This paper deals with the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, focusing particularly on the contemporary Netanyahu government (established after the last elections for the Knesset: January 22, 2012). The paper begins by analyzing the favorable conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough in the negotiations: an exceptionally energetic and committed American Secretary of State (Jerry Kerry), an equally committed Israeli negotiator (Tzipi Livni), a formal acceptance of the two-state solution by the leader of the Center Right (B. Netanyahu), the weakening of the Palestinian radicals (Hamas), etc. Then the paper takes note of the unfavorable conditions for a breakthrough: a sharp power inequality between the parties, negative perception among Israelis of the consequences of withdrawals from Lebanon & especially Gaza, the strength of the rejectionist camp both inside Likud and in the Israeli Right in general, the traditional ideological position of the Prime Minister, etc. Given this balance, the paper evaluate the chances of finding a solution—permanent or temporary—that the parties could agree to, analyzing in details the parameters of such a deal (borders, demographics, security, Jerusalem). Most specifically, the paper compares the positions of Prime Minister Netanyahu in his third term in office (1996-99, 2009-2013, 2013-14), assessing patterns of continuity versus patterns of change.

The conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979 constituted a landmark in the balance of power both regionally and internationally. Ever-since its conclusion, the budding relations between the former foes have gone through many difficulties and faced concrete challenges. The downfall of the three-decade Mubarak regime posed a question mark concerning its future. Nevertheless, The Peace Agreement between the two countries has proven to be solid and stable. Surprisingly, even the short-lived Muslim Brothers period in power did not lead to a considerable change. The question arises is why? What were the reasons and factors that prevented dramatic changes in the Israeli-Egyptian complex equation? In answering this question, I will argue that this peace treaty would not have reached its present shape had the USA not constituted an integral part of it. The US involvement in and commitment to the maintenance of the treaty was most significant. Egypt and Israel have become the two main beneficiaries of US foreign aid (the two countries received together about 50 percent of the aid). The agreement also ensured a symbolic American presence in Sinai, in place to this day, which apparently neither side would agree to waive. The recent inter-power maneuvering game played by Egypt׳s present military regime intended to put pressure on the US government to moderate its criticism of the regression in Egypt's pace towards democracy following the July 2013 coup. The flirt with Russia's Putin is tactical and may fit in with the early phases of the Cold War in the Middle East when Egypt's respective governments, before and after the 1952 revolution, embraced the doctrine of what I defined as Calculative/Pragmatic Nationalist Neutralism. In short, this paradigm may be defined as the utilization and manipulation of the emerging inter-bloc conflict in order to advance their national goals and aspirations. In my paper, I will focus on the present state of affairs in Egyptian-American relations, and my analysis of its possible evolution is to be based on the special characters of this relationship taking into account the US commitment to Israel's security and the preservation and continuity of the peace treaty.

The "Arab Spring" which was followed by a short Islamic Winter has come to a temporary halt. In Egypt the army's return to politics and brought this country back to the point of departure, to the good old days of Husni Mubarak with one significant difference – Husni Mubrak the man, was replaced by General Sisi, as the kingmaker of the Egyptian politics. The Egyptian counter revolution of 30 June came as good news to Israel, which was able to maintain intimate military and security cooperation with the Egyptian military establishment against radical Islam in the Sinai peninsula as well as against Hamas government in Gaza. As for the northern front, Israel fall in love with the idea that Bashar al-Asad might survive the Syrian revolution after all, strong enough to keep the border between the two countries quiet and secure, but as the same time too week to pose any challenge to Israel. Israel also followed with interest the sinking of Hizballah into the bloody Syrian quagmire as well as the increased pressure on the organization inside Lebanon. It seems as the best Israel could ask for the year 2014 was that it would be as good for Israel as 2013 was.

The nuclear agreement signed with Iran on November 24, 2013, drew criticism from both Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia. The press speculated that Saudi Arabia and Israel - the most important US allies in the regions and the countries most felt most jilted by Washington - would increase their cooperation. But given its history and concern for the legitimacy of its rule, particularly after the Arab uprisings, the Saudi royal family is more likely to draw closer to Iran than Israel. When it comes to Israel, the Saudis will continue to balance their national security considerations with their internal and regional legitimacy concerns. The political cost of improving relations with Israel is much higher than improving relations with Iran. Even though the Saudi Wahhabis have no love for Iranian Shiites, the latter are at least Muslims. A bit of bandwagoning with Iran will therefore most likely be the order of the day. In any case, the Kingdom knows that the US, for its own reasons, will have the Saudis’ back.

Iran and Israel are two countries at loggerheads. Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s explicit statements threatening the very existence of the state of Israel and speculations on a possible Israeli attack on Iran have headlined the news on a regular basis. When evaluating Iran and Israel, one should keep in mind some general remarks with regards to the nature of their relations. The two have no direct territorial conflicts and have never engaged in war against one another. Besides the ideological legitimacy that Israel provides Iran, the conflict is essentially a strategic one. Although employing Islamist arguments and giving support to Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, who have given new meaning to the Arab-Israeli conflict by defining it as a religious crusade rather than a national conflict, Iran’s actions have been strategic. Iran has thereby been able to directly involve itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict on several fronts while positioning itself as a powerful contender for leadership in the Middle East arena. The new president-elect Hasan Rohani offers a more moderate perspective on Iran's foreign policy. It seems that Rohani, who is fully committed to his voters and would like to deliver on the economic and social fronts, will have to modify Iran’s approach to its nuclear project in order to ease the sanctions on Iran. However, this poses Israel with a new challenge. Yet Rohani concurs with hardliner Ahmedinejad’s view that Iran has the right to a nuclear program; as such, even if he adopts a more moderate foreign policy, he will continue to strive for a nuclear Iran. Israel must get ready for such a challenge, particularly if and when the U.S. puts Iran under Rohani to the test. The U.S. is likely to offer Iran a grand bargain on all the regional security issues. It is reasonable to suppose that the U.S. will give Israel assurances that such a bargain will not compromise Israel's vital security interests. Nevertheless, such a bargain presents Israel with a real security dilemma. If a deal is made, and the safeguards are not rock solid, or Iran pursues its nuclear program in secret (or attempts a plutonium backdoor), then Israel may face an economically healthy nuclear-armed Iran in the near to midterm.