Between 2011 and 2020, three waves of a panel survey have been carried out in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. In Egypt, of a nationally representative sample of 3,496 adults interviewed in 2011, 2,430 were re-interviewed in 2016 (response rate of 70%). To compensate for sample attrition, 1,428 additional interviews were conducted, bringing the total of interviews to 3,858. Of this number, 3441 were located and re-interviewed in 2020. In Turkey, of a nationally representative sample of 3,019 adults interviewed in 2013, 1,682 were re-interviewed in 2016 (a response rate of 56%), plus a sample of 1,077 additional interviews to compensate for sample attrition, bringing the total to 2,759. Of this number, 1442 respondents were re-interviewed plus a sample of 1063 additional interviews were conducted to compensate for sample attrition, bringing the total of interviews to 2505 in 2020. In Tunisia of a nationally representative sample of 3,070 respondents interviewed in 2013, 2,395 were re-interviewed in 2015 (a response rate of 78%). Of this number, 1485 respondents were re-interviewed plus a sample of 913 additional interviews to compensate for sample attrition, bringing the total to 2398 interviews in 2020. Altogether, the three waves produced a total of 26,941 completed interviews. The analysis of these extensive datasets across the three countries in three waves show significant changes in the sociopolitical and cultural values of the respondents toward expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, liberal values, and religious tolerance in Egypt and Turkey. While the Tunisian respondents were also experiencing the same trend between wave one and wave two, in wave three there was a significant drop in their support for secular politics, liberal values, and religious tolerance. Attitudes toward gender equality, however, remained unchanged among the Tunisian respondents between the last two waves. This paper further discusses the implications of this trend for a better understanding of cultural change across the three countries and beyond in the post Arab Spring.

Despite the value of assessing opinion expression in free and consolidated democracies, exploring the willingness of opinion expression in non-democratic settings remains limited. Examinations of people’s communication behaviors under alternative political regimes can help demonstrate if the exchange of opinions online might engender alternative political impacts in settings where citizens may desire greater levels of political engagement. This study compares opinion expression in incongruent offline and online settings on the issue of gender desegregation in Kuwait’s public schools. Given the competing social perspectives that exist, gender desegregation is an issue that wields strong opinions on either side of the debate, though a conservative view currently predominates publicly. The Spiral of Silence theory provides the foundation for examining the impact of cultural conformity, religiosity, Twitter-use variables, and traditional SOS theoretical components, including the fear of social isolation and perceptions of current and future opinion climates, on Kuwaitis’ willingness to express their opinions both offline and online. Based on a questionnaire administered to 534 public and private university students, multiple regressions and analyses of variance tests were performed which demonstrated that, overall, most people preferred to express opinions in offline rather than online settings. Some people who are characteristically expressive offline continued to be so online, but more often, those who use Twitter frequently moderated their opinion expression. Other respondents were more interested in reading opinions on Twitter than they were in expressing their own. Offline and online, the nonconformist personality variable was a positive predictor of opinion expression. Fear of social isolation was not only a negative predictor of offline opinion expression, but it was the strongest of all predictors. Two additional impediments to offline opinion expression were identification of religious certainty and the fear of social isolation, demonstrating the substantial impact of dominant cultural norms on opinion expression. From these results, it seems that on the issue of gender desegregation, in a Kuwaiti context at least, the Twittersphere does not appear to be facilitating a more robust public debate of the type that might provoke a reevaluation of the status quo. Rather it appears to be contributing the opposite effect.

An increase in positive emotions towards an outgroup is often taken for granted as a necessary step for conflict resolution. Evaluative studies of intergroup encounters between Israelis and Palestinians generally measure the success of these programs through their ability to increase participants’ positive feelings towards each other. Several recent studies however have complicated these assumptions. For example, while empathy appears to decrease aggressive attitudes during times of violent escalation in Israel/Palestine, it does not appear to predict support for a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Scholars have also noted the productive role of “negative” emotions such as anger in intergroup encounters. In line with these findings, a growing number of researchers and practitioners have explored the benefits of a more confrontational approach to dialogue programs that forgoes some immediate positive feelings in order to cultivate a deeper recognition of structural violence and inequalities. This study examines the role of sympathy in motivating political thinking and actions among dialogue program participants in order to clarify the role of empathetic emotions in mobilizing Israelis and Palestinians against injustice. Participants in an immersive dialogue program were surveyed before and after the program to assess its impact on participants’ feelings towards each other as well as their political attitudes and behaviors. Respondents included 55 Israeli and Palestinian teenagers who participated in a two-week interfaith dialogue program run by the non-profit organization “Jerusalem Peacebuilders.” Pre- and post-program survey data were analyzed to determine whether those participants who experienced significant increases in sympathy towards each other also experienced changes in their political attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, this paper addresses whether increased levels of sympathy predicted changes in participants’ political ideology, empowerment, commitment to peace, as well as the types of political actions that participants supported. My findings complicate the assumption that changes in sympathy towards an outgroup translate into political attitudes and actions that advance social justice. By demonstrating the range of relationships between sympathy and certain political views and forms of mobilization, this paper calls for a deeper understanding of the ways that intergroup dialogue contributes to a just peace.

Authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia are hardly known for their comedic output, and yet comedy often constitutes a useful medium for political expression within repressive conditions due to its multivalent and ostensibly unserious nature. Comedians may plausibly deny responsibility for any political impact, even as their messaging goes viral. Yet most studies of political comedy focus on a handful of US programs, such as “The Daily Show,” and their impact on domestic public opinion. This paper contributes by (1) expanding the focus to political comedy produced within an authoritarian regime—Saudi Arabia—and (2) assessing the impact of such comedy on international public opinion. Specifically, the paper offers qualitative insights gained from interviews with prominent Saudi comedians and data from an experiments on the effects of their comedic messages on US and Australian respondents. For the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to view a comedy video that went viral and was produced by the Saudi comedians to spoof ultra-conservative clerics’ opposition to women driving (“No Woman, No Drive,” a satirical take on Bob Marley). After the media stimulus, respondents completed a survey focusing on stereotypes about Saudi Arabia and the broader Middle East as well as attitudes toward the US role in the region. With theoretical footing in broader work on political comedy effects, the paper discusses the effects of the comedy stimulus on US public opinion in comparison to two alternative media treatments—traditional news footage as well as a Saudi government-produced tourism promotional video—and also a no-media control group.