This paper builds on the concept of ‘omnibalancing and ‘relative autonomy’ in multiple environments, applied by Gerd Nonneman to the analysis of Saudi foreign policy. Nonneman uses this concept to explain Saudi Arabia’s ‘more explicitly ‘polygamous’ foreign policy’ since the end of the Cold War. He assumes that the best way to analyze the foreign policy of non-Western states, is to adopt a theoretically pluralist approach, while incorporating some basic realist assumptions, which supposes focusing on factors and dynamics internal to the state, and examining whether and/or how they are linked to transnational values. Moreover, the interests pursued by decision-makers are multiple, aimed at domestic and sometimes elite-based aims, as well as at security from external threats; the ‘state’ comprises multiple groups, interests and intertwining dynamics; and domestic, regional and global factors are intertwined. Finally, ‘dependent’ states such as Saudi Arabia, have been able to pursue a ‘relative degree of autonomy’. When analyzing the determinants of Saudi foreign policy, it thus makes sense to begin at the domestic level and the issue of regime survival. At the same time, it is important to link the domestic level to the regional level and to take into account transnational factors having to do with identity and ideology. Indeed, since in Saudi Arabia’ case, the two are closely intertwined, the Saudi leadership’s two main foreign policy goals, have been domestic security and external security. More specifically, this paper proposes to investigate the application of the concept of ‘omnibalancing and ‘relative autonomy’ to Saudi Arabia’s ‘new’ assertive foreign policy in the context of the increased regional hegemonic rivalry with Iran and the perceived retreat of the United States from the Middle East. Additionally, this papers seeks to evaluate to what extent this ‘new’ policy, can be considered Islamic, as has been claimed by Saudi policy makers and most recently by the Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, in reference to the creation of a 34 anti-terror Muslim Coalition, which was made public mid-December, 2015.

In the years immediately following the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia began planning for an energy research facility at King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz University (KAU) that included nuclear energy research. The Saudis asked the United Kingdom’s Harwell Atomic Energy Research Establisment (A.E.R.E) to consult on the project. The goal of the “Energy Research Center” project, in the words of Harwell’s Dr. A.E. Taylor, was “to transfer a culture of science to Saudi Arabia.” Taylor added that “the twin pillars of knowledge on materials and energy sources are judged essential for a developed technologically based society.” One of the Saudi goals was to select and train approximately 1,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians over a period of ten to fifteen years in order to avoid a “brain drain” of Islamic scientists. The Saudis also wanted to contract with Western suppliers to obtain a heavy ion accelerator, atomic fission and fusion facilities, and a synchrotron. Mohammed Al Faisal, the son of the late King Faisal, was the senior Saudi prince responsible for the project, and Dr. Fawaz al-Alamy was to be the chairman of the new research center. This paper, based on primary source archival research, will describe the origins of Saudi nuclear research facilities and the role of Western governments and companies in planning and building them. More broadly, the paper will examine the social and political context for the Saudi decision to build a nuclear energy research program, during the decade after the Iranian revolution and before Saudi Arabia signed the Treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) in 1988.