February 2011 will be a month marked in the annals of history and will be examined and analyzed for decades to come by scholars of Middle Eastern studies. In the 20th century, regime change occurred in the aftermath of successful coups d'etat and Muslim cleric-led protests that removed political strongmen from power, whose legitimacy, in the eyes of the people, no longer existed. In the 21st century, fueled by the organization and the frustration of the youth who are connected by global online social networks, the ouster of President Ben Ali of Tunisia and President Mubarak of Egypt signaled the collapse of the barrier of fear and the rise of a new modus operandi for political change in the Middle East. In the aftermath of these events we see that the rules of the game have been changed. Consequently, the parties and individuals that manage to fill the power vacuums in the coming months will be more inward looking and less concerned with foreign policy. They will learn from the mistakes of their predecessors and, thus, the "Arab street" and its pulse and rhythm, will be much more influential, and possibly even dictate the decision making of Middle Eastern leaders. In the months following the uprisings, more of the same events and tactics will be used to defy status quo, but there will be many more question marks and few answers. Moreover, in light of these events, it has become clear that America's role in the Middle East is not what it used to be. Future leaders of the Middle East may think twice before making an alliance with the United States either for reasons of mistrust or due to the unpopular reputation the United States has in many Middle Eastern countries. Of course, this bears implications for Israel, whose foreign policy and security has been tied with that of the United States for decades. It is also very likely that as each state traverses through revolution, immediate transition will not lead to democracy and the region will witness much suffering and instability. Perhaps it is time for Israel to take the initiative and make serious diplomatic gestures to its neighbors and the international community as well.

This paper will assess the positions of Israel’s Prime Minister on the critical questions related to what has been called over the last several decades “the Middle East peace process”. The puzzle is genuine and complex. On the one hand, Netanyahu wrote several books & articles in which he expressed his strong, determined and principled opposition to the most important element in the peace process, the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank & Gaza as part of a negotiated settlement. His policy position was grounded in expansive ideological belief system emphasizing Israel’s historical rights & negating the rights of the Palestinians. Moreover, as Israel’s premier between 1996 & 1999, Netanyahu is seen by many observers as responsible for the collapse of the Oslo process. On the other hand, since his reemergence as Israel’s leader, Netanyahu announced his acceptance of the two-state solution, has pushed for direct negotiations with the Palestinians, and agreed to the freezing of Israeli settlement activity in the territories. His complex behavior and equally complicated pronouncements raise the question on his real intentions. Has he come to accept the international consensus on the inevitability yet another partition, or is he playing for time in the hope that circumstances will change? This paper will try to answer these questions by looking at several sources including verbal pronouncements & political behavior.

As in previous years, 2011 is expected to be the Year of Iran. Iran, as well as Turkey, emerged in the last decade as regional superpowers, leaving behind the Arab world, and in particular, some Arab states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which used to play a leading role in the region's affairs. Against this background, it is no surprise that moderate Arab countries, i.e., Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States, are ready to coordinate their moves and even to cooperate with Israel. These countries believe, however, that a progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process can ease and even legitimate their dialogue with Israel in the eyes of the Arab public opinion. However, it is unlikely that in the shadow of Iranian-American-Israeli tension any progress will be achieved in the peace negotiations. Thus, much is dependent on the American policy and on American moves. In 2010 the Obama Administration failed in its efforts to reach a breakthrough in the peace negotiation, and it unclear whether the Administration can change its policy in a way that will ensure its success. At the same time, Iran's allies, Hizballah, Hamas and Syria, deepened their cooperation with Iran, preparing themselves for a possible confrontation which might start in the Persian Gulf and from there might spread to the shores of the Levant. In the mean time, Syrian President is sending mixed signals to Israel as for his readiness to resume peace negotiations with the Jewish state. At the same time, he threatens Israel that if peace can not to be achieved, Syria might start a war against Israel to force it to accept the Syrian demands (total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights). Thus, in this front too, Israel and the Arabs find themselves in the face of the same dilemma – war or Peace.

Forthcoming.