Algeria since 1962: nationalist politics and the nation-state in question The form of politics which, by 1962, had established its practical monopoly of representation of the Algerian national idea proved able initially to promote two central aspects of the nationalist agenda – the recovery of sovereignty in relation to the exterior in general and the former colonial power in particular and the development of national society through the vigorous promotion of an ambitious strategy of economic and especially industrial development. The abandonment of this strategy from 1980 onwards was accompanied by a corresponding abandonment of the nation-building agenda in favour of a divide-and-rule strategy which sought to guarantee the power of the governing politico-military élite by playing off sections of the nation against one another. This tendency, apparent by the early 1980s, reached its logical extreme in the protracted violence in the 1990s and the simultaneous emergence within elite circles of the self-serving concept of “the revolutionary family” in shocking contrast to the FLN’s original rhetoric of “by the People and for the People”. Among the political premises of this evolution have been the element of “substitutionism” in the outlook of the original FLN and the militarist mind-set which has sought to emulate the French “Jacobin” strategy of nation-building at the expense of Algerian nationalism’s original preoccupation with the enfranchisement of the Algerian people.

The relationship between state and society in Algeria has evolved over the past fifty years, moving from seeming symbiosis during the revolutionary 1960s and 1970s, to rupture in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2011, both state and society, perhaps exhausted from the turmoil of the last thirty years, are extraordinarily weak. Society cannot efficiently articulate demands, whereas the state finds it increasingly difficult to implement its own policy on the ground. Indeed, despite close to fifty years of state and society building, contemporary Algeria might be best characterized as having a weak society, a weak state, and a resistant regime. This paper seeks to understand the evolving nature of state-society relations in Algeria. Doing so, it revisits focuses on the heyday of Algerian popular democracy in the 1960s and 1970, the disjuncture of the 1980s and 1990s, and seeks to assess the perspectives for liberal change in light of recent events in Tunisia and Egypt.

Conflict and coopération distinguishes the post-colonial history of Algeria and France. Besides providing a process by which Algeria attained its independence (July 1962), the Evian Accords (March 1962) preserved an important French social, economic, and cultural post-colonial presence. France’s aid policies, collectively known as coopération, offered significant financial and educational assistance programs. The mission civilisatrice was converted into a post-colonial rayonnement, “radiating” and publicizing France’s cosmetic shift from colonialist to cooperator. Nevertheless, from 1962 to 1971, Algeria pursued a concurrent policy of “post-colonial decolonization,” marked especially by nationalizations, such as that of French oil hydrocarbons concessions in the Sahara. After a period of readjustment, relations were re-launched (the relancement) projecting a new pragmatism and highlighted by the presidential visit of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1975. Nevertheless, chronic emigrant/immigrant worker problems and commercial imbalances, compounded by the Spanish/Western Sahara crisis and conflict, caused a precipitous decline in bilateral relations dashing Algeria’s hope for significant French investment in its ambitious state-building. François Mitterrand’s redressement, marked by “co-development” projects and accords, temporarily briefly lifted relations to a privileged level in the early 1980s. The October 1988 riots, the emergence of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), and the overthrow of the Algerian government in January 1992 after the first round of parliamentary elections marked a new period in the relationship. While France publicly condemned the coup, it also supported the Algerian government. French citizens were targeted by the escalating civil strife in Algeria, including religious. Furthermore, violence also occurred in France. On the one hand, the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the presidency, a longtime foreign minister, seemed to promise a period of promising relations—mutual trust and understanding. On the other hand, new problems beset the relationship on moral and epistemological levels (to be emphasized by the paper). Algeria has repeatedly requested an official French apology for its colonialism. Historicism and memory have also become contentious issues regarding the interpretation of such infamous events as the Sétif Riots (May 1945), the October 1961 emigrant worker suppression, and the murder of French monks (discovered in May 1996). Despite occasional bilateral “psycho-dramas,” there remains a constant tangible and intangible need for the other, which is understood bilaterally. The post-colonial identities of Algeria and France are closely and paradoxically linked and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

US-Algerian relations have developed substantially, especially since 9/11. Few could have imagined that such close cooperative relations would be established. Their cooperation in the military-security domain has been outstanding; Algeria today partakes in a variety of joint exercises and is an integral part of the security arrangement the United States built in the Maghreb-Sahel. Trade, especially in the hydrocarbons sector, has also grown exponentially. However, despite the new ties and full similarity of views on security issues, the two countries have divergent views about the Middle East conflict, the definition of terrorism, and the conflict in Western Sahara. Furthermore, Algeria remains opposed to the establishment of AFRICOM in the continent. Due to the foundations that underlie its foreign policy, Algeria is reluctant to become a close ally of Washington, at least not under the latter’s terms. This paper provides an analysis of US-Algerian relations from Algeria’s pre-independence to the present; the objective of analyzing US policy toward colonial Algeria helps understand the perceptions that Algerians developed regarding the United States and other powers, perceptions which evolved into determining factors in shaping Algeria’s foreign policy since its independence in 1962. The working thesis in this paper is that despite current strong US-Algerian ties, the suspicions born in the pre-independence years, coupled with the policy clashes with the United States due to the radical foreign policy Algeria pursued until the early 1980s, have prevented the development of a close alliance. The paper will also test the hypothesis that the United States today would like for Algeria to play a proxy role in the volatile Sahara-Sahel region and will also seek to answer the question whether and under which conditions Algeria is willing to assume such role. The paper will be based on official documents and interviews with US and Algerian officials. It will also draw from the theoretical works of Bahgat Korany on the foreign policies of Third World states, as well as those of Alexander George and others on foreign policy and diplomacy.

This paper has a primary focus on Algeria’s foreign policy in North Africa, mainly toward Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, and a secondary focus on newly developing security relations with countries in the Sahel region. In the Maghreb, Algeria’s relations have generally been cordial but distant with Tunisia and Libya but antagonistic, competitive and suspicion-laden with Morocco. Algeria had the potential to play a pivotal role in a region in need of leadership and coordination in the face of a series of challenges, including underdevelopment, violent Islamist radicalism, unbalanced relations with the European Union, and globalization. However, it did not live up to it. This paper will tackle several questions on Algeria’s policy in the region, including: 1) why didn’t Algeria take on a leadership role in spite of its economic and military capacities? 2) What role has Algeria’s diplomacy had in the stalemated implementation of the Arab Maghreb Union; 3) Have the guiding principles and content of Algeria’s regional policy remained constant, evolved or changed in response to domestic, regional and international events, shifts and shocks? 4) What role have specific members of the governing elite—both military and civilian—played in the formulation of Algeria’s policy and with what consequences? To answer these questions, the paper will cover three key periods, each characterized by some behavioral shift but no change in the fundamentals and guiding principles of the policy: 1) the 1965-1978 period, which was dominated by President Houari Boumediene; 2) the 1978-1999 period of President Chadli Bendjedid and some ephemeral leaders (Boudiaf, Kafi and Zeroual); and 3) the 1999 to date period, which covers the presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The paper will argue that Algeria’s regional foreign policy was driven mainly by geostrategic, political and symbolic concerns, that its conception and formulation involved both civilian and military elite, each controlling one or more agenda items, and that such policy was affected more by intra-elite dynamics, domestic events, regional developments, than by extra-regional factors such as the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attack on the United States, and global economic downturns. The conceptual tools of analysis will be drawn from the literature on the study of foreign policy making, regional state power dynamics, and political realism.