Distributive social contracts in the Gulf monarchies have been key factors in maintaining their vaunted political stability. But these rentier social contracts are based on an unsustainable practice: Encouraging domestic demand for chief export commodities. This paper argues that a variable that once explained the longevity of these monarchies – the in-kind distribution of energy – now threatens their survival. This variable, which has been aggregated within the rentier literature among the broader distribution of resource rents, carries different properties and more damaging implications for political structures, and warrants separate treatment. If this special group of rent-distributing states is unable to arrest growth in domestic demand for export commodities (and unable to diversify into replacement sources of rents or energy) exports will suffer. This paper argues that theories of politics of rentier states should acknowledge this contradiction and concede the possibility of its reform, through the social contract. The research shows that reforms which would reduce citizen welfare benefits are underway. The paper offers results predicting that further reforms are likely in some – but not all – Gulf monarchies. These reforms, which run contrary to existing theory, are possible because the alternative is worse. If the Gulf monarchies are unable to arrest growth in domestic demand for export commodities, the subsequent drop in exports and rent receipts will force changes in the character of governance, if not in the regimes themselves.

The importance of oil and gas for MENA countries, their states, economies and international relations is well documented in the academic literature. Oil rents are crucial in financing many of the region’s states either directly or indirectly via aid and migrant remittances. Natural gas has developed into a central pillar of rapidly growing domestic energy consumption and efforts at economic diversification. The region’s food import dependence also emerged as a strategic concern in the wake of the global food crisis of 2008 as it imports about a third of globally trade cereals. Prices for non-hydrocarbon minerals (NHM) like aluminum, iron ore or copper did rise during the commodity boom of the 2000s as well and globally strategic interests were raised. Large importers of raw materials like China, Germany, or the US pondered the need to secure supplies via investments, storage and trade policies. Some exporters tried to take advantage of market dominating positions. China implemented export restrictions for Rare Earth Minerals and iron ore producers were successful in pushing for higher prices in an oligopolistic and intransparent market. In contrast to their prominence in global energy and food markets, MENA countries do not seem to figure in the global geo-economics of NHM, neither as large importers nor as large exporters. Yet, some countries either have substantial production and exports in key minerals or they have import needs of feedstock that they try to secure via strategic policies. Morocco for example has a whopping three quarters of global phosphate reserves after the recent reserve revision by the USGS and Gulf countries try to secure their import needs for iron ore and alumina via foreign direct investments in Africa and India. The paper is based on available literature and statistics, grey material and interviews with executives in the respective natural resources sectors. It outlines countries and minerals in the MENA region that play a role in the global geo-economics of NHM and takes a look at key actors from the public and private sectors. It compares the strategies that the various countries have adopted and analyzes how this manifested itself in policies, development plans, mining codes and institution building. It also takes a look at the social and environmental problems that are often associated with mining operations. The focus is on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Morocco, Iran and Turkey.

Overlooked in the tumult of the Arab Spring has been Qatar, which holds the distinction of being the only country in the region to avoid any political unrest. For many observers and analysts, the country’s political stability is no puzzle. Classic rentier state theory argues that these states can distribute their vast reserves of externally produced wealth to keep their citizens politically apathetic and acquiescent (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Ross 2001, 2012). For decades, this theory has superseded concerns over legitimate power and persuasion in the rentier states of the Arab Gulf. Yet Qatar provides a salient example of a quintessential rentier state interacting with its citizens contrary to theoretical expectations. Despite the billions spent on welfare and other economic benefits for its citizens, Qatar invests tremendous additional effort and resources in strengthening its legitimacy through religious preservation, national identity promotion, and cultural mega-projects. The case of Qatar challenges a fundamental assumption of classic rentier state theory—that the economic relationship between ruler and ruled is the only interaction necessary to maintain political stability. By examining Qatar’s legitimization efforts, I show that rentier states are not as exceptional as once perceived. Rentier states must interact with their societies in very similar ways as do productive states; the difference is in resources but not in scope (Herb 1999; Foley 2010). This paper also makes a methodological contribution by introducing a new and original data set—an 800-person survey of Qatari citizens that utilizes contextualized questions and anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2004) to ensure that both the question and the answer are understood appropriately. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods through an in-depth case study of Qatar—an increasingly important player in regional politics and the global economy—results in specific and well-supported evidence to revise a broad and oft-cited theory. The paper uses the example of Qatar’s nation-building legitimization projects—in the fields of culture, nationalism, and religion—to illustrate the ways in which the state supplies its citizens with reasons to support the state beyond economic allocation. Further, I present tangible evidence that societal justification of the current regime is high, for reasons beyond riyals and dirhams. This paper provides useful information on the politics of Qatar while advancing theoretical and methodological research in studies of the Middle East and political economy.