This paper offers the first systematic study of civilian victimization in the fight between the Turkish state and the Kurdish insurgency (the PKK), one of the longest lasting ethnic conflicts in the post WWII period. After a period of negotiations resulting in decline in violence with 2013, the conflict was rekindled with greater intensity in the summer of 2015. What are the temporal and spatial dynamics of civilian victimization in this conflict? Which parties target civilians more frequently? After answering these questions, the paper adopts a more theoretical approach and addresses the patterns explaining civilian victimization. How do political events such as electoral competition affect the motives of warring parties engage in more indiscriminate violence? How does the Syrian civil war characterized by very high levels of civilian deaths affect the pattern of conflict in Turkey? The paper is based on a unique dataset about violent events related to the Kurdish insurgency since January 1, 2000 until the end of 2016. The Kurdish Insurgency Violent Events (KIVE) dataset covers all events with fatalities, identify the different types of fatalities (security forces, insurgents, and civilians), records the exact day, location (province-district-neighborhood/village), number and type of fatalities, the type (i.e., firefight, bomb attack, etc.) and nature of (i.e., initiated by insurgents) violence. The dataset utilizes information from a plurality of sources with different biases, including the Turkish state and insurgents, Turkish media, pro-PKK media, and human rights associations in both Turkish and Kurdish. While this strategy of triangulation does not eliminate political biases in reporting and the fog of war contributes to significant levels of uncertainty, the KIVE offers very detailed and precise information making it possible to identify the long-term evolution of the armed conflict in Turkey. The dataset shows a significant increase in civilian casualties in 2015 and 2016 with the coming to violence to urban cities. More than 45 percent of all civilians who were killed between 2000 and 2016 lost their lives in these two years. The initial analysis also suggests that the targeting of civilians is closely linked to political balance of power as measured by the levels of electoral competition. Politically more competitive areas (i.e., districts) are less likely to witness high levels of civilian victimization. Furthermore, the Syrian civil war had spillover effects over the conflict in Turkey. The Kurdish question in Turkey is now very much intermingled with the Kurdish question in Syria.

This study investigates why some individuals pledge political support to ethnic rebel groups while others do not. This question especially becomes important in the light of resurrected civil war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Turkish government. Urban fighting across many Kurdish dominated cities in last summer and the reactions to this fight displayed deep divide across Kurdish communities. To what extent Kurds view the PKK as their freedom fighters and support its causes. And to what extent they use similar language with the state toward it. And more importantly, what factors are crucial in increasing support for the PKK. This study utilizes three original public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey in 2011, 2013 and 2015. The surveys are unique, covering the periods before, during and after the ceasefire and failed peace negotiations between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. We focus on and test two dimensions of the grievances Kurds hold: perceptions of political discrimination and socioeconomic inequality. We also offer hypotheses on two overlooked factors in the civil war literature: ideology and religious commitment. The findings suggest that perception of political and economic grievances alike drive people to support the PKK, but the impact of socioeconomic inequality is higher. We also find that contrary to the expectations dominant in the literature, religiosity does not hinder – and may even increase – support for the PKK among Kurds.

How would a job ad for the recruitment of rebels in a civil war read? Expectations in rebel recruitment cluster around two preferences: first, individual capacities in combat are important for the establishment of a new rebel group. Combat training and experience contributes to the group’s immediate fighting capacities in addition to the training of rebels without prior combat experience. Second, strong ideological compliance with the rebels’ cause turns into a decisive asset in asymmetric warfare—that is, for the rebels’ protracted fight against a government that typically relies on superior fighting capacities. In short, warriors are needed to establish a rebel group, while believers are required for sustained rebel action. The paper’s main argument is that these two preferences create a dilemma in rebel recruitment with respect to deserters from the government army: army deserters are particularly valuable warriors for their proven combat capacities, but they are lousy believers indicated in their very insubordination as a necessary prerequisite for switching sides. The paper establishes a novel theory on rebel recruitment drawing on the body of literature on military cohesion, side-switching, and defection in civil war. The Syrian civil war serves as an empirical plausibility probe to substantiate the paper’s broader claims. Systematic interviews with former Syrian military personnel in the refugee communities of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, generate empirical evidence. Deserters from the Syrian army have been crucial in the establishment of the Free Syrian Army, which emerged as the most capable rebel group in the conflict’s early stage (late 2011 to mid-2012). Yet, such former members of the regular Syrian army have expressed criticism in the rebels’ lack of professionalism and ideological direction, resulting in their compromised loyalty to the rebel group.