Within the influential literature on the ‘rentier state’ in the Middle East, there remains a significant gap regarding the role and importance of international variables. The rentier state that arises from the extant literature is typically depicted as politically autonomous, not only from their own society but also from foreign political influences (the exception being those that impact the fiscal basis of the regime). Yet the region in which RST was first formed, the Gulf, is critically shaped by international and transnational social, political, and security interests, not only the international political economy of rents. This paper addresses this gap, presenting an in-depth case study of an archetypal ‘extreme’ rentier state to examine how the state negotiates labour reform in light of competing and contradictory domestic and international social pressures. Specifically, the paper focuses on the debate over migrant labour rights and the Qatar 2022 World Cup that drove the creation of a revised labour law in 2015. As the paper explores, external and transnational pressures compete with domestic forces to shape state-society relations. The influx of migrant workers into Qatar over the past few decades forms an important element of the state’s ‘late rentier’ development strategy, yet has simultaneously driven small-scale social mobilisations challenging a key state policy objective; this suggests that the implemention of a ‘late rentier’ development strategy can, paradoxically, contribute to the emergence of societal dissatisfaction. In the case of 2015 Qatari labour reform, complete overhaul of the labour system is unlikely to occur solely as a result of external pressure, particularly where the state must remain responsive to its domestic citizenry, who are concerned about what reform might mean for their status in a country where they are already vastly outnumbered by migrant workers. Without theoretical space for these international and transnational dimensions of state-society relations and, crucially, the interaction between these international variables and domestic societal actors, RST risks overemphasising the autonomy of the state, whereas it seems more likely that oil and gas-rich Gulf states are not isolated politically, economically, or socially, from regional and international pressures. International variables, then, must be more directly integrated into the core understanding of state-society relations in rent-rich states.

When it comes to transnational ideologies in the Arab world, few are as powerful as that of the Muslim Brotherhood, the region's oldest and most organised Islamist group. Following the uprisings of the Arab Spring that resulted in Muslim Brotherhood-led governments in Egypt and Tunisia, rulers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, though not traditionally sites of Islamist complaint, came to focus on the potential political influence of Muslim Brotherhood organisations at home. This paper will trace the ways in which transnational migration patterns initially provided space for ideological influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf, as well as how such migratory flows altered individual government policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood, with particular emphasis on the cases of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In so doing, we will also examine ways in which the relative strength of the rival transnational ideology of Arab nationalism affected the flow of Islamist migrants into the Gulf in addition to government views of these new residents. Though the experiences of the GCC states with the Muslim Brotherhood were initially quite similar, with all governments welcoming Brotherhood implants to staff their nascent education and judicial systems at a time of heightened Arab nationalist complaint, they later changed course, as illustrated by the current and 2014 Gulf crisis. This paper will take into account how and why states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE that are otherwise quite similar developed strikingly different policies, both in terms of regulating migration and monitoring the local population, when it comes to the transnational ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. It will also assess the extent to which such states have aimed either to aid or to cripple the Brotherhood movement across borders through major foreign policy decisions, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

The profuse literature on Gulf security mostly analyses regional issues through the lens of Western interests and sensitivities rather than through a focus on the Arab Gulf States’ own perception of their strategic environment and on the specific strategies they deploy accordingly. Yet, foreign and defense policies of Gulf States, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and, more recently, Saudi Arabia, have greatly evolved in the past decades – along the lines of what the author calls “Small Princes-States” Defense Strategies. As a result of new regional and international incentives meeting with new internal priorities, they have gradually moved from survival strategies based on external security guarantors to an exceptional form of relative autonomy given the traditional status of small states in international relations. In particular, they have diversified their defense cooperation and military procurement partnerships, in order to be less dependent on one given ally. Since 2011, they have also demonstrated a new assertiveness on the regional stage and beyond to suppress perceived threats to their security and stability, but also to defend their interests by projecting their forces and influence on many external theaters. Now, in a context where the three states do not always defend the same interests, this sometimes leads to additional tensions in the environment they are engaging in. These issues are crucial to explore today as the stato- or ego-centric approaches of these Princes-States’ leaders run counter to internal and external incentives to move towards unity and cooperation rather than towards more individual strategies leading to increased regional and global insecurity. This paper presents the general dynamics of the Emirati, Qatari and Saudi recent move from survival strategies, to relative autonomy, to assertive power plays on the regional stage and beyond. It explores how their new policies play out in a shifting regional and international environment, against the backdrop of persisting tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and of increased rivalry with Iran, which also benefited from the power vacuum associated with the unfolding of regional events since 2011. Finally, the paper will confront these realities to critical approaches of Gulf security by deconstructing the idea that individual political and military dimensions of security matter more than non-traditional (economic, societal and environmental) dimensions of security or transnational issues such as terrorism which could all lead to increased unity and cooperation.

Salafism has received scrutiny as the main ideological source for violent extremism propagated by jihadi groups. There is a significant corpus of literature discussing transnational jihadi networks, especially after the ‘9/11’ attacks in the United States. These discussions include the radicalisation of Salafi thoughts by jihadi theoreticians and ‘ulama. However, Salafism is not a monolith: it contains numerous streams. An understanding of all such streams is crucial to understanding the socio-political dynamics of Muslim societies that Salafism influences. Besides Salafi jihadis—those who sanction violence—there are two other broad trends of Salafism: quietist and activist. Quietist Salafis endorse an apolitical tradition. Activist Salafis advocate peaceful political change. Each stream is led by ‘ulama, seen as the preservers of Salafi traditions. The quietist and activist ‘ulama are vigorous agents affecting Muslim societies in the Arab world. Until now, the works of scholars on such clerics have been explored within the framework of country-specific studies, focusing on internal clerical dynamics in countries such as Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen. Some studies explore the development of Salafi movements and the religious institutions that promote Salafi ascendancy in Muslim societies. However, there is very little literature assessing the origins, interactions and dynamics of the transnational networks of Salafi clerics in the region, and how quietist and activist ‘ulama work across borders to preserve and promote what they see as “authentic” Salafism. Similarly, the competition and cooperation between the two streams are often explored within the framework of domestic concerns and not transnational interactions. This paper analyses the transnational networks of Salafi Sunni Muslim ‘ulama, encompassing principally Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It examines how these networks of conservative ‘ulama have been developed and sustained, while taking into consideration the contest between their alternative political persuasions: activists versus quietists. The paper evaluates the impacts of local and regional circumstances on the transnational networks of Salafi ‘ulama. It examines how these networks are fostered or destabilised by these interactions, resulting in contestations and negotiations over Salafi religious and political identities.