Scholars of democratic politics continue to refine their theories of how citizens attribute praise and blame for political outcomes (e.g. Hobolt and Tilley 2014, Harding 2015). Yet we know relatively little about how citizens understand accountability in authoritarian regimes, where questions of attribution are no less important. Citizens’ assessments of the possibility and desirability of political change are rooted in their understandings of who is to blame for political, economic, and social failures. Is the regime’s authoritarianism enabling corruption and causing stagnation? Or does the venality of the opposition demonstrate precisely why authoritarian rule is needed? Opposition groups work to establish that the regime is responsible for society’s ills, but they often find themselves blamed for the very failures they attribute to incumbents. Why are some opposition parties better than others at “naming and shaming” authoritarianism? I investigate this question through a comparison of two Moroccan opposition parties, the nationalist Istiqlal and the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Both parties have taken the risk of participating in authoritarian cabinets – thus exposing themselves to charges of hypocrisy – but with starkly different results. The Istiqlal has been losing vote share amidst claims of corruption and co-optation, while the PJD has survived seven years in “power” with its oppositional reputation largely intact. Through a historical and interpretive analysis drawing on party texts, ethnographic observation, and interviews with party members, I argue that this divergence stems from the parties’ differing discursive choices. The high modernist Istiqlal relies on Romantic metaphors of modernization and progress (Scott 2004), justifying its compromises in the present by promising future gains. Because these metaphors depend on imaginary future events for validation, they exacerbate Istiqlal’s credibility problems and undermine attempts to blame the makhzen for Morocco’s troubles. The PJD’s Islamist commitments, by contrast, have insulated it from nationalist and leftist teleologies and supported an ethical approach that treats correct behavior under authoritarianism as a matter of personal virtue. This approach is self-validating: every demonstration of virtuous behavior by a PJD official contributes to the credibility of their overall political claims. By contrasting Istiqlal’s strategic approach with the PJD’s ethical one, I speak to broad questions of attribution and accountability while remaining firmly grounded in the specificities of Moroccan political discourse.

Research has found that tensions, conflicts, and wars worsen the views groups hold towards each other and, plausibly, increase social distance (Parks 1924; Bogardus 1925; Owen et al. 1981; Siber 1997; Parrillo and Donoghue 2005; Oswald 2005; Strabac 2016). Since the twentieth century the Middle East is caught up in interlocking pattern of crises, conflicts, wars, and terrorism. Almost every country in the region have serious problems in social and political stability. The focus of this study is to investigate levels of social distance in conflict areas like Iraq and Lebanon where thousands of people have been killed and displaced because of civil wars and counter-terrorism. I use Arab Democracy Barometer Survey data, Wave II to investigate the determinants of social distance. I am specifically interested to see the relative importance of: practicing religious rituals i.e. praying, fasting, attending Friday prayer/Sunday service; sectarian/denominational identification; and in-group favoritism as determinants of social distance. Findings indicate that Iraqis have higher levels of social distance than the Lebanese. Further, controlling for age, gender, education, and geographical area (urban vs rural) findings indicate that there is no association between practicing religious rituals and social distance. Finally, there is a positive association between the outcome variable and sectarian/denominational identification, as well as, in-group favoritism.