Beyond Sectarianism: New Directions in Iraqi Studies
Panel 048, 2019 Annual Meeting
On Friday, November 15 at 10:15 am
Panel Description
This past decade, an important body of scholarship on Iraq and the Middle East have foregrounded sectarian identities and dynamics, often focusing on the period following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. From the "Shi'a revival" to the rise of ISIS, many scholars have explored the sectarian dimensions structuring of the post-2003 context, as well as the importance of identity politics. This panel argues that there is a need to explore contemporary and recent Iraqi social, economic and political realities beyond communal and identity-based categories such as sect, ethnicity and religion. Similarly, while the context following the invasion and occupation of Iraq is clearly characterized by the institutionalization of communalism -sectarianism, ethnic and religious divisions through the muhasasa system - by the US-led administration and the new Iraqi elite, this panel proposes to take a wider historical perspective.
It is a transdisciplinary panel that aims to explore aspects of Iraqi social, religious, economic and political realities of the recent period from complex, multilayered and wide historical perspectives. The panel particularly examines current military conflicts, the Iraqi state and regime -the muhasasa system and electoral politics-, political, religious and social movements. The first paper examines the effects of de-Baathification commission on Iraq's post 2003 governing trajectory. It argues that the comprehensive purging of Baathists and the institutionalization of the de-Baathification created a legal and structural mechanism for excluding targeted segments of the Iraqi population. The second paper argues that the politics of sect are no longer the chief driver of political instability or of political contestation in Iraq, a product of exceptional circumstances that are unlikely to be recreated. It analyzes the shifts in the muhasasa system, electoral politics, the parameters of populist discourse and the normalization of political Shiism. The third paper explores the participation of Shi'a clerics in parliamentary elections in post-2003 Iraq and analyzes their relationship to the state, political power and religious institutions. The final paper focuses on the context following the Islamic State invasion of 2014 characterized on the one hand by the "militia-zation" of the Iraqi regime and on the other hand by the strengthening of movements of civil society protests. It argues that these polarized social and political phenomena, need to be analyzed in looking at neoliberal economic politics, the political economy of war and militarization and the "toxicity of everyday life".
The context following the Islamic State invasion in Iraq is characterized on the one hand by the “militia-zation” of the Iraqi regime and on the other hand by the strengthening of movements of civil society protests. I argue that these polarized social and political phenomena, need to be analyzed in looking at neoliberal economic politics (privatization, job crisis etc.) the political economy of war and militarization, and the “toxicity of everyday life” - the structural conditions of everyday life and livelihood such as health and sanitary infrastructures and environmental conditions-. Relying on recent ethnographic research among women, youth and civil society organizations and networks in Baghdad, Najaf-Kufa, Karbala and Nasiriya. I explore the social, economic and political dimensions that structure recent movement of protests, revealing a shift from identity politics to “issue politics”. I also look at the political and structural mechanisms that resulted in the violent repression of these new forms of political activisms. While recognizing the importance of identity-based categories (sect, tribe, religion, ethnicity etc.), I argue that it is equally important to analyze them as relational (existing in relation to one another), changing and dynamic. Thus, this paper explores the articulation between different forms of structural violence, senses of belongings, competing political discourses and concrete practices of civil society activisms in today’s Iraq.
Scholarship on post-conflict statebuilding, whether as an outcome of revolution, civil war, or externally-induced regime change, underscores the import of designing parallel peacebuilding institutions to accommodate a country’s democratization pathway. Often conducted under the auspices of international and multilateral organizations, international peacebuilding has been shown to reduce the outbreak of violence and civil wars by fostering cross-communal and locally-tailored conflict resolution strategies aimed at de-escalating and depoliticizing group grievances in multiethnic states undergoing transitions from authoritarian rule. This article examines incongruent statebuilding in Iraq by examining the effects of the de-Baathification commission on Iraq’s post-2003 governing trajectory in the absence of international and multilateral support for post-conflict peacebuilding. I posit that the comprehensive purging of former Ba’athists and the institutionalization of de-Baathification bereft of parallel peacebuilding institutions created a legal and structural mechanism for excluding targeted segments of the Iraqi population, which contributed to the re-ethnification of the governing playing-field and radicalization of Sunni-Arab grievances. By triangulating findings from elite interviews of former rank and file members of the de-Baathification Commission, American military, intelligence, and foreign policy elites as well as data mining of WikiLeaks documents pertaining to de-Baathification, I demonstrate that early warning signs regarding the politicization and potential pitfalls of the Commission were ignored in favor of fulfilling an ideologically-driven neoconservative agenda of a post-Ba’athist Iraq that emphasized statebuilding over peacebuilding. I conclude by exploring the ways in which peacebuilding strategies can be adopted to remedy de-Baathification and its outcomes.
When do clerics participate in formal politics and why? In this paper, I explore the participation of Shi’a clerics in parliamentary elections in post-2003 Iraq. By relying on candidate data from the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and interviews with elite Shi’a clerics, I argue that participation in formal politics entails a trade-off for Shi’a clerics. Clerics derive popular legitimacy from their Hawza connections which can be useful in electoral campaigns. At the same time, their decision to participate weakens their ties to the religious institution and limits their ability to further expand this legitimacy. This has important implications for managing the relationship between religious and state institutions in democratizing contexts. On one hand, it demonstrates that the religious establishment does not fully sanction formal participation in politics through traditional means. At the same time, the interference of clerics informally in politics in addition to their self-described role as the “spiritual fathers of the Iraqi nation” are indicative of a desire to remain above the state.