Most scholarship on contemporary politics in the Maghreb has focused on actors and institutions such as political parties, social movements and heads of state. Very little has, however, focused on an institution that has played – and arguably continues to play - a crucial role in the politics of the region: the military. In Tunisia a former general has been President for the past twenty years having ousted and replaced a civilian figure. In Morocco military figures have twice narrowly failed to overthrow the ruling Monarchy through attempted coups d’états and continue to figure prominently in the Moroccan elite. In Algeria, the country’s senior military figures have effectively appointed and removed every president since the country’s achievement of independence with individual military officers actually assuming the presidency themselves for well over half of the period. This paper aims to look beneath these headline facts to examine the reality of the military’s political role in the contemporary Maghreb. Adopting a comparative approach looking at all three states, it will examine how the militaries of the states were constructed in the aftermath of the achievement of independence and how the varying contributions of former guerrilla fighters, exiles and former members of the European colonial armies contributed to shaping the different political roles the militaries would come to play in each state. All three states experienced attempted seizures of power by elements from within the military during the early decades after independence, the varying nature and impact of which will be analysed. The paper will also look at how the military in the three states sought to respond to the new challenges of social unrest and the rise of Islamist movements from the 1980s. Assessing the current state of play, the paper will conclude and show that although the military as a broader institution has been very influential, real influence and power rests with the state security apparatus in each state which although related to the military often counterbalances, rivals and ultimately prevails over the formal military. The paper will draw on a range of sources including existing published works, print media from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, together with interviews with relevant actors.

The decision of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to revise the Algerian constitution in order to stand for a third term has reinforced the tendency of North African leaders to see themselves as indispensable. Yet practices of orderly succession are crucial to the construction of durable states. This paper examines the issue of succession in a region where Qaddafi has been in power for 40 years, Ben Ali for more than 20, and Bouteflika and Mohamed VI are entering their second decade of rule, and where the military have recently deposed an elected president in Mauritania. What are the consequences of these patrimonial styles of rule for the region? What are the prospects for some form of orderly ‘alternance’ for the Maghreb? The paper will address these questions in the light of recent events in North Africa.

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have implemented important economic reform programs in the past two decades that have significantly transformed their economies into more market oriented ones. Economic liberalization has not been accompanied by a similar political liberalization drive. Even though sometimes political openings did occur and were heralded as the start of a new dawn, they have proved more often than not to be just temporarily and thus reversed by the ruling elites. Like in the case of Tunisia when initial optimism of Ben Ali’s political liberalizing moves after he came to power in 1987, turned into disillusion with the strengthening of his authoritarian rule since the early nineties. Although Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia differ in terms of political systems (republics versus monarchy), all three share the legacies of French colonialism, cycles of economic crisis and adjustment and the above mentioned lack of significant political reform. The resilience of authoritarianism in these three states has been explained looking at different factors, from the lack of meaningful external pressure, cultural factors, to a civil society that is constrained in its activities by the state. Relatively little academic comparative work has been done on state-business relations in these countries. With the withdrawal of the state from intervention in the economy and thus an expanding role of the private sector, the power relationship between state and business will be altered. Such a change could provide the private sector with the opportunity to not only ensure the sustainability of the economic liberalization efforts but expand liberalization to the political field as well. This paper will look at regional business elites in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, and analyze how these new forces operate within the constraints that the states have imposed. What roles do they play in the processes of economic liberalization? And will they represent a political force, thus a threat, to the incumbent regimes? The central claim of this paper will be that the specific implementation of economic reform provides the state with the opportunity to fragment the private sector and build new alliances within the business community. Pre reform alliances are reorganized through partial and selective reform to create a private sector that remains dependent on the state and thus fails to become an autonomous force. The paper will make use of existing primary and secondary literature and will draw on interviews with business elites, government officials, and members of civil society.

Most of the available literature on Western Sahara deals with the history of the conflict, its location in geopolitical and economic strategies, and its impact on relations in the Maghreb. However, in the Mashreq, there is little interest and indeed scant knowledge about Western Sahara and the protracted struggle of its people for self-determination. Undoubtedly, the lack of attention granted the conflict by the Arab League, and Morocco’s role in swaying many Arab states towards its position, played a role in obscuring the Sahrawis and their predicament in the Middle East. Yet, although it appears as an isolated case, and on the margins of its larger Arab milieu, various aspects of the Western Sahara case lend themselves to meaningful connections and comparative analyses with Middle Eastern societies. Based on anthropological research, this paper draws comparisons between the Sahrawi and Palestinian national movements. Although there are fundamental distinctions that characterize the two cases, such as: historical circumstances, socioeconomic and cultural formations, etc., they also portray many similarities. The paper tackles two interrelated themes. The first traces the genesis of nationalism, and the historical and socio-cultural contexts that reshaped their contemporary ideologies and nationalist discourses. It posits that Sahrawi nationalism is more concerned with delineating markers to distinguish Sahrawis as a people/nation for two main reasons: first, because their contemporary adversaries are also Arabs and Muslims who aim to forcibly integrate them under Moroccan sovereignty; secondly, a number of Arab governments have supported Morocco and neglected their plight. This compelled them to turn elsewhere for support, mainly to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, where they enjoy more support. The second theme deals with Sahrawis and Palestinians as nations which established “quasi-states.” The status and hegemonic influence of these self-declared quasi-states are challenged by their failure to achieve independence. This raises questions that the paper tackles: will the official nationalist discourse survive as an ideological framework that harnesses consent? How is it transformed by larger processes? Are the seeds of alternative solidarity frameworks arising?