This paper examines the evolution of security as discourse in framing the issues which become securitized in the Arab oil monarchies of the Gulf. Taking the theme of ‘regime security’ as its central starting point, it questions how ruling elites construct and respond to local and regional security agendas. The paper adopts a constructivist approach to security and illustrates the importance of agency in creating and sustaining security policies in the six member-states of the Gulf Co-operation Council [GCC]. One of the primary aims of the paper is to examine how these regimes distinguish between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of the security agenda and also how these relate to each other. By shedding light on the myriad factors which inform regimes’ perceptions of their internal security matrix, it aims to enhance our understanding of their policies towards external threats and challenges to regional security. This is crucial to proper analysis of regional policy formulation towards the unfolding post-occupation dynamics in Iraq, continuing tensions between Iran and the international community, and the threat posed by radicalism and trans-national terrorism. These external issues cannot be separated from the threats they are seen to pose to internal security by policy elites cognisant of the multiple supra- and sub-state linkages and ideational cross-currents at play in the region. This is most evident in the social construction of the ‘Shiite crescent’ theory which provides a powerful filter through which much regional security policy is filtered. The second core theme of the paper argues that, just as local discourses on security are dominated by the issues listed above, policy-makers give insufficient attention or weight to a range of evolving and longer-term challenges to local and regional security. These include demographic changes and the challenge of integrating large numbers of young people into stratified labour markets, resource depletion in several of the states which will require a reformulation of the social contract and redistributive mechanisms which regulate state-society relations in renter systems, progressive state failure in Yemen which is allowing extremist organisations a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and links Gulf security to the volatile Horn of Africa sub-regional complex, and the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation with the attendant risk of sharpening existing fault-lines and access to scarce resources within the region.

The ongoing rivalry between Hamas and Fatah culminated in Hamas’ the seizure of power in Gaza (June 2007). One bone of contention was who would control Palestinian security services. If Fatah continued to dominate the police and intelligence forces, it could curb domestic opponents and restrain unauthorized violence against Israel. These goals were anathema to Hamas, especially after the party won legislative elections (January 2006). Hamas formed its own Executive Force, which orchestrated the seizure of power in Gaza. This paper addresses two questions. First, how can security sector reform be advanced in Palestine, so that police and other personnel are dedicated to advancing the human security of citizens instead of settling scores between rival elites? Second, how can the United States and other members of the international community advance a human security agenda? The Bush Administration sponsored the training of Palestinian police with a counterinsurgency mission targeted against Hamas and a political objective of strengthening Fatah. What vision should guide the Obama Administration in promoting diplomacy and Palestinian security? For the United States, Israel’s security requirements have traditionally taken precedence over those of the Palestinians, as apparent in the Oslo Accords and subsequent diplomatic initiatives. American and Israeli insistence that the police target those launching operations against Israel undermined public confidence public in the legitimacy of Palestinian security forces. In the future, a broader framework of governance will be needed so that followers of competing political factions can gain confidence in the accountability of security personnel to the rule of law. Egyptian and other regional intermediaries have sought to promote national unity governments and ceasefire arrangements to calm repeated cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence. But the US and other international actors can stimulate diplomatic momentum and design transitional security mechanisms to safeguard border crossings and facilitate Israeli territorial withdrawals. This paper draws upon the author’s ongoing research for a book on Palestinian security. Close scrutiny of Palestinian, American and Israeli scholarly, policy-oriented, and media sources is supplemented by interviews with several dozen academic and diplomatic personalities. The analytical framework is enriched by lessons learned from American experiences in training Iraqi and Afghan armies and police in recent years. The inadequacy of American planning for comprehensive security sector reform in Iraq and Afghanistan has generated a considerable literature, yielding cautionary guidelines that may improve the chances for fledgling Palestinian security forces to promote human security for their citizens.

In July 2006, Hizbullah, the Lebanese political-military group, managed to do what few such groups, including PLO, never accomplished – deny Israel a medium-term military and political objective. Hamas has recently attempted to do the same in Gaza, arguably with some success. What accounts for the variation in effectiveness between these organizations? This paper explores this question by examining how the strategies organizations such as Hamas, Hizbullah, and the PLO employ for acquiring resources. I argue that resources themselves ultimately prove less significant than the means by which they were acquired. The proposed paper, an initial summary of the findings of my dissertation field research, will be based on interviews conducted in the Middle East, as well as existing public opinion data and statistical analysis using the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset. The literature on asymmetric warfare reflects a consensus that there are a variety of resources, material and non-material, that hybrid military-political organizations require for effective operations. These resources are for the most part acquired from local civilian populations and/or foreign sponsor states. In either case, there are three main strategies which non-state actors can use to convince civilians and/or foreign sponsors to furnish them with the resources they require: coercion, service-provision, and marketing. However, not all of these strategies provide the same quality or quantity of resources. Those who use coercion (violence against civilians, or compelling an unwilling state to provide safe haven) are likely to receive only material support, and will likely be unable to employ strategies for acquiring non-material support later on. Those who use service provision (that is, the provision of social services to civilians or the offer to act as a military proxy for a sponsor state) may find that they receive primarily non-material support from civilians, and that this support is not particularly durable. The most effective strategy is the use of marketing (the use of ideological or ethno-communal appeals to convince civilians or another host state to offer aid) which is most likely to generate a mix of material and non-material resources, and lead to the greatest degree of effectiveness for the militia in question. I argue that this is the best explanation for Hizbullah’s and relatively greater effectiveness and Hamas’ moderate effectiveness as compared with the difficulties experienced by the PLO in Lebanon and Jordan.