This paper explores how the great chain of being in classical Islamic philosophy has been selectively chosen and reinterpreted in debates surrounding the evolution-creationism controversy within the Islamic world. For the classical Muslim philosophers, the great chain of being was a hierarchy of nature in which they identified and combined a host of plants and animals, including coral, date palms, vines, snails, shellfish, horses, falcons, elephants, and monkeys. Why were these specific plants and animals chosen and what does the great chain of being reveal about how modern Muslim intellectuals have responded to Darwinism? Although this hierarchy of nature was utilized by many of the classical Muslim philosophers, they disagreed about which plants or animals should be chosen as intermediate links. For example, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi believed that the horse and falcon should be used as the link between animals and humans, while the Ikhwan al-Safa’ believed it should be the elephant. Other classical Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, al-Biruni, Miskawayh, Ibn Khaldun, and al-Qazwini, thought the monkey connected animals to humans. In modern times, the great chain of being has been reinterpreted by Muslim intellectuals as a form of evolution, even though it is not. This interpretation is justified by pulling from those classical Muslim philosophers who chose the monkey as the link between animals and humans. Given there were other animals chosen for this link in addition to the monkey, this selective choosing and reinterpretation of the great chain of being reveals modern Muslim intellectuals to have specific agendas when responding to Darwinism. These agendas appear in two distinctive ways. First, there are those who utilize the version of the great chain of being that includes the monkey by arguing that the idea of evolution can be found in the history of Islamic thought before Darwin, and thus provides a justification for denying Darwinism. For example, the Muslim intellectuals who first responded to Darwinism, e.g. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, fell into this group. Second, there are others who appropriate the same version of the great chain of being, but instead of denying Darwinism, argue that it should alleviate fears of the ummah and motivate Muslims to learn evolution and accept its incorporation into science education curriculum. Since the 19th century, this position has become more popular and is best represented by such contemporary Muslim intellectuals as Nidhal Guessoum and Salman Hameed.

Emerging out of the interaction between East and West, the first Muslim Qur'an translations into English, produced in early 20th century India, rationalized the Qur’?n and attempted to reconcile it with modernity. Those translations, not unlike earlier European translations, were deeply rooted in their socio-political circumstances. The earliest English translation, based on a French translation of a medieval Latin translation, was published in 1649 by Alexander Ross and reflected the anti-Islamic biases of its Latin original. The second English translation, that of Sale, was produced in the Age of Enlightenment and echoed some of that era’s characteristic features such as appreciation of learning and critical thinking, but it also stressed the use of Qur’?n translation to convert Muslims. Four additional 19th century English translations, though driven by genuine interest in Islam and presenting outstanding scholarship, still saw the Qur’?n as a bad copy of the Bible and filled with superstitions and irrationalities. In mid-nineteenth century, when Protestant missionaries were allowed into the Subcontinent, they depended on these translations to argue against Islam. Muslims of the Subcontinent on their turn saw a dire need to translate the Qur’?n to convey its true meaning. They also reflected disputes within the Indian Muslim community about how to respond to the challenges of modernity, notably in the role of the Ahmadi translations. The first Muslim English translations discussed in this study are Muhammad Abdul Hakim Khan (1905), Mirza Abu’l Fazl (1912), Hairat Dilhawi (1912), Maulana Muhammad Ali (1917), and Al-Haj Hafiz Ghulam Sarwar(1929). I read these translations in light of (a) traditional Qur’?n interpretations, (b) earlier European translations, (c) the cultural milieu of India, and (d) modern concept such as rationality, pluralism, and tolerance. Reconciling the Qur’?n with the mind of the modern man, these translations had a strong influence on Islam in Europe as well as on many of the later English translations. The history of these translations, then, can be read as the rise of Qur’?n translation as a modern phenomenon and an important aspect of the encounter between Islam and modernity.

One of the primary discussions between Muslim philosophers and theologians concerns divine freedom. There are two basic questions regarding this problem: Firstly, was God free to create this world rather than creating another world? Secondly, was God free not to create any world at all? Avicenna, for instance, argues that, given the categorical difference between God and the imperfect nature of human beings, God’s actions should be considered neither intentional nor natural. His action of creating this world was volitional while not requiring alternative possibilities or the power to do otherwise. Nonetheless, though it was neither open to Him to refrain from creating this world nor any world at all, this does not imply, Avicenna believes, that He did not have freedom in His creating activity. Contrariwise, al-Ghazâlî, and Ma`t?r?dite and Mu`tazilite theologians, by assuming a single account of freedom both for human beings and God, argue that alternative possibilities and the power to do otherwise are required for acting with free will. Since God has a perfect freedom, it was open to him to create this world, or another world, or not to create anything at all. In this paper, I will look into this discussion in relation to contemporary discussion of the topic. In particular, Thomas Flint recently argued that although God has a power to choose between creating a specific world and not creating it, it is not possible that He does not create anything at all. In other words, while God is free with respect to creating and not creating a specific world, He is not free not to create anything at all. Given that God is a morally perfect being, not creating anything at all is not an alternative possibility with respect to His nature and attributes. I conclude that if this view is correct, it has the merit to provide a middle ground between two opposing theories in the Islamic world, since it takes into account the chief motivations of both sides.

Occasionalism is the theory that God is the sole creator of every contingent thing. There is no secondary causation in nature and the causes that we think we are observing are merely occasions for God’s creation. Although many Western scholars, Muslim theologians in particular, defended occasionalism for centuries, there are a few philosophers who hold occasionalism recently. Contrary to the contemporary disinclination for occasionalism, a revived theistic account of causation is necessary for a theist who endorses the idea that God is the only creator in the universe. Given that almost all orthodox Muslim scholars – Ash’arites and Ma’t?r?dites – adopted occasionalism, a defense of occasionalism on philosophical and theological grounds is particularly necessary for a Muslim theist who shares the same intuitions with them. My aim in this paper is to show that occasionalism is not only a viable and plausible theory to explain God’s relation to causality for a theist or at least for a Muslim theist, but also is a better theory than the rival theistic theories such as mere conservationism and concurrentism. In so doing, this paper addresses two questions. First, what is the best theistic view to explain God’s relation to causality? I will look into the alternative theistic explanations and argue that occasionalism provides a better insight for a theist to deal with the problem at hand. I will take al-Ghaz?l?’s arguments for occasionalism as a representation of occasionalist arguments. But, occasionalism seems at variance with our intuitive idea that there is a kind of necessity in natural operations. This objection leads us to the second question: What is the plausible causal theory that an occasionalist can adopt to protect both the so-called sense of necessity and God’s comprehensive creation? I will look into the contemporary causal theories and conclude that neither reductionist nor anti-reductionist causal theories is open to an occasionalist. I will use Alvin Plantinga’s notion, “creaturely inviolability” to describe our sense of necessity in causal relations. I will follow al-Ghaz?l? and argue that this necessity comes from divine decree but not from the nature of objects. Thus, while occasionalism avoids the necessitarian views according to which there is a kind of logical necessity between causes and effects, it protects the intuitive idea that there is a kind of necessity between causes and effects. I conclude that this point particularly makes occasionalism a better option for a theist.