This paper compares and contrasts the strategies used by seven Israeli and Palestinian peace and justice groups working for a “just and lasting peace” during the al-Aqsa intifada. Based on nine months of field work and over 90 formal interviews in 2004-2005 and two weeks of follow up research and 14 formal interviews conducted in July 2008, the paper examines changes that have occurred over time as a result of changing domestic, regional, and international dynamics as well as differences across different types of groups (uninational vs. binational; religious vs. secular; NGO staff vs. voluntary activists). The paper first discusses the limitations of peace theory in addressing the options available to those working to resolve conflicts. It then explores how a mechanism-based approach to peacebuilding allows one to more systematically compare and contrast strategies across different types of activist groups. Using ideal typical mechanisms grounded in the literature on peace and conflict resolution, the paper explores how, why, and to what extent peacebuilding approaches changed between 2004-2005 and 2008. The findings highlight the on-going challenges facing peace groups in Israel/Palestine and their efforts to cope with a worsening socio-economic and political environment for peacemaking. The paper also suggests that those interested in progress towards a negotiated peace agreement at the official level should carefully analyze the social, political, geographic and economic contexts rather than assuming past policy instruments will work in the current environment.

One explanation for the failure of the Oslo Peace Process points to the violent actions of extremists on both sides. In the wake of this violence, popular support for the peace process has waned, along with the willingness of the leaders on either side to push the process forward. But are the extremists alone to blame for Oslo’s death? This paper will argue that it is the peace-makers themselves who also share much of the blame. The paper represents the concluding chapter of a manuscript on the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process, and will bring together the findings in order to draw some lessons for future peace processes. In the manuscript I test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: When there is an asymmetric distribution of power, moderates on the stronger side will take advantage of the asymmetry to promote their side’s interests. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates on the stronger side will attempt to keep their options open and will view the peace process as a test for the weaker side. Hypothesis 2: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will continue to view the peace process as a zero-sum game. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will try to wring maximal concessions from their adversary, while trying to minimize their own concessions, and they will be willing to countenance the breakdown of the negotiations in order to ensure that they get the best possible deal for themselves. Hypothesis 3: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will be unable to fully commit to the peace process. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will vacillate or oscillate between competitive and problem-solving approaches to the peace process; their support for the peace process will be based upon pragmatic considerations, rather than matters of principle; and they will be concerned about how their actions in pursuing peace will be interpreted by other members of society. Hypothesis 4: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will be unable to reconcile with their adversary. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will not change their views of the enemy, themselves, or their national myths or stories. This paper will begin with a discussion of the logic behind these hypotheses, and then discuss whether the Oslo experience supports or refutes them. Then, based upon these findings, the paper will conclude with a series of proposals for future peace processes to avoid the same fate as Oslo.

The struggle between the Israeli and Palestinian nations has persisted for nearly a century and has engulfed them, as well as regional and global communities, in prolonged conflict and turmoil. Too often Israeli and Palestinian communities have sought to redress their grievances, both perceived and real, through violence; ranging from state-sponsored military strikes to non-state assaults on civilians to individual acts of personal violence. Despite the long and widely publicized history of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, there is also an historic and ever growing commitment towards nonviolent resistance as a means of attaining a fair, equitable and negotiated settlement to the conflict. Yet these nonviolent movements have not received the same level of attention and study as violent forms of resistance. Since the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, anthropologists, sociologists, and peace and conflict scholars have increasingly broadened the study of resistance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by examining the social, cultural and economic factors that influence the various forms of resistance activities. Initially, this scholarship often framed the nonviolent resistance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a strictly Palestinian activity; however, later research would expand to include the actions of Israeli and international activists. Yet despite the increased scope of research, there is a tendency in these studies to isolate the nonviolent resistance participants into discrete, compartmentalized units that act independently. As a result, there is a major gap in the knowledge base in terms of understanding the full phenomenon of nonviolent resistance – one that in part has propagated a narrative that resistance is either an exclusively Palestinian activity or one that involves little or no intentional cooperation and coordination across Palestinian, Israeli and international activist groups. Based on anthropological fieldwork conducted between 2004 and 2009, this paper will use social movement theory to challenge the compartmentalized theorization of resistance that posits Palestinian, Israeli and international activists are separate agents of resistance. By introducing the concept of cooperative nonviolent resistance networks into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper will demonstrate how social movements cut across ethnic, religious and national identities and are becoming powerful agents of conflict resolution. Specifically, the paper will address the 1) organization and execution of actions by cooperative nonviolent resistance networks; 2) impact of cooperative nonviolent resistance on the political discourses surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and 3) potential utilization of cooperative nonviolent resistance networks in improving the peace-building capacity in Palestinian, Israeli and international communities.

A survey with representative samples of Jewish and Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel (N=502 and 530 respectively) is used to investigate the relations between collective memory, the sphere in which it is produced, and national identification. In the survey, held in July-August 2008, interviewees were asked in an open-ended way what events and persons they consider most important in the history of the country in the past 100 years. In addition, they were asked to mention the main source of their historical knowledge, and to openly define their identity. The findings indicate significant differences in the sources of historical knowledge of each society. Among Jewish respondents "school," was the most common source, while among the Arab respondents school was ranked only in the fifth place, lagging after television, books, internet, and the family. Most likely, this gap represents lack of trust in the state-sponsored education system among the Arab respondents. These findings do not mean that formal education has been insignificant in shaping historical consciousness. Those Arab respondents who did see school as the most important source of historical knowledge were significantly more likely to mention names of Zionist figures as the most important figures in the country's history, as compared with other respondents. On the other hand, Arab respondents who considered their family as the most important source of historical knowledge were much more likely to mention Arab national figures in answering the same question. The association between references to certain historical events and figures on the one hand, and national identification on the other hand, was especially salient among the Arab-Palestinian respondents. In a multivariate analysis it was found that mentioning myths of victimhood and heroism, as well as mentioning Arab national figures, are significant predictors of identification as Palestinian, even if religion, ethnicity, religiosity, gender, education, and cohort are controlled for. References to the 1948 war and to Yasser Arafat were especially salient in predicting Palestinian identification. These findings suggest that memories might have an autonomous effect on national identification, especially among national minorities. Furthermore, Ernest Renan’s argument that defeats are more important than triumphs for shaping national identification has been validated, as the memory of the Nakba was found to be significantly correlated with Palestinian identification, much more than any myth of activism and heroism.