The parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict have seen over the years countless third-party peacemakers come and go. Many have tried and failed – to a greater or lesser extent – to broker deals that would bring one of the world’s most intractable disputes closer to resolution. Scholars, in tow, have produced a rich body of literature analysing third-party involvement, an intellectual effort directed primarily at identifying the conditions for successful mediation. In presenting a sample of the latest research on third-party engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the proposed panel will explore the state of the field today. Each paper will highlight a different case of third-party involvement, and offer a distinct take on the key questions of why third-parties opt to engage in mediation efforts, and what factors contribute to effective mediation. The first paper will shed new light on the Madrid Peace Process. Hosted by the government of Spain and co-sponsored by the United State and the Soviet Union, the Madrid conference of 1991 brought Israel, the Palestinians and Syria to the negotiations table. The study draws on negotiation analysis to identify the parties’ respective strategies, and evaluate the role of third-party mediation in bridging the marked power asymmetry between the negotiating parties. In late 1992, against the background of the ongoing official Madrid negotiations, the first in a series of secret meetings took place in Oslo between Israelis and Palestinians. The second paper will explore the role played a weak and (theoretically) impartial mediator, Norway, in the Oslo Peace Process. It will trace the evolution of Norway’s role from low-key facilitator to active mediator, explaining why Norway had succeeded where the United States had failed. The third paper will outline the mechanisms by which Israel navigates peace negotiations and third-party mediation efforts. The unparalleled success of the Israeli negotiation tactics will be examined through an analysis of a series of negotiating games charted overtime, starting with the Camp David 1979, and on to Oslo 1993, Camp David 2000, and Sharm el Sheikh 2001/2002. The fourth paper will focus on Turkey – the only regional power that has managed to keep out of the conflict that in many ways has come to define the region. The paper will seek to explain the gap between Turkey’s expressed eagerness to play significant third-party roles in the Arab-Israeli peace process since 1948, and its actual level of involvement and effectiveness.
International Relations/Affairs
-
Mr. Can Ozcan
The paper aims to explore influence of impartiality of the Turkey’s mediation efforts since 2002 in the conflicts of Israel-Syria and Israel-Palestine on the Turkey’s mediation outcomes perceived by the disputants which are Israel, Palestine and Syria. This research examines the mediation process as a triangular process rather than dyadic by taking every disputants’ perception towards the mediator into account.
To this aim, comparative case study is used which is Turkey’s mediation efforts in Syrian- Israeli and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts since 2002. The comparative case study method I use is the Most Similar System Designs (MSSD) in which cases are chosen because they are similar in most of the aspects. The cases differ on only one or two independent variables
The research consists of a textual analysis and in depth interviews. Most of the data used in this study derived from the official declarations of high level policy makers of Turkey, Israel, Palestine and Syria since 2002 as well as qualified newspaper accounts and academic writings. In order to complement those sources, interviews were conducted with the high level foreign policy makers of Turkey.
The research question focuses on a particular area of disagreement in the mediation literature which pertains to the role of impartiality in facilitator/communicator strategies. The findings of the research have implications both in theory and policy. Theoretically, the research indicate that ongoing discussions in the literature about the influence of the impartiality on the effective mediation outcome is not sufficient enough to capture all the aspects of the mediation process. I argue that impartiality single-handedly is not solely enough to initiate a successful mediation, rather a mediator ought to have balanced bias with each disputant.
Second theoretical implication as this study demonstrated that the distinction between impartiality in behavior and attitude should be differentiated as they causes different outcomes in the mediation process.
In terms of policy implications, the findings show that Turkey as a mediator could utilize its partiality by establishing a balanced relative bias towards disputants in order to achieve successful outcomes. Secondly, Turkey’s impartiality in behavior, not necessarily impartiality in attitude; has a more positive influence on achieving successful outcomes.
