The purpose of this research is to identify and explore attitudinal differences in Southern California regarding sexual activity pre/post-marriage, sex education, contraception, and family planning of first-generation Iranian immigrant parents, and second-generation Iranian immigrant daughters following the latter’s exposure to sexual education in American schools. To analyze differences in perceptions of the two groups, second-generation Iranian-American females ages 18-35 who have graduated from American high schools, and first generation Iranian immigrant parent(s) of daughters of the same criteria were recruited online through Iranian organizations and communities. A total of 22 respondents completed online anonymous questionnaires, where 11 first-generation parents were asked about their knowledge of their daughter’s sex education and their views about her sexual life, and 11 second-generation daughters were asked about their exposure to sex education and their views on their sexual lifestyle choices. Both groups also answered open-ended questions about what they felt influenced their beliefs about how important, satisfying, and fulfilling sexual activity is to life. A positive correlation between daughters’ exposure to sex education in U.S. school and their making more liberal independent decisions about their sexual lives was found. Similarly, it was found that first-generation Iranian immigrant parents that had more awareness of their daughters’ exposure to sex education believed sex education to be more important. Responses to open ended questions illustrated that although perspectives on sexual lifestyle choices are increasingly liberal based on exposure to dominant U.S. culture and sex education, these perceptions and attitudes are predominantly seen within the context of marriage.

This paper examines the motivation behind establishing judicial review in a new democracy. Using Tunisia as a case study, it explores how political actors successfully created a constitutional court with the power of judicial review following the collapse of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime. I argue that the diffuse nature of the Constituent Assembly, in addition to the activist character of Tunisian civil society, allowed for the emergence of a constitutional court with strong powers of judicial review. This argument builds on Thomas Ginsburg’s insurance and commitment theories, which posit that when a majority is in charge of drafting the constitution, it often chooses to include strong powers of judicial review. According to this logic, strong judicial review powers act as a type of insurance for the majority party; should it be deposed in the future, the party would still be protected by the constitutional court it established in the constitution-writing stage. I critique the limits of Ginsburg’s Commitment Theory and adapt it to include civil society. To prove causality, I use process tracing; I utilize both sequence and mechanisms to explain the relationship between diffuse political parties and an activist civil society with the establishment of a constitutional court and judicial review. To enhance my causal claim, I select another country for comparison that varies on the independent variables: Egypt. While Tunisia had a diffuse Constituent Assembly and an active civil society, Egypt’s Constituent Assembly was extremely homogeneous and its civil society was suppressed. In turn, Tunisia established very strong judicial review while Egypt did not.

In this paper, I argue that Fat?’s theoreticians drew on the examples of Algeria and Vietnam, as the most pernicious and prominent examples of settler colonialism and the establishment of a state on a portion of a people’s national territory against their will by the colonial power, for an understanding of the Arab national predicament. Starting from the conviction that Arabs constitute a single nation divided against their will by imperial machinations, Fat?’s theoreticians conceptualized Israel not as a fully independent nation-state in its own right, similar to France, Germany, and the Netherlands, but as a massive colonial military occupation in the guise of a state bolstered by a settler colonial population that the Great Powers planted in the heart of Arab land in order to prevent Arab unity and act as a base for and servant of Western “imperial and colonial interests” in Africa and Asia. Israel, then, was not the expression of the will of some section of world Jewry, but a marionette state of Western imperialism, the illegitimate child of a colonialist conspiracy against the just and noble aspirations of the Arab nation.

While a plethora of existing research examines the widespread negative stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs in U.S. mass media, there is a dearth of research on the impacts of public education on American attitudes toward Arabs and Muslims. Public education is a means by which societies ensure certain knowledge and world outlooks are passed on to the next generation. This knowledge is often presented as factual, unbiased information, yet the representations found in schools are embedded in a larger conflict over the politics of knowledge. Through textbooks and state standards, state and federal governments, special interest groups, and for-profit companies dictate what students learn about groups of people around the world. Therefore, my research seeks to understand the portrayals of the Middle East and Islam in U.S. public education and how these representations came about. Specifically, this study uses the six most widely used high school world history textbooks, state standards from Texas, Florida, and California, and a series of interviews with textbook and state standards writers to determine the extent to which politics influence the portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. education system. I hope that by determining how these representations emerged, we can better understand how to reform the way these subjects are taught and thus improve students’ perceptions of the region and religion.

