The Iran-Iraq war was one of the bloodiest wars in modern history. It started more than thirty-five years ago based on regional rivalry and a desire for territorial acquisition. Despite Saddam Hussein’s belief that it would be an easy victory for him, the Iran-Iraq war lasted eight brutal years and resulted in wide scale devastation on both sides. As a result, this war has had and continues to have an immense impact on Iran, Iraq, as well as the greater Middle East. This is related to the use of ideology (religious sectarianism) as a tool for propaganda and the propagation of internal and external support. More specifically, the strategic use of Sunnism by Iraq and Shia’ism by Iran, assisted each nation to strengthen its position during the war. For example, the Sunni versus Shia framework was used as the pretext by Saddam Hussein for the invasion of Iran and the war despite his political and geostrategic aspirations. The Sunni versus Shia framework that emerged, not only impacted the war, but also evolved into the sectarian struggles we see today. It ultimately put Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia at odds with one other and created the foundation for ongoing sectarian conflict between the two nations. Similar to the Iran Iraq war, sectarianism is being used as a tool to achieve political and geostrategic advantages and ultimately regional dominance. The long-term impact of the sectarian fault lines of the Iran-Iraq war can be seen today across the Muslim world, including in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These countries have been torn apart along deepening fault lines and the lives of citizens have been severely impacted as a result. As such, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the role that sectarianism had in mobilizing forces and support during the war for both Iran and Iraq, as well as the impact this strategy continues to have in the Middle East. This paper will examine the Iran-Iraq war, including its evolution and framing, as well as an analysis of the psychological impact of the war on Iranian society and by extension the country’s foreign policy in a post Iran-Iraq war context.

This paper has two interrelated foci, one theoretical and another empirical. Theoretically, it examines several questions: When do passive identities become politically visible? The main interest here is to investigate how and under what conditions to social identities become political. What role do political actors play in this process? And finally, what implications does such a politicisation of an identity have on regime construction and deconstruction? These theoretical questions will form the point of entry into the politics of sectarianism in the two case studies of Iraq and Lebanon. Rooted in the social scientific tradition of Historical Sociology, this paper argues that whilst sectarianism is now too visible in Arab politics, it has been an active, but latent, socio-political factor in the making and unmaking of political regimes in the region. By systematically comparing the two cases of Iraq and Lebanon, the paper will demonstrate that the politicisation and visibility of sectarianism varies in the two cases due to various factors: (1) Different state formation trajectories; (2) varying dominant socio-political norms; and (3) different regime types. The paper shows that whilst in Lebanon sectarianism amounts to an historical institution, in Iraq the demarcation of sectarian boundaries took time to crystallise, contributing to gradual state failure. The paper divides into two key parts. The first addresses the theoretical questions, focusing on identity politics and its relation to regime making and unmaking. The second part compares the two cases by examining the three variables identified above

In this paper, I argue that the discursive re-articulation of sectarianism in Syria, as a form of “cultural politics,” was constructed during the transformative period 2011-2013 not only to defy the regime’s dominant discourse of “political culture” and its repertoire of “Pan-Arabism” and “resistance,” but also to demobilize nonsectarian actors among the opposition.  I examine processes of “sectarinization” by using “groupness,” as analytical category, rather than “sects,” as unitary actors, which provides a critical insight into intra-conflict amongst various groups and the conflict over meanings, social powers, public spheres and subjectivity (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar 1998; Brubaker 2006; Wedeen 2002; Wimmer 2013). With the transformation of the Syrian uprising into a proxy war, the utilization of sectarian symbols and rhetoric has become increasingly prevalent among dominant armed groups and Syrian activists. Notwithstanding, that was not the case when predominantly peaceful protesters took to the streets in Syria on March 2011 during the context of the “Arab Spring.” How the objectives of the social movement[s] in Syria have been transformed dramatically from popular demands for political reforms to a “Revolution for all Syrians,” and to the ongoing bloody civil war with an increasing visibility of sectarian and exclusive discourses? How has sectarianism moved from the private to the public sphere; from suppressed and peripheral spaces to the center of contentious politics founded upon exclusion? Methodologically, this paper is based on discourse and content analysis of 146 statements, videos, slogans, and images disseminated and promoted by both mainstream media(Al-Jazeera) and social media (the Syrian Revolution Against Bashar al-Assad 2011Facebook page) between 2011-2013. This paper is also informed by first-hand observations, fieldnotes, and regular weekly meetings with activists in Damascus during the Syrian uprising until August 2012. The data and discourse analysis was further supported by 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Syrian activists who participated in the uprising but currently residing in Washington D.C, where the interviews were conducted in August 2014. I conclude with a discussion of how the conjuncture of four main dynamics (certain grassroots organizations; sectarian entrepreneurs; regional actors; and Arab satellite outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, and social media) contributed to the sectarianization of the public sphere and laid the necessary conditions for constructing exclusionary symbols and rhetoric which transferred sectarian politics from the private to the public sphere; from suppressed and peripheral spaces to the center of contentious politics founded upon sectarian-based groupness.

