In 1006/1597 peace negotiations took place between the rebellious Yemeni Zaydi imam al-Mansur Qasim and an Ottoman official, amir 'Abd al-Rahim. The imam sent a delegation consisting of three groups (ta'ifas): al-sada, al-fuqaha and masha'ikh, i.e. descedants of the Prophet, the scholarly class, and shaykhs of the tribes. This stratification was not new, and the three groups were of equal importance to the Zaydi state and the Ottoman provincial administration in Yemen. However, the episode is one of the earliest in which these groups are distinctly organized, tasked with representing the head of the Zaydi state and recognized as such legitimate representatives by the Ottoman administration. This paper proposes to examine how the interference of the Ottoman empire and its administrative practices affected the social structures of Zaydi Yemen. In particular, it focuses on the appearance of a new social group of educated men involved in administration, a sub-group of the fuqaha' who were first integrated into the Ottoman administration of Yemen and were later incorporated in the Qasimid state. This paper considers what the preexisting conditions for the development of a professional administrative class in Zaydi Yemen prior to the Ottoman conquest were; how the professional class started to develop during the first period of Ottoman rule and what trajectory it took in the early modern period after the ousting of the Ottomans from Yemen. It relies on several types of sources: 1) siras of the Zaydi imams who were contemporaries of the Ottoman period of rule in Yemen; 2) chronicles by 'Isa b. Lutfallah (Rawh al-ruh fi ma jara ba'd al-mi'a al-tasi'a min al-fitan wa-l-futuh) and al-Sharafi (al-La'ali al-mudi'a fi a'immat al-zaydiyya); and 3) Ottoman financial documents from the region (maliye defterleri). Taken together these sources provide an encompassing view of the rise of the professional class Through the study of the integration of Zaydi Yemen into the Ottoman Empire and the rise of a new imamate in the region this paper highlights how the Ottoman empire interacted with the societies and state structures that it encountered, and how Arab state institutions and traditional social groups responded to Ottoman expansion. Through this case I seek to reach broader conclusions about encounters between states of different scale and the long-term effect these encounters have on society and state development.

For over 350 years, the Military Frontier between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires served as the first site of engagement in the long struggle to define and defend the borders of two civilizations. The administrative and military history of this border, which separated two major empires for centuries, has received some attention by historians. The complexity of life on the border between two major imperial military and administrative systems, however, remains under-explored. For example, how did imperial centers, nearly a thousand miles away, generate loyalty on the border? This is especially pertinent, considering that the marcher lords on both sides of the border spoke the same language in which they often communicated and generally subscribed to the same heroic ethos. The intricate balancing of accommodation, adaptation and confrontation that was employed to generate loyalty and cooperation among martial border populations particularly comes to light during times of crisis. One particularly poignant crisis or “quarrel” (?a?va), as it has been described by Ottoman chronicles, illuminates the complex layers of loyalty, self-interest, material and moral interest. In one of the furthest imperial outposts, the citadel of Biha? (Ottoman: Bihke) in northwestern Bosnia, which juts deeply into Habsburg-Croatian territory, the marcher lords came into direct conflict with the imperial governor and his treasurer. The treasurer was accused of withholding their payments and slandering the marcher lords in the imperial capital. This led to a serious of military confrontations and ended in numerous deaths. Some of the slain were figures larger than life already during their lifetimes – cycles of epic songs had been composed about their heroic deeds and survive to this day. Initially resulting in an imperial death sentence against the remaining marcher lords, the sentence was commuted by the sultan, when informed of the heroic status of the accused. This demonstrates a number of issues that are fundamental to our understanding of early modern state formation and can only be discerned if looked at from the perspective of the periphery. Military-political actors on the imperial periphery had developed their own distinct ethos, which could be turned, without reluctance, against the state and its representatives, insofar as those were seen as infringing upon their rights. Their heroic status, in turn, carried such moral weight, that it nearly ensured immunity from imperial punishment.

This research examines the relationship between the state and the border in Ottoman Hungary during the late sixteenth century and the Ottoman army’s ability to operate on the frontier despite the unique challenges posed by the region. This paper examines the ruzname of Mehmed III’s Eger campaign, Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic communications, and the chronicles of Ta’liki-zade and Mustafa Naima. By examining these sources, this paper seeks to build on the data gathered on the borderlands by other Ottomanists and how the empire was able manage its Hungarian provinces. This frontier in the late sixteenth century was dominated by lawlessness and the constant raids by both European and Ottoman subjects. These conditions came about as a result of the devolution of Ottoman state authority to the fortress garrisons and provincial governors, and the wide area of territory. The Long War resulted from a lack of control over border governors when Telli Hasan Pasha invaded Croatia in 1593, but was defeated by European forces. In Hungary proper, peasants often migrated out of Ottoman Hungary or remained and were harassed by their timar holders and the raiders from the Habsburg side of the border. At the same time, the Ottoman fortress garrisons provided employment for Balkan migrants who became soldiers within them and gained weapons and military training. These troops were not as effective as the state troops of the empire, however. These chaotic border conditions, and the larger instability in the empire, did not prevent the Ottoman army from winning at the sieges of Gyor (1594) and Eger (1596). While the timar cavalry system was becoming unsustainable due to the decrease in new land conquests, this did not hinder the army. The Ottomans were able to maintain their tactical edge with concentrated firepower, a functional logistical system, and large numbers of men. Military leaders on the periphery like Hasan Pasha could not muster the men and material the Ottoman state could, and fortress volunteers had a mixed record defending the empire’s defense network. Even though the timariot system was in need of reorganization and reform, this did not prevent the Ottoman army from winning against European opponents. The lack of significant conquests by the end of the Long War was not a sign of decline, but showed that the Ottoman army was able to defend the territorial integrity of the empire.