The University of Michigan’s Arabic Program utilizes the textbook considered the standard for Arabic instruction across the country, al-Kitaab fii Ta'allum al-'Arabiyya, hereafter, al-Kitaab. However, al-Kitaab has been cited as problematic by students of Arabic as it is riddled with politically charged vocabulary, conflations of Arab culture with Islam and Muslims, perpetuates negative and Orientalist stereotypes about Arab culture, and misrepresents the purposes of the Arabic language. The textbook is often used in the context of introductory Arabic courses and by students who are new to the language and Arab culture. As such, al-Kitaab is coming from a position of perceived legitimacy when it places more importance on politically charged vocabulary than basic, everyday vocabulary. The book has been cited as problematic for synonymous reasons in multiple university papers across the country with examples including articles in the Stanford Daily , Chicago Monitor , and the Tufts Daily . In this paper, we explore how the textbook is perceived in the eyes of other students at the University of Michigan (U-M) and on college campuses around the country as well as the potential impact(s) of teaching Arabic in a politicized manner on the perceptions of Arab culture. We initiated this work by publishing an opinion piece in the U-M’s school newspaper and circulating a petition around different student organizations which was signed by over 100 individuals who previously used the textbook. Many of these signatures were accompanied with qualitative data that were subsequently used in conversations with faculty members and staff members in the Department of Near Eastern Studies. In addition to problems with diversity, equity, and inclusion, some professors expressed issues with the presentation of grammar and language development in the textbook series. In this paper, we discuss the research that we conducted related to Arabic instruction materials and the implications of using such materials.

In 2016 a propaganda video titled “The structure of the Caliphate” was released by the jihadist movement the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The video details the governance structure of their self-proclaimed caliphate and bears persuasive arguments that appeals to potential recruits. This study uses rhetorical analysis to find several rhetorical strategies used in ISIS’ video to construct convincing arguments. This study suggest that there are two main arguments used; the credible state argument and the superior state argument. These arguments are made persuasive by appealing to logic and credibility and are reinforced by the appeal of emotion. The credible state argument seeks to convince the audience that ISIS has all the right qualifications to take on the role as leaders of Islam. ISIS thus gains the confidence of their audience by crediting themselves as eradicators of evil and enforcers of Islam. Once they have gained the confidence of their audience ISIS is able convince potential recruits that there is a religious meaning to joining ISIS. The superior state argument seeks to convince the audience that the Islamic state has a logic-based structure of power and that it is a well-organized state. Radicalization and the will to join ISIS has often been referred to as mental illness. I suggest that there is an actual appeal to ISIS that compels foreign fighters to join ISIS and that appeal needs to studied rather than reduced to brainwashing. ISIS’ propaganda is sophisticated and well-constructed and has the ability to persuade a sane audience, one does, in other words not have to be “mentally ill” to find ISIS appealing. Although we cannot through a rhetorical analysis measure the effectiveness of ISIS’ propaganda i.e. how many foreign fighters join as a result of propaganda,we can by unfolding the hidden rhetorical strategies in their propaganda, understand their appeal and understand how it is used to persuade.

This paper evaluates the economic struggles of Hebron, one of the most contentious cities in the West Bank, through a historical lens. The city center was once a thriving center of the Hebron’s economy as well as the greater Palestinian economy, but settlements, curfews, and IDF-imposed movement restrictions have turned the historic part of the city into a “ghost town” because it has closed over 1800 Palestinian businesses. Consequently, this suffocated the economic production of the city as a whole. Periods of sizable economic growth and decline have followed key historical events in the city, and this paper analyzes each separately in an attempt to connect the effects of these events on Hebron’s economic conditions. Critical years analyzed include before and after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in 1994, the implementation of the Hebron Protocol in 1997, and after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. The paper aims to achieve two goals. First, it provides a historical background of the situation in Hebron. Second, it references data from Labor Force Surveys conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics between 1995 and 2005 to quantitatively analyze the economic effects of movement restrictions implemented following these critical junctures. It also draws on data collected from my field visit to the city as well as from an original report by B’Tselem. In doing so, this paper illuminates the severe consequences of movement restrictions and draws conclusions that show what steps could be taken to revitalize Hebron’s economy by reversing such restrictions.

This paper builds upon Eva Bellin’s theories of authoritarian resilience in the Middle East by incorporating the factor of selective immigration, especially in Gulf monarchies. Based on existing data and theoretical propositions by Bellin and others including R.P. Shaw, the paper argues that immigration policies reinforce regime stability in authoritarian states by creating religious homogeneity and expanding rentierism. This research uses Bahrain as a case study of this phenomenon and proposes three major hypotheses. First, Bahraini immigration policy towards foreign labor migrants positively impacts economic stability of the regime because labor migrants significantly contribute to the GDP of economic sectors in which Bahraini nationals are not highly involved. Second, Bahraini immigration policy towards Sunni Muslim foreigners positively impacts the religious authority of the regime because it consolidates power around the Sunni ruling family while simultaneously excluding Shi’as from society. Lastly, Bahraini immigration policy is more favorable towards migrants from countries with which the regime has strong political alliances because it maintains the status quo for Bahraini foreign relations. These hypotheses are examined through the use of secondary data compilations, namely the Central Informatics Organization (CIO) of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The CIO provides data points and statistics regarding ethnic composition of the Bahraini labor force, as well as breakdowns of economic sectors by concentration of foreign versus native workers. The Gulf Labor and Migration Markets project tracks the number of foreigners in Bahrain broken down by individual country of origin. The variety of data and research utilized approaches the question from multiple angles to understand the range of effects of immigration policy on Bahrain’s state interests. Ultimately, the research concludes that the first two hypotheses are sufficiently supported to corroborate the thesis, and while the third is weakly supported, the intervening variables exemplify the significance of labor migrants in Bahraini authoritarian exceptionalism.

