After the two-decade failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the putative consensus over the two-state solution is breaking down among political leaders and public opinion, as the feasibility of such a solution on the ground declines. Instead, many have begun to examine hybrid approaches between partition into two states, and the emergence of a single democratic state. This paper focuses on one such model – a confederation of two states with decentralized governance that gives Israelis and Palestinians a measure of self-determination within a single territorial space. In the paper, we chart the turn from partition toward confederal models as a framework for resolving the conflict, describing the leading proposals and exploring the politics that have given rise to them. Drawing on experience elsewhere, we conclude by considering the challenges Palestinians and Israelis will face in reaching agreement on and implementing a confederal scheme.

The paper argues that federalism, as proposed in the Yemeni draft constitution of January 2015, should not automatically be seen as an alien concept. If federalism is seen as a new form of decentralization, then, one can identify a kernel of widespread commitment and expectation for forms of decentralization in Yemeni republican life. After a brief overview of earlier attempts in Yemeni republican history to create forms of decentralization, the paper concentrates on the work carried out by the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference (2013-2014), and which proposed the creation of a federal state with more open inclusive political order to soothe decades of internal tensions, north (Huthi) and south (separatist movement). Pros and cons of a federalist Yemen are discussed in relation to public Yemeni debates on the matter and with interviews with stakeholders.

The Moroccan regime faces persistent internal and external challenges: periodic unrest driven by corruption and socioeconomic concerns, low Maghreb regional and global integration hindering economic development, and control over Western Sahara that is entrenched but not normalised or internationally recognised. Against this backdrop, King Mohamed VI launched the ‘advanced regionalisation’ programme in 2010. Building on earlier regional deconcentration measures, it represented Morocco’s first foray into decentralisation to local elected authorities. It became a key component of the constitutional reform process which the King launched in 2011 in response to the country’s 20 February protest movement (M20). Internationally, it signalled that Morocco remained committed to a political resolution in Western Sahara. By formulating autonomy for the ‘Saharan Provinces’ within frameworks of symmetrical autonomy and rural development, it did so without compromising the King’s constitutionally-enshrined status as guarantor of Morocco’s territorial integrity ‘within its authentic borders’, a foundation of the monarchy’s legitimacy. Advanced regionalisation significantly enhanced the democratic legitimacy and governance of regional councils and modestly increased their powers and resources. Nevertheless, it failed to establish meaningful subsidiarity. It increased central government review of the regional councils’ decisions without reducing a priori supervision (tutelle). Consequently, it does not meaningfully address the demands of the M20 and the most recent Rif protest movement, which spring from disaffection with this ruling elite (the makhzen). And by doubling down on Morocco’s unitary post-colonial national identity, advanced regionalisation goes no way toward normalising Moroccan rule over Western Sahara or incorporating Sahrawis into the Moroccan body politic. The literature has approached advanced regionalisation from a governance perspective. This chapter examines it principally through a conflict management lens, with particular focus paid to its implications for the fate of Western Sahara. Seen through this lens, advanced regionalisation underpins a two-pronged strategy by the regime: a hardening external position on Western Sahara coupled with internal efforts to minoritise and folklorise Sahrawi identity. The goal of this strategy is to disassociate the question of Western Sahara from the decolonisation/self-determination paradigm and reframe it as a matter of Sahrawi minority rights and cultural preservation. However, this strategy has the potential to shift the dynamics of the Sahrawi nationalist movement and the struggle for Western Sahara.

One of the few beneficiaries of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the Kurds seemed on a linear path towards independence as the Iraqi state reeled from sectarian civil war, the 2011 Arab uprisings and the emergence of ISIS in 2014 and its dramatic defeat in 2017. Kurdish politicians had long-quipped that Kurdistan would become independent, not through their own agency, but simply because the Iraqi state would collapse first. However, when Masoud Barzani forced an independence referendum on September 25, 2017, the back lash was swift. Within three weeks the Iraqi Army and associated militias had reclaimed disputed areas (and crucial oilfields) under Kurdish control since 2003, closed Kurdish airspace and subsequently renegotiated the Kurdish autonomy bargain on Baghdad’s terms. How did this stunning reversal occur? This chapter argues that Kurdish aspirations for independence or even an enhanced autonomy were challenged on three levels: weak and divided institutions in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), economic mismanagement on a colossal scale, and the withdrawal of trust in Kurdish leaders by the public. A curious paradox of the KRG’s trajectory since 2003 has been its increasing economic dependence on the very forces that could determine its survival, namely; Baghdad, Turkey and Iran.

Despite continued efforts in recent years by numerous Libyan actors, the United Nations, and the international community, national politics in Libya remain paralyzed amid a rivalry for authority that has resulted in persistent instability. Nevertheless, advancements at the local level may offer Libya a way forward out of the current governance crisis. In the absence of capable and unified national institutions, local governance authorities in Libya, primarily municipalities, have sought to develop the capacity to deliver on the needs of Libyan citizens where the national government has failed. Evidence suggests that devolution of authority from the central to the local could help address crucial challenges facing Libyan institutions and the Libyan people—including effective service delivery and accountability. Increased investment in the development of local authorities in Libya through an emphasis on decentralization could contribute significantly to the long-term process of rebuilding the Libyan state. Such a decentralization process would not be synonymous with federalism. To the contrary, it would involve establishing a clear legal framework for local governance that would ultimately be dependent on the existence of a strong, national state. Indeed, a successful decentralization effort relies on the existence of a strong national structure that clearly defines the respective areas of responsibility of national ministries and municipalities. Nevertheless, major impediments, particularly at the national level, including limited political will, weak institutional structures, and the lack of a clear constitutional framework, remain. This paper therefore argues that the stabilization of Libya requires the simultaneous pursuit of bottom-up and top-down state building approaches. The paper begins with an examination of the existing legal framework in Libya regarding decentralization and the current constitutional debate, before assessing the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization based on an analysis of local capacity building efforts in Libya since the 2011 revolution, as well as lessons learned from other recent decentralization initiatives in the Middle East. It also examines the role played by the international community, such as the European Union, in boosting local capacity, and questions the impact of such local efforts amid intense international competition over Libya’s national political landscape. It concludes by arguing that the long-term success of local capacity building efforts is inherently dependent on simultaneous progress at the national level.