There is a widespread perception in Egypt that marriage is far more costly today than it was in the past. Rationalist accounts would predict that over time, the material prerequisites for family formation will be moderated to accommodate existing economic constraints. Still, marriage expenses have continued to rise in spite of increased wage stagnation and job instability (Singerman & Ibrahim 2003). Using qualitative data gathered in the course of 60 in-depth interviews with engaged youth in two field sites, I investigate the cultural scaffolding that props up the institution of matrimonial transactions in spite of the tremendous financial difficulties they impose. First, I contend that material exchanges of jewelry, cash and furniture all play a role as signifiers of class status during the critical period of courtship. I describe the conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1934) practices that that accompany Egyptian unions. Rings or gifts of gold (shabka) are often circulated and admired by guests during engagement parties, and loud processions accompany the moving of all the goods acquired by the bride from her family's home to the groom's. Since these acts of consumption define the position of the natal and marital households of couples vis-v-vis other households, I posit that matrimonial transactions are an important element of status maintenance and the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status. I also argue that adherence to customs of who purchases what, how, and when marks social boundaries of class and community. Elaborate social rules govern the giving of gifts and other goods, and in my interviews with young people I find that knowledge and enactment of these rules are used as indicators of how good of a match a partner is. Second, I posit that matrimonial gifts and assets, which are themselves highly gendered, play an important role in the construction of gender ideology. It is no accident that young women accumulate household goods such as linens, rugs and small kitchen appliances, whereas young men display their readiness for the assumption of family duties by providing material support (in the form of gifts or small allowances) to their fiancfes. Matrimonial transactions help demonstrate conformity with normative ideals of manhood and womanhood, thus 'performing gender' (West and Zimmerman 1987). In conclusion, I argue that rationalist accounts ignore the symbolic work matrimonial transactions do, symbolic work that is too important for the actors involved to circumvent.

In 1951 Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was the prime minister of Iran, announced the complete nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Almost immediately following this announcement, he went on a journey to the United States to defend Iran's rights over its natural assets, following a British demand that the United Nations prevent Iran from doing so. On his way back to Iran, Mossadegh visited Egypt, a nation which had many similarities to Iran at that time; both were reigned by pro-western monarchies, each had a depressed nationalistic movement, and both had major national assets which were controlled by British interests. The Egyptians viewed the Iranian Prime Minister as a role model. British officials in Egypt and the Egyptian political elite did not share the same point of view, however. Mossadegh's visit to Cairo cemented his position as a regional leader, and at the same time provided Egyptian nationalists a paragon upon which to base their own national government. In July 1952, a few months after the visit, the Free Officers Revolution took place in Egypt, which engendered a new spirit and hope among the Egyptian people. In August 1953, Mossadegh was overthrown in a CIA sponsored coup d'etat, and the Iranian National Project came to a premature end. The new revolutionary regime in Egypt, however, used the Iranian coup to make a stand toward the new Third-World-Consciousness that was just about to embark. Egyptian officials used Mossadegh's tremendous popularity in Egypt to recruit the masses the long fight against British and western imperialism, which would eventually culminate with the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In the recent years Iranian influence on the Arab Middle East was viewed in a negative context. As this paper will show, in the earlier years the Iranian influence was not only taken as much more positive, but Iranian politics was also adopted as a model for the Arab fight against Western imperialism. This paper tries to answer the following questions: How did the Egyptian public react to Mossadegh's visit What were the approaches toward Iran in the Egyptian public sphere What did British decision-makers think about the implications of such a visit How was Mossadegh character was used in the rhetoric of the new Egyptian regime In the paper I analyze Egyptian newspapers coverage, British Foreign Office documents, and memoirs of leaders of the Free Officers regime.

Studies of the British in Egypt during the British occupation (1882-1922) have generally focused on the lives and exploits of law-abiding upper and middle class Britons who served in the military or civil service. Drawing from a variety of primary sources, this paper suggests that Britons from diverse socio-economic circumstances engaged in a wide array of professional misconduct and criminal activity. Data from private papers, government correspondences, business and church archives contends that certain British lawyers, teachers, doctors and hospital workers engaged in occupational misbehavior and negligence. The bulk of the discussion, based primarily on Cairo and Alexandria consular court records, describes the personal/domestic, social, financial and sexual crimes of Britons in Egypt and the mixture of class and professional backgrounds among the perpetrators. Regarding personal and domestic crimes, a railway technician, two engineers and a dentist were penalized for domestic abuse. A sergeant was imprisoned for arranging his child's abortion. A railway worker, a maid, a stewardess, a bank employee, an engineer's wife, and a chemist were all 'guilty' of committing suicide. Concerning social crimes, a foreman carpenter, engineer and journalist committed assault while a Methodist minister and businessmen were accused of libel. A son of a business owner, a foreman, a matron of a hospital, a military officer and his wife, and a fair number of clerks, were culpable of financial crimes. As for sexual crimes, a missionary and a railway worker were guilty of rape while former British military officers and soldiers were at fault for running brothels and procuring prostitutes. The discussion also acknowledges the response of the British authorities and the resentment of many British residents towards prostitution. Throughout the analysis, the prevalence of certain crimes in Britain is mentioned to imply that criminal activity among Britons in Egypt was similar to that of Britain. The paper suggests that alcoholism, unemployment and lack of military discipline were some factors that triggered criminal behavior. It also proposes that crime combined with lenient sentences may have encouraged Egyptian nationalist sentiment and disdain for the British especially in light of the harsh sentences handed out to Egyptian offenders during this time. Since little research has been done regarding British crime and misconduct during the occupation, this effort aims to be a useful contribution to Egyptian history, British imperial history, 'history from below' or the history of non-elites, and the burgeoning field of the social history of crime.