The focus of this project regards the significance of Sunni madhahib in the contemporary Arab Gulf. Specifically, the project will analyze the history and beliefs of the Maliki and Hanbali madhahib. The project will utilize case studies of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to conclude whether two different factors have influenced these countries’ legal codes and sharia courts. The first factor being British involvement in Gulf legal systems and the second being the role the Wahhabi movement has played in their development. The arguments made in the paper are two-fold. The initial argument of this paper regards the introduction of western law via the British on the legal systems of the Gulf, with a focus on Bahrain and Kuwait. It argues that British involvement has served to diminish the jurisdiction and influence of these countries sharia courts by introducing secular courts and propagating codification of law. The second argument this paper makes regards the prominence of sharia courts in countries where a fundamentalist movement is supported by the rulers. This is done via case studies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who both adhere to the Wahhabi-Hanbali movement. The paper argues that the presence of the Wahhabi movement in Qatar and Saudi Arabia has allowed enhanced jurisdiction to their respective sharia court systems. The paper initially provides an overview of jurisprudence and then moves on to detail the four orthodox Sunni madhahib and where they are contemporarily prominent. Following this, an overview is given of British involvement in the region and how the European power came to obtain jurisdiction over certain groups of citizens in its protectorates. The project then examines case studies of Bahrain and Kuwait to ascertain the role British intervention has played in the development of their legal/judicial systems. It then provides a brief overview of Wahhabism, and how the movement came to be involved in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Followed by case studies of the two countries legal/judicial development. It ends with a conclusion comparing and contrasting Bahrain and Kuwait as well as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This project is a continuation of a research paper I was assigned during my Middle East Studies course, Sunni and Shia Islam. The project will use scholarly databases as well as secondary sources to analyze what role sharia courts still play in these countries and in multiple cases how these roles have changed.

Traditionally, the “Theory of Translation” has privileged approaches to translation that assume a clear correlation between faithfulness to the original text (or freedom) and success (or failure). Such approaches depend upon established notions of what constitutes a “word” or “content.” Thus, they are inherently insufficient, privileging in turn certain systems of signification that are not necessarily reconcilable within certain poetic traditions. This is particularly evident in the case of the classical Sufi poetry of Hafiz, whose historical, socio-political, and cultural context is already complicated by the obscurity of the author himself; the subversive role of Sufism; and the ineffability of ecstasy. A “word” is, in many theories of translation, a sign. Yet if we consider the role of the embodied habitation of signs theorized by Aristotle and expounded upon by Saba Mahmood (2009), we can explore each word of poetry not only as a representation of, but also a manifestation of the concept that is being referenced. Furthermore, the cultural assumptions of both poet and translator make the translation of Sufi metaphors (such as being drunk on wine) especially tricky. These cultural particularities stand in sharp contrast to the intimate universality of love and separation, as embodied in the ghazal form of Sufi poetry. Combined, all these aspects of Sufi poetry create a paradox of meanings, making its translation even more difficult to perform, or even assess. In this paper, I argue that the translation of Hafiz is most faithful when it is “inspired”—whether that be in the more traditionally “faithful” approach of Gertrude Bell, or the more controversial “interpretive” approach of Daniel Ladinsky.

Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous: Sultan Suleiman and Hurrem’s Relationship Throughout the Ottoman Empire and Beyond In royal circles during the rise of the Ottoman Empire, intimacy or love did not characterize marriage. But in 1533, Sultan Suleiman married the love of his life, Hurrem, a concubine. Their marriage proved controversial because Suleiman broke the long-standing Ottoman court custom that Sultans did not take wives also he favored Hurrem over all others. This unique position pushed Suleiman to do more for her than he had ever done for previous concubines. My senior capstone explores their relationship and argues that Suleiman and Hurrem’s love, led them to break court customs and transform the culture surrounding Ottoman marriage and succession practices. Their actions also left a lasting legacy in European culture and continues to influence popular culture in contemporary Turkey. Much of the literature on Suleiman and Hurrem’s relationship takes a gender studies approach, analyzing what their courtship demonstrates about women’s agency within the Empire. While this approach situates the immediate impact of their love, it does not address the relationship’s ability to transform cultural ideals about what a royal relationship meant. To answer this question, and add to the discussion on marriage during the early Ottoman Empire, I employ a cultural history approach, investigating the effects of their relationship throughout the empire. I explain how new cultural policies, such as marriage and limiting heirs during princedom, affected generations following the couple. I use a variety of primary sources—ranging from personal letters between the couple to reports of foreign ambassadors—to define and chart the transformation of Ottoman cultural customs during Suleiman’s reign. I conclude my research by investigating how the couple’s relationship affected popular culture beyond the Ottoman Empire. This includes an analysis of plays on the couple in Baroque Germany, the couple’s inspiration for nineteenth-century Ukrainian nationalism, as well as modern-day Turkey’s soap operas.