"The Nur Party’s position on Copts is clear and outspoken in considering them partners in the nation, they are an original part of Egypt’s sons, […] my right is his right and my destiny is his destiny" (1). This statement by Spokesman Yusri Hammad seems to stand in contradiction with the Salafi Nur party’s repeated calls to implement Sharia law. Instead of dismissing this comment as a flowery phrase made during the parliamentary elections in 2011/2012, it can be used as a starting point to investigate the question whether the context of political competition and liberalization induced a change in the attitude of Islamist actors towards Coptic Egyptians in the period 2011-2013. This talk focusses on the attitude of three organizations in Egypt that established political parties in 2011; the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party; al-Dawa al-Salafiyya and the Nur Party; al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and the Building and Development Party. Although these parties shared similar outlooks and goals, they had a different history of attitude towards Coptic Egyptians and, most importantly, competed against each other after the revolution. The comment quoted above suggests that between 2011 and 2013, the “Copts” presented a valuable asset to appear as a moderate and serious political actor. At the same time, there was also a profound tension between the new political requirements and the ideological positions of the actors that did not fundamentally change. This was particularly evident in controversies that at first sight did not seem to be relevant such as the question whether to congratulate Copts for their religious feasts. Al-Dawa al-Salafiyya and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya did not depart from their general attitude considering Christians in Egypt polytheists and dismissed greeting for Christmas as an endorsement of polytheist practices. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Nur Party on the other hand displayed changing and competing attitudes which very much reflected underlying tensions between Realpolitik and ideology. This talk therefore sheds light on Islamist attitudes that are not limited to the question of dhimma but instead are bounded to their local context, and, within these attitudes, limited agency was granted to the Copts. This analysis presents results of a research project conducted during a post-doctoral fellowship. (1)Al-Shuruq (18 Dec. 2011). "Al-Shuruq interviews Yusri Hammad in the Name of the Nur Party]." Issue 1051, p.15.

The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt have brought about drastic sociopolitical changes to Egyptian society. Among these changes, a significant increase in the number of violence acts against Coptic Christians who are the largest religious minority in the Middle East, including attacks on Christian individuals and torching church buildings, has been remarkably challenging to their community. In order to promote a more comprehensive understanding of the patterns and the mechanisms of the sectarian attacks and clashes in Egypt, I engage with social movement literature, focusing on political opportunity theories, to challenge the notion that Islamists are inherently violent. I also relate this violence to studies on sectarian violence in the Global South, in order to understand political motivations of committing violence along the religious lines in the postcolonial era. Drawing on event data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, the UCPD Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), and national and international newspaper articles from 1970 to 2014, I provide a qualitative analysis of over 280 violent incidents against Christians that have been inflicted by the Egyptian state, Islamic militants, and Muslim neighbors to varying levels and degrees. My findings suggest the following: first, the patterns of Islamic militant violence against Coptic Christians are relevant to the ways that Islamic militants reacted to the state crackdown on their power since the 1990s. Second, communal violence that occurred between Muslim and Christian neighbors does not necessarily take place due to religious issues; however, clashes later evolved as sectarian strife due to differences in religions. Finally, Coptic Christians are not simply the victims of sectarian violence; they have protested calling for state protection and to oppose Islamic militant groups’ attacks on their properties. The findings help us understand political and structural factors that have contributed to the marginalization of Coptic Christians through violence over time, particularly in relation to the rise of Islamic militant groups since the 1990s and since the Arab Spring in Egypt. This paper provides insights on how power and religion are intertwined when political violence occurs.

The Islamic State in northern Iraq has committed egregious human rights abuses, particularly against the many ethnic and religious minorities that populate the region surrounding Mosul. Many of those displaced are ethnic Assyrians, a traditionally Christian ethnic minority settled in Iraq since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The European Union, the United Nations and the United States Congress have attempted to impose a permanent solution by creating an ethno-religious enclave within Iraq under United Nations auspices, in an attempt to permanently end the historic marginalization faced by the Assyrians people. Attempts by Western and international government to intervene in Iraq’s complex ethno culture frame the problem in starkly religious terms, embodying an antagonistic vision of Christian-Islamic relations in the Middle East. Moreover, they ignore the complicating factor of ethnic identity and the presence of multiple ethnic and religious groups in northern Iraq, advocating for the top down implementation of a “Christian State” within Iraq. Despite the overly religious rhetoric employed in discussing the continuing persecution of Assyrians, current violence has its historical roots in ethnic rather than religious divides. By revisiting historical literature on Iraq, and incorporating an analysis of Assyrian history, media, and human rights reports presenting competing narratives of identity, I uncover the historical construction of Assyrian identity in the context of the Arab/Muslim Iraqi state. Based on alternative historical documents and reports from Assyrian media, I show that Saddam Hussein, rather than directly suppressing Assyrian national identity, sought to inculcate various sects of the Assyrian churches in order to present a religiously tolerant regime. The historical literature reflects the efforts of various regimes to suppress Assyrian national identity while advocating religious tolerance, resulting in an Assyrian ethnic identity that has been “forgotten”, replaced instead with an antagonistic understanding of Islamic-Christian relations in Iraq that ignores local context and effaces Assyrian ethnic identity. A lack of understanding of complex ethnic divisions in Iraq feeds essentializing narratives of civilizational conflict between Christianity and Islam. Despite these attempts to essentialize Assyrian identity as Christian in the context of global religious antagonism, I propose in my paper that Assyrians in Iraq are actively involved in creating multi-ethnic coalitions that promote a broader vision of diversity and inclusion, rather than advocating merely for narrow nationalist goals.