
Under what conditions does conspiratorial rhetoric sway voters? I investigate this question using an original survey with embedded experiments deployed in Turkey shortly following the 2016 attempted coup. The results suggest that exposure to conspiratorial rhetoric that victimizes a politician and blames outsiders significantly increases respondents' levels of trust for the political victim during times of high perceived threat and uncertainty. Specifically, Turkish respondents who are primed with conspiratorial information about the Gulen Movement and the United States are more likely to report that they trust President Erdogan. The treatment is particularly strong among respondents with low political knowledge. The boost in support for Erdogan remains significant when restricted to members of the political opposition, demonstrating that widespread dissemination of out-group conspiracy theories can broaden politicians' support.
Using a survey experiment this paper investigates the impact that US foreign policy’s choice of focus on ISIL or the Esad regime in Syria has on attitudes towards the US, a host of other countries, and domestic policy issues in Lebanon. The paper examines how perceptions of threat and attitudes towards domestic actors affect this relationship. We observe a spill-over from foreign policy concerns to domestic issues in the Lebanese public based on the US policies in Syria. However, this effect is not confined to the US only. We observe a similar relationship for another country in the region, Turkey. The findings seem to support the idea that for countries with cross-border groups and actors, foreign policies of third parties on neighboring countries have a direct influence on public opinion on domestic issues. Moreover, perceptions of threat regarding domestic actors can shape attitudes towards other nations.
What explains polarization in authoritarian regimes? I problematize existing literature on repression in authoritarian regimes and radical actor moderation, and incorporate theories and evidence from behavioral psychology to propose an original explanation for the way in which experiences of repression condition levels of polarization. Specifically, I argue that the extent to which repressive experiences are shared by opposition elite determines whether repression fosters ideological polarization or convergence among these political actors through a collective memory formation mechanism. The empirics of the larger dissertation project are drawn from a paired case study of Egypt and Tunisia, two countries which experienced uprisings that unseated long-standing presidents in 2011 as part of a larger wave of mobilization, popularly referred to as the “Arab Spring.” The new political elite charged with governing the country were drawn from the opposition under the old regime. I argue that the explanation for the difference in polarization on the Islamist-secular axis of competition in these countries in 2011 lies in the patterns of regime repression during the previous authoritarian period, particularly under the regimes immediately preceding the uprisings.
In this paper, I present the design and results of lab experiments conducted among a student pool at Cairo University in Cairo, Egypt during Spring 2016. The experiments utilize dynamic process tracing to demonstrate the collective memory mechanism through which experiences of repression condition group identification, group-related preferences, and cooperative behaviors. In the paper, I discuss the utility of pairing experiments with in-depth qualitative work; the lab experiments supplement comparative historical analyses of real world actors and provide additional causal leverage on the relationship between repression and polarization that is difficult to fully capture with observational data.
