The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with roughly 85% of their population comprised of non-citizen foreigners, present a unique opportunity to understand immigrant integration. Existing paradigms rooted in the study of immigration in Western contexts fall short in capturing the nuances of integration trajectories within exclusionary and ethnocratic regimes like the Gulf, often dismissing immigrant inclusion as an impossibility. However, despite the strict kafala sponsorship system and nationality-based migration hierarchies that undoubtedly constrain migrant life, inclusion does occur. Immigrants in the Gulf carve out dynamic social relationships, become deeply embedded in economic activities, forge meaningful political identities, and articulate a sense of belonging that suggests scholars must rethink the notion of immigrant inclusion altogether. Based on 35 in-depth interviews with both high- and low-skilled migrants from Europe, the U.S. and Asia in the State of Qatar, this research finds that immigrant integration occurs primarily vis-à-vis the diaspora community itself and is shaped by two dynamics. First, the sheer size, diversity, and interconnectedness of the broader diaspora community in Qatar helps migrants avoid the traditional pitfalls of excessive co-ethnic network dependence and isolation. Through regular interaction with the international community, migrants acquire valuable cultural and migrant capital that facilitates meaningful economic and social mobility despite restrictive state policies and institutions. Second, access to the international diaspora allows migrants to break away from identity structures that may otherwise define them in their home countries (i.e. caste, tribe) and reinvent themselves. The resulting hybrid identities shape both the sense of inclusion articulated by the migrants in Qatar, as well as the nature of the social remittances they transmit home. The interview data confirms that both processes represent unique sources of empowerment, belonging, and social mobility for migrants in highly exclusionary integration contexts, and suggests a path forward in the research on immigrant integration in non-Western contexts.

Since 2000s, there have been a range of countries in the Middle East placing greater emphasis on strategic autonomy. In this regard, the United Arab Emirates is an important case, which has been much more assertive and activist in its foreign and security policy as well as making every efforts to bolster internal capabilities in defense, diplomacy, energy, and technology to achieve strategic autonomy since the Arab uprisings of 2011. This article proposes that UAE’s rising profile and its quest for strategic autonomy may be studied through the changes of its national role orientation. National role orientation is an important variable in the formulation and implementation of a country's foreign policy, and it is also the result of the combined effects of various factors, including geopolitical environment, country size, resource endowment, and policymakers’ tendency. Since its establishment in 1971, the UAE's foreign policy can be divided into three stages: 1971-1990, 1990-2011, 2011 up to now. During these three stages, the UAE has successively witnessed changes of its national role orientation and the corresponding transformation of foreign policies: from “a small state bandwagoning with the regional power (Saudi Arabia)” to “an emerging regional power bandwagoning with the global power (America)”, then to “a key regional power hedging between global powers (America and China)”. Based on different national roles and foreign policies, the UAE used multiple policy tools, including foreign aid, conflict mediation, military intervention, as well as state branding in the fields of education, museums, exhibitions, sports and aviation.

This paper aims to reveal Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies toward the Rohingya Crisis in 2012–19 using Arabic sources. It examines Saudi Arabia’s domestic protection of the Rohingya and its foreign policy of engaging the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to pressure the Myanmar government. Saudi Arabia’s actions constitute omnibalancing behavior. The Rohingya have been repeatedly exposed to human rights violations and violence in Myanmar since the 1970s and forcibly displaced internally and externally. According to English-language international media, Saudi Arabia has done nothing to support the Rohingya. However, such reports are false. Saudi Arabia's comprehensive project on improving the life standards of the Rohingya residents in the Mecca slum district was praised by an UN officer for being the “first in the world” of its kind. Saudi Arabia supports Rohingya who do not engage in terrorism. Saudi Arabia does not have leverage in Southeast Asian politics unilaterally but has condemned the Myanmar government for committing genocide. Saudi Arabia chose the OIC as a tool to engage in the Rohingya crisis after it failed to mobilize the United Nations for this purpose. The OIC has addressed the Rohingya crisis more efficiently than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; in 2019, the Gambia sued the Myanmar government for the crime of genocide in the International Court of Justice, which issued a provisional order directing the Myanmar government to stop its repeated violence against the Rohingya. Thus, Saudi Arabia has been effectively supporting the Rohingya in the domestic and international spheres. This paper applies and adopts omnibalancing theory to explain Saudi Arabia’s domestic and external behavior in supporting the Rohingya. Omnibalancing theory was proposed in 1991 in the field of international relations. It criticizes both classical realism and structural realism, stating that states in the Third World have to balance internal and external threats rationally rather than balancing external threats only. However, this theory has been largely neglected, and only a limited number of case studies have been published. The policy implications of omnibalancing theory should be revised to cover Global South issues, including refugees, and include an analysis of the interactions of states and regional organizations.

The role of the IMF in the global financial architecture and in the Middle East more specifically, has been under scrutiny for a variety of reasons. From those who argue that it creates moral hazard among states to those who see the IMF’s conditionality as an infringement on a countries sovereignty. Both sides often argue that the prescribed policies do not have the intended consequences of turning debtor countries into thriving economies for its citizens. Lately calls for reform of the IMF have received additional attention due to the changing balance of power in global finance and monetary relations. The rise of China, its bilateral financial support and the new international institutions it has set up, have added to the new international reality in which the IMF has to operate. In addition, the Gulf monarchies with their sovereign wealth funds, have become larger and more assertive in their international financial operations. Their role in the Middle East has changed since 2011. It is therefore of interest to question in what way debtor countries, like Egypt, have seen their bargaining power change vis-à-vis the IMF and what repercussions this has had on the money flows from the IMF and the prescribed policies. Do we indeed witness less funds being drawn from the IMF by Egypt? Is the IMF less stringent with its conditionality and is it allowing Egypt more leeway in designing its policy response to an economic crisis? This article tries to address the point whether we see any shift in neoliberal policies applied by the IMF in Egypt. I argue that, despite the backlash against the IMF and the changing global context in which it operates, the Egyptian case shows that the position of the IMF has actually been strengthened, both in terms of the financial role the IMF plays as well as in terms of the neoliberal policies prescribed by the IMF. The key to understand this paradoxical position lies in the interplay between regional politics, the role of the Gulf states in the global financial world and the Egyptian domestic political economy. The regional geopolitical context determines the donors, while the domestic political economy situation influences the type of financial flows and how they change over time, especially after the fall of President Mubarak in 2011.