Over the past few decades there has been a great deal of interest in the academic literature on the relationship between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the state, and the impact of state power on CSOs in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Yet, despite this interest, very few detailed empirical explorations of these issues have been conducted to date. Of the detailed empirical work that does exist, none has focused on state-CSO relations in a democratic context in the MENA. This paper contributes to filling this gap by examining these relations and their implications in the Turkish context. More specifically the paper explores the democratising role of independent women’s organizations in Turkey and the ways in which the state has sought to exert power over and control these organizations. The methodology consists of a series of 38 in-depth interviews with both registered and un-registered women’s organizations from across the seven administrative regions of Turkey. The findings show that while CSOs do challenge the state in some regards, the state is by far the more powerful actor and very effective at moderating and de-radicalising civil society. The state does by controlling the areas in which CSOs can operate and be effective, and through the use of repressive measures. The results show that these measures are having the effect of tempering the demands of CSOs and reducing their capacity to challenge and counterbalance state power.

From late May to July 2013, Istanbul was a constant focal point for global media due to both protests centered on Gezi Park and the state’s severe reaction. During these events and since, analyses have surveyed the broader experience with regard to civil society and social mobilization, struggles over public space and social media, urban politics and neoliberalism, civil liberties and human rights, and the politics of repression and resistance in an ostensibly democratic system, among other themes. Also conveying protesters’ diverse concerns—oftentimes inventively with sundry caricatures, biting satire, and vulgar yet trenchant humor, however, there was a ubiquitous array of graffiti inscribed by activists in concert with ongoing demonstrations. References to the graffiti have appeared oftentimes amid colorful accounts of wider dynamics and settings of the protests, though some studies have focused on these messages and others in terms of humor as a mode and tool of resistance. This paper employs the concept of democratic authoritarianism to analyze the Gezi Park experience and evaluate how graffiti functioned as a contested marker over both public space and collective memory. Though it situates the graffiti as both an act and an account of resistance—with relevant examples, it interrogates specifically state efforts to purge from public view and from subsequent discourse those ideas that politicians identified as disparaging and even seditious. In pursuing their agenda, the republic’s leaders revealed profound continuities between their physical and their discursive tactics to deal with opposition; engaging simultaneously in practices to police, brutally confront, and scatter open assemblies of activists, on the one hand, and to eradicate actual narratives of dissent from public view and subsequent recollection, on the other hand. Seeking to cleanse public space, media, and memories of objectionable ideas during and since 2013, leaders conveyed dubious political and personal distress regarding criminal and treasonous motives, foreign conspirators, and insults to nation, office, and individuals. Through the concept of democratic authoritarianism, this fieldwork-based paper thus scrutinizes dimensions of how this mode of governance is manifest and enacted by focusing on the spatialities of graffiti and its erasure. While much of the graffiti itself was obliterated physically from public view almost immediately amid the protests, its political substance endures today as officials selectively prosecute continued disseminations of it (e.g. in photographs) and reiterations of its content (i.e. through quotations) in Turkey’s national media.

The Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002 with promises of democratizing Turkey. However, over the years, as the party increased its popular support in elections, the democratic regime began backsliding into authoritarianism. In flagrant disregard for the constitution, the government and the President routinely violate rights of any opposition, including those in the media, the Kurds, Alevis, the youth, feminists, even the pious Sunni women who happened to criticize the government or the academics. The situation is reminiscent of the democratic paradox (a la Chantal Mouffe) where electoral majorities that strengthen a government can lead to a restriction of rights and freedoms. Whether we name this turn as a drift toward “competitive authoritarianism”, a process of de-democratization, or the age old “tyranny of the majority”, there is a massive violation of rights by the government and the state that requires an explanation. Even though there is a vast literature on democratic collapse, gradual regime change has attracted less attention. While scholars have named hybrid regimes, there is less on how or why the slide towards hybridity takes shape. In this paper, I shall argue that this gradual decline of democracy in Turkey became possible because the party struck an authoritarian bargain with its constituency: the supporters of the party tolerated violation of rights in return for economic or political stability. People are interested in promoting their interests and the Justice and Development Party responded to their needs. In a context where the opposition is weak and electoral competition is skewed in favor of the incumbents, strong popular support can undermine rather than empower the democratic regime. I use secondary material and present an interpretive analysis of the political developments in Turkey to elaborate my thesis.