Tripoli, the capital of North-Lebanon, serves as a key political battlefield for any Sunni Lebanese leader ambitioning a national destiny. This acute political competition is set in a landscape of socioeconomic marginalization of the former main port of Bilad al-Shams. In this socially depressed context since the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), clientelist informal institutions ensure the sustainability of their electorate by purveying welfare access (wasta) to their supporters. However, the settlement of thousands of Syrian refugees since 2011 increases the pressure on the sources of material dominance of Lebanese patrons. I will argue that the 2016 municipal electoral shock, where independents won the Municipal elections, was the political expression of a mechanism of social exclusion affecting a share of the Tripolitan lower Middle class who lost the patronage from Oligarchic leadership. This research paper is based on more than 24 elite-interviews and a locally generated survey on Lebanese and Syrian households collected over several months of fieldwork from summer 2018 to spring 2019. This article demonstrates that Oligarchs destabilised by the Syrian migratory pressure (most notably Saad Hariri) implement an exclusionary mechanism at the expense of the least valuable (social capital) of their protégés to ensure the sustainability of their leadership. Socially excluded individuals compete to secure patronage thus creating enough political space for the emergence of new independent leaders. The victory of Ashraf Rifi’s list of outsiders and civil society members in 2016 represents a unique win against the oligarchic leaders, at the latter’s own surprise. Nonetheless, I will demonstrate how the traditional bloc of oligarchic and traditional leaders successfully annihilated the independents’ municipal governance thanks to cartel alliances. The 2018 legislative elections confirms the temporary takeover of traditional sectarian politics… until the Tripolitan’s street expression of anger and discontent in October 2019. Finally, this article contributes to our understanding of the political consequences of the disruption of social order in municipalities subjected to unsustainable migratory pressures for their informal institutions of governance.

Understanding Lebanese Politics through its Constitutional Court Contemporary political studies of Lebanon tend to overlook formal state institutions under the assumption Lebanon constitutes a “weak state”. It is true that institutional logics do not say much of Lebanese politics. Yet, institutions are also coveted and contended by political elites from all trends. Therefore, despite their lack of autonomy, institutions appear as privileged spaces to observe how the constitutive logics of power in Lebanon concretely unfold. This paper will delve into this by analysing the activities of the Constitutional Council, Lebanon’s constitutional court. It will be done through an analysis of its relationships with political elites through judges nomination and procedures for referral of cases but also of its decisions within their socio-political context. The paper will also be strengthened by interviews with both political elites and Constitutional Council’s member. These sources reveal how the institution is absorbed by the consensual, sectarian and clientelistic logics shaping Lebanon’s political system. Within it, the Council does not exert a gravitational pull, in the sense that it does not impact the outcome of major political and constitutional controversies, as it eclipses when summoned to do so. This weak "agency" in political decision-making should not however overshadow that the Council probably exerts a more diffuse and objective force on the reproduction of Lebanon’s political system. By its simple existence, its formal powers and its ordinary functioning, the Constitutional Council testifies to the existence of the Lebanese Constitution and participates in the production of a discourse attesting of its implementation. In this, the Council contributes to the enterprise of legal-rational legitimization of the Lebanese state from which political elites articulate their power. This activity is performed by skilful judges who are concerned to some extent with the legal quality and consistency of their decisions. This will lead in conclusion to question the notion of rule of law and the conditions upon which it can be used to understand and analyse countries whose political system do not fit occidental democratic conceptions.

The formation and resilience of the Lebanese popular movement (LPM) has yet to be researched by scholars. This research therefore seeks to analyze the sudden rise of the 2019 LPM by mapping its mobilizers, its political and non-political goals and the limitations precluding the achievement of its goals. Social movement theorists pay little attention to the activists and followers that make up a movement. These movements are primarily formed through civic engagement- the voluntary association of individuals and NGOs. The actors’ attempt to mobilize people relies on integrating a comprehensive framework of identities, grievances and emotions. This was evident in Lebanon onSeptember 17, 2019. For the first time in the history of the country, thousands of protestors from across different sects religions and socio-economic backgrounds united together and chimed for political change and socio-economic reform. The protestors insisted on their demands by chanting “revolution” and the “fall of the regime”. They also recited several slogans, most famously was “all of them means all of them”- a reference to the sectarian political elites who ruled the country for decades. Public anger has been accumulating for years against the state’s failure in attending to the needs of its citizens, as was apparent in the weak economy, crumbling infrastructure, lack of services, and high unemployment and corruption rates. The theoretical underpinnings of this research explore the possibility of the success and failure of the movement. I use social mobilization theory (SMT) as a theoretical framework which allows the incorporation of the complexities of the Lebanese case and utilizes an instrumental approach in understanding networks of mobilization within the “political opportunity” structures. Revolutionary movements, as argued by Jeff Goodwin and Rene Rojas, are rarely successful in overthrowing the political regime, due to an inherent need of weakening the elite divisions in power. In Lebanon, history has proven that the deeply rooted sectarian confessional system appears very strong and resistant to change.The success of the Lebanese revolution would necessitate a weakening of the state’s political “infrastructural power” and the breakdown of the sectarian and clientelist structures. Methodologically, this research will assess the motives behind the participants and organizers and will conjure a model to facilitate the successful long-term involvement of the participants in the movement. This research further concludes that the success of the LPM hinges on its resilience and the strengthening of the networks of mobilization within the political opportunity structure.

This paper will be a comparative analysis of two contemporary models of institution building in the Muslim world; one from an apolitical context oriented towards development and another in a politically loaded context yet again oriented towards development. These are the Aga Khan Development Network, a global development organisation affiliated with the Ismaili Imamat; and the Musa al-Sadr Foundation in Lebanon, which has operated before and after disappearance of Musa al-Sadr. The focus will be on the humanist aspects of both institutions and exploring their intersections while noting their differences. Even though both institutions have been led by a figure of authority from a Shi?i context, there are fundamental differences between the AKDN and Musa al-Sadr’s foundation that practically turned into what it is today after the disappearance of its charismatic leader. It is not clear in which direction the Musa al-Sadr Foundation would turn if al-Sadr himself was still present; but the current formation of the institution is clearly a continuation and unfolding of the humanist vision of al-Sadr himself. This area is one in common with the AKDN and the vision of the contemporary Ismaili Imamat which is now representing a transnational global community. This paper will look into the transnational versus the local aspect of these institutions and the implications they have on the future of these communities. Also central to this comparison is the type of leadership found in these two examples. While Musa al-Sadr was a highly charismatic figure, the Ismaili Imamate today represents more than anything else a legal-rational-bureaucratic element in institution building and at the same time, elements of tradition and charisma are also alive in the Ismaili community. Comparing these two models will provide us with some insights into success stories of improving the quality of life of the target communities without falling into narrow and reductionist interpretations of faith