This paper explores the techniques and strategies used by Ottoman authorities to control the Bedouin with a specific focus on the province of Hijaz between 1840 and 1908. Using primary sources from the Ottoman and British archives, it argues that the Ottoman Empire developed a ‘politics of negotiation’ towards the tribes in its attempt to secure cities and major pilgrimage and trade routes against tribal attack. The principal agents of the empire who made this negotiated governance possible were the amir of Mecca and the governor of Hijaz. To the contrary of what Albert Hourani articulated as the 'politics of notables', a differentiation between the 'indigenous' and 'imperial' actors, or between the Arab and non-Arabs, does not help us to understand the nature of this negotiation. Most of the so-called indigenous actors were the agents of the empire to negotiate with the tribes and to maintain the imperial order in the region. In this regard, contrary to what Hourani suggested, conflict between amir and governor, or the contrast between Hijazis and the Ottoman government, did not constitute the foundations of the politics in Hijaz. Rather, amirs and governors were the agents of the Ottoman Empire who aimed at maintaining order in the province through a politics of negotiation with the tribes. Rather than clashing with each other for supremacy, they dealt with the Bedouin, who posed the most serious challenges to imperial order. Using the local notables and its bureaucrats as its agents, the government allocated grain allowances to the tribes and salaried their chiefs in return for their service on behalf of the state in their territories. Imperial authorities used these incentives as effective instruments of negotiation and as weapons for bringing tribes back into line when they disturbed the order. But the latter was in the Bedouins’ benefit, it was the most influential means by which they could coerce the state into carrying out their demands.

The late Albert Hourani remains an influential scholar in Middle Eastern Studies. His thesis concerning ‘The Politics of Notables,’ first presented at the University of Chicago in 1966, stands as one of his most enduring works. ‘The Politics of Notables’ influenced countless scholars, and has come under closer scrutiny in the past two decades. Criticizing his Arab nationalist perspective, and by utilizing new and innovative sources, scholars have argued that Hourani’s original thesis placed far too much emphasis on the role of traditional Arab elites. Though this is the case, the political and social activities of notable members of Syrian society are worthy of further study. Based on research in Ottoman and European archives, this paper reassesses Hourani’s original ideas through an analysis of petitions written by Syrians of various political and social backgrounds from the 1880s through the 1930s. During the late Ottoman period, petitions were often written by professional scribes (arzuhalcis), well-versed in the language Ottoman state discourse. After the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the mandates, nationalists re-purposed the Ottoman tradition of petitioning and sent thousands of telegrams and letters to mandate officials. This paper pays particular attention to the petitions written by Dr. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali, co-founder of the National Bloc, and compares them to petitions about the governance of late Ottoman Aleppo. Through this comparison, it is clear that al-Kayyali, and others like him, became unofficial arzuhalcis of the opposition to French mandatory authority thanks largely to their position within Syrian society. The elevated status of al-Kayyali made him a desirable ally of some nationalists in Aleppo and throughout the rest of Syria. Thus, his political career should inform us more about how elite and non-elite nationalists interacted with each other within the political institutions brought about by the creation of the mandate system. Furthermore, the continued use of petitions as a method of engaging with the state provides yet another example of the legacy of 19th-century Ottoman reform. Non-elite nationalists were by no means pawns in development of nationalism in the Arab world, and their elite counterparts also played important and influential roles. The relationship between these two groups was more complicated, and more fluid, than many acknowledge. Nationalist leaders like al-Kayyali became unofficial scribes of the demands of the Syrian people against the mandate, in what could be considered a more inclusive ‘Politics of Notables.’

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War left the region that eventually became Jordan in shambles. The late nineteenth century centralization efforts of the Ottoman state over the region disintegrated with the Empire. Thereafter, the region quickly reverted to diffuse tribally organized confederations. The British Transjordan Mandate, and the establishment of the Hashemite Emirate, was meant to create a new centralized state emanating from Amman where one had not existed for millennia. This artificially manufactured Emirate survived because it both incorporated local elites into the government to bolster its authority while simultaneously trumpeting the importance of its Sherifian Amir, Abdullah Ibn Hussein. This new state centered in Amman needed to legitimize its authority and develop an institutional infrastructure. The Transjordanian state experienced a number of growing pains before the central authority of the state solidified and before its character had been determined. These internal contestations were fought in the first true political arena of the state, the Legislative Council, the first elected body in Transjordan. In the earliest sessions of the first Legislative Council, founded in 1929, battles were waged for control over language, authority, prominence, and prestige. Most of all, the Council proceedings demonstrated the earliest attempts by the representatives to combat the gravitational pull of the nascent Hashemite state. This paper will demonstrate how the state incorporated formerly autonomous regional elites into the official machinery of Amman and transformed them into Transjordanian elites. The history of the Legislative Council is the story of negotiation between the central government and the elites of Transjordan. The Legislative Council gathered leading elites from throughout Transjordan and made them directly interact with the Anglo-Hashemite state (as represented by the Executive Council and the British Resident). Sectarian differences did not define these men. The levels of power and political intrigue in the Council transcended any one group or region. Although the efforts of the council representatives to safeguard their autonomy and institutional control were eventually defeated, these proceedings marked a clear battle over power and control in the new Hashemite state.