The paper uncovers determinants of political participation in Iran’s electoral authoritarianism by studying the role of institutional and socio-economic variables in parliamentary politics of the 2000s. The paper argues that Iran’s electoral system has dichotomized the pattern of participation between center and periphery. The dynamic of participation in the center stems primarily from national shifts in the factional rule and controlled politics by the Guardian Council. However, political participation in provincial peripheries has been motivated by personal connections and particularistic demands of constituents. The personal connection between MPs and citizens mediates the impact of the socio-economic concerns of individuals, cultural elements, ethnicities and kinship ties. This argument draws on statistical analysis of parliamentary turnout in Iran and the study of several Iranian newspapers and official reports. The findings of the paper suggest a new mechanism by which institutional settings may shape the pattern of participation more generally.

This paper seeks to understand via comparative analysis under what conditions mainstream Islamic parties in power embrace democracy. How do Islamists’ commitments to democracy change when the transition from an oppositional to an incumbent role? Under what conditions do they adhere to democratic principles or take an authoritarian turn once in power? The central puzzle of the paper revolves around three prominent Islamic parties that came to power in Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia, and their ultimately divergent trajectories once in power: The AKP in Turkey established hegemony by devolving into an authoritarian party; the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt immediately sought a monopoly of power and was subsequently overthrown by the military; and Ennahda, in Tunisia, contributed to Tunisian democratic transition through compromise, peaceful transfer of power, and recent desertion of political Islam. To put it differently, why has the AKP slid into authoritarianism and ideological rigidity although it was established as a moderate splinter party? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood resisted moderation before and after coming to power? Why has Ennahda followed a different path than the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP to display sustained commitment to democracy, pragmatism, and compromise in its encounters with other political actors? This paper traces Islamist parties’ trajectories from opposition to power with particular attention to their relationship with democracy. The central argument is that an Islamist party’s political trajectory ultimately rests on the balance of power between moderates and hardliners within. Depending on the power distribution among different factions, an Islamic political party might adhere to democratic principles and embrace pluralism, or endorse a majoritarian view of democracy, monopolize power and use its power to exert top-down Islamicization. The paper advances this argument by building on Wickham (2014) and by way of studying ideological evolution, internal power struggles and the ways in which these struggles interact with external factors to chart and explain the course of Islamist parties in Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia. To solve this empirical puzzle this paper draws on extensive fieldwork conducted in Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia, semi-structured interviews with prominent figures in these Islamist parties, and official statements released by these organizations. The paper seeks contribute to the ongoing debates on the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

What explains when citizens in transitions exhibit stable preferences and consistent voting behaviour, and when they do not? Studies of democratization have found higher party system volatility in new democracies, partly due to the learning process of political participation. The underlying premise is that as voters participate in several election rounds, their preferences and party choices stabilize. Yet, not all voters exhibit inconsistency. Our original survey data from Tunisia and Egypt (collected in 2011-2015) find that some voters exhibit consistent political behaviour --- both reflecting vote choices that are consistent with their political beliefs, and preferring similar parties over time--, while others do not. We examine two competing explanations to determine which voters are consistent: first, that those who voted in elections prior to the transition were “taught” democracy, and thus developed stable preferences (cf. Lindberg 2009); and second, that in polarized political contexts, it is those on the extremes who are most politically consistent. Interrogating these hypotheses allows us to contribute to understanding the extent to which ‘democratization by elections’ is possible, and also to identify those voters who defy polarisation and vote across sharp cleavages.

Scholarly research on political participation and service delivery has only implicitly examined the relationship between social ties, clientelism and outcomes. The literature on clientelism highlights how political brokers can use social relations to solve commitment problems and ensure that exchanges of material goods for votes are maintained (Auyero 2000, Szwarcberg (2012), Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). For instance, Susan Stokes’ (2005, 318) interlocutor in Argentina highlights the importance of dense social ties in explaining why vote-buying is prevalent in his area: “Here it’s different than in Cordoba [the nearest big city]. Here they know everyone. And they know whom everyone is going to vote for.” Other scholars emphasize the interplay between social ties, the norms governing social relations, and political behavior, pointing out, for instance, that individuals are more likely to vote for coethnics because they anticipate that those with close social ties are more likely to respond positively to their demands in the future (Chandra 2004; Lust-Okar 2005; Habyamaira et al. 2009). While the assumptions underpinning these theories are that clientelism and social ties are closely linked, there has been little exploration of the relationship between reliance on social ties and political clientelism in obtaining services. This paper explores this relationship, drawing on survey evidence from 6 unique surveys conducted in Egypt, Libya, Jordan and Tunisia between 2011 and 2013. It first examines the relationships between the use of social ties and political networks in accessing goods and services. It then delves into the case of Tunisia, exploring how these relationships are key even in a country in which tribal linkages and ethnic ties are muted. Finally, it considers how the need for both social ties and clientelism creates inequalities based in gender, age, and class. The paper extends our theoretical understanding of clientelism and ethnic politics, provides insights into how these factors vary across quite different societies in the MENA region, and offers a basis for understanding inequalities and social stress in the region today.