This paper examines the ideological and social origins of political parties in the Middle East. The Arab Awakening has provided an environment conducive to new party formations in the region. Starting from the theoretical accounts of party formation in Western Democracies, the paper investigates the principal dimensions of emerging party systems in the Middle East. Political competition is characterized in a two-dimensional space composed of historical legacies and modernization. It is argued that political elite exploit the opportunities created by the Islamic versus secular cleavage and the outcomes of asymmetric modernization (i.e. multiple modernities) to appeal to the larger electorate. The paper explores the role of socio-economic factors and the ideology in party formation within this two-dimensional competition space. While the analysis pays more attention to the recent party formations and the reshuffling of parties after the Arab Revolutions in countries like Tunisia and Egypt, the explanatory insights are also driven from other countries with more institutionalized party systems in the Middle East (e.g. Turkey and Morocco). The paper uses comparative historical method, the analysis of party programs, and the more recent media coverage of parties in the Middle East to unfold the contours of party competition. Cross linkages between party formations and three central notions, -a historical legacy of secular-Islamist cleavage, the demands of shari’a implementation, and the consequences of differential modernization paths- are analyzed to explain the origins of political parties in the Middle East. The study has implications beyond the Middle East and provides insights about the larger question of origins of political parties and party system institutionalization.

Before the winter of 2011, there was little reason for scholars to think that states in the Middle East would become pressured by the greater forces of civil society mobilization. Decades of repression and cooptation seemed to make these regimes highly resistant to civil society mobilization (Bellin 2004, Heydemann 2007, Anderson 1987; O’Donnel, Guillermo and Schmitter 1986). This assumption, that civil society groups in the Middle East were irrevocably undermined and coopted by the authoritarian state (Diani 2008), disappeared with the mobilization of many ‘weak’ civil society groups during the Arab Spring. In Kuwait specifically, this mobilization is especially pertinent to observe in early 2012, considering the increase in nonviolent political action by numerous Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) through collective street actions, unified symbols for democratic reform, and sustained and effective parliamentary lobbying. These series of events has led me to the question: How and under what conditions have ideological frames diffused between SMOs in Kuwait? In the most relevant theoretical literature (Social Movement Theory) to comprehend these increased levels of collective action, scholars disagree over the conditions under which SMOs can be tied to one another. This is largely due to the differing concepts of diffusion, which greatly influence academics’ method to studying ties between civil society groups and how that generates the particular environment for collective action (McAdam 1995, Tarrow 1993, Staffenborg, Meyer and Whittier 1994). The tentative hypothesis of this paper is that increased mobilization efforts in Kuwait relate to new methods of indirect diffusion in general ideological discourse (through new print press and internet sources), that broaden collective action between SMOs. This allows groups to mobilize and unite around similar ideological frames without the more traditional direct diffusion connections emphasized in previous literature on social movements. A comparative case study of nine SMOs involved in contentious politics in Kuwait will test this hypothesis. It will look at three different types of SMOs: 1) government subsidized SMOs 2) human rights NGOs and 3) youth organizations. The study of each organization will have two main parts: 1) An analysis of indirect and direct networks connecting them to other SMOs, interviews with activists, and participant observation and 2) observation of the overarching frames which SMOs use to mobilize support through interviews with activists and a content analysis of their policies as well as press and internet sources. This paper represents an academic contribution by refocusing perceptions of collective action.

Some conflicts unfolding in the Middle East have crossed the revolutionary threshold, while others still remain on its verge. In looking at the diverging results in Jordan and Syria, I assert that the social structure in Jordan allowed for the monarchy to neutralize mobilization and deflect opposition, while the social structure in Syria forced the regime to confront the opposition directly and violently. This direct confrontation eroded the Syrian regime’s legitimacy and fueled the conflict’s escalation. The Jordanian monarchy never faced calls for regime change, and was able to maintain its legitimacy when using force to stymie protests. I further argue that the authoritarian regime in Syria was forced into this position by the Syrian people’s demand for regime change, which was caused by a conjuncture of events related to economic reforms, political division, institutional illegitimacy, and regional political upheaval. The failure of this same conjuncture of events to materialize in Jordan explains why the protest movements in Jordan never reached the revolutionary mode of discourse discussed by Mansoor Moaddel. In this study, I use the typology developed by Matthew Shugart, Moaddel’s concept of episodic discourse, and organizational theory to provide an analysis of the differing political conditions in Jordan and Syria. This paper’s findings elucidate the Syrian uprising as well as the recent wave of mass protest movements and revolutions globally. It also addresses the question of why some protest movements become revolutionary. Using Shugart’s typology allows for these countries to be placed in a global context so that their popular movements can be compared to appropriate movements in countries from outside the Middle East. I analyze the effects of social networks on the movements’ progressions employing Moaddel’s concept of Episodic Discourse in combination with organizational theory. Finally, I assess the attempts by both regimes and opposition movements to protect and gain legitimacy through controlling the discourse around reform and stability. The cases of Jordan and Syria offer insight into the long-standing debate over what circumstances convert general discontent into turbulent revolutions. This paper employs three contrasting but complimentary models to explore this topic in the hopes that the findings will shed light on studies of revolutions and popular movements around the globe.