-
Started in 1991 in Madrid, the Middle East peace process has gathered three key actors of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Israel, the Palestinians and Syria. What lessons can be drawn from the process? Why did the talks fail to reach a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict? The purpose of this study is to shed new light on the process that brought the Palestinians and Syria to negotiate with Israel, and compare their respective strategies, process and outcomes. Power asymmetry in favour of Israel has been a constant feature of the process, but the asymmetry was differently addressed by the Palestinians and the Syrians in their choice of strategies. The two tracks were also contrasted by Israel to extract additional concessions on the part of Palestinians. The role of power, in shaping strategies, perceptions and negotiation outcomes, is therefore evaluated. Core issues – borders, security, water, Jerusalem, refugees- are identified and construed against the background of the overall conflict between Israel and its neighbours over the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. The study draws on negotiation analysis and a conceptual framework is introduced to identify the parties’ strategies over twenty years, the impact of time on their respective bargaining positions, and explore possible links between actors, structure, process and outcomes. The research is based on primary and secondary sources, including official position papers, recently leaked confidential documents, interviews with key policymakers, first-hand accounts, and print media in English, Arabic and French. The underlying objective is also to assess the strongest party (Israel)’s strategy in the negotiations, and to question whether the objective was to maintain rather than challenge the existing status quo. The role of third-party mediation is evaluated, mainly in its nature (impartial/partial, facilitative/manipulative) and (in)effectiveness in bridging power asymmetry. The paper also evaluates the obstacles on the road to peace, and the potential for a resumption of wider peace talks for a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict over land and water in the new regional context.
-
Dr. Hilde Henriksen Waage
How could a small, cosy and secret setting in Norway in any way compete with, or replace, the huge and prestigious Middle East peace process that was taking place in Washington in 1993? It was Norway – and not the United States – that ultimately contributed to the Oslo Agreement. The United States knew nothing and was kept in the dark. How can this be explained? When the Oslo process started in 1992–93, the Norwegians had come in as low-key facilitators; they had no intention of acting as mediators. But, gradually, the Norwegians moved into a new role, as an active mediator. But Norway was not a mediator on equal terms with both the Israelis and the Palestinians. Norway could not alter the power asymmetry between the two sides. It was no superpower, and it could not force solutions on unwilling parties. Israel was the stronger party, with a clear national security agenda, and it was unwilling to concede much. The PLO was the weaker party, willing to accept little in order to avoid further marginalization. Norway had to be acceptable not to both parties, but mainly to the stronger party, Israel. Its mediating role demanded such a loyalty. Like it or not, there was nothing Norway could do about this situation: this was Norway’s room for manoeuvre. Indeed, Israel had found an easier counterpart in Oslo than in Washington. Compared with the superpower, Norway was also a much more willing instrument, one that was more prepared to accept Israeli conditions. Thus, Israel chose the weak PLO and little Norway to obtain more, to protect Israeli self-interests and, hence, to get its own way. As a consequence, the United States was deliberately kept uninformed and was even misled by two of its closest friends and allies: Norway and Israel. The paper is based on a wide variety of sources, including recently declassified (and partly still classified) documents filed at the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs, records of the Norwegian government and parliamentary proceedings, and documents from the US state department. In addition Norwegian newspapers have been examined, and a large number of interviews conducted with key actors in Norway, Sweden, the United States, and the Middle East.
-
Dr. Shelley Deane
Israel navigates negotiations and third party mediation efforts with unparalleled success. Adopting a rational actor game theoretic approach to successful negotiations from 1979 Camp David Agreement on, Israel perfects the art of talking while conceding little. By identifying and prioritizing state level preferences often at odds on the internal domestic state level Israel’s success at avoiding sub-optimal state preferences revealing themselves at the state –to-state level highlights the successful mechanisms of a within-state coalition regime. Drawing on the US Institute for Peace’s publication “How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate”’ (2005, Tamara Cofman
Ed.) This paper considers the institutional, organization, procedural and precedent forming policies adopted and adapted by successive Israeli Government coalitions overtime. Examining the ways in which Israel perfects a regime based on hard and soft power manifestations of the norms and guiding principles of the state’s politically relevant military and bureaucratic elites.
The success of the Israeli coalition regime is examined through a series of negotiating games (Camp David 1979, Oslo 1993, Camp David 2000, Sharm el Sheikh 2001/2) where Israel exercises the capacity to substantiate, support, sabotage or successfully spoil efforts at third party
mediation. Finally, using archive documents, first person interviews and secondary sources, the paper addresses the opportunities provided to mediators and the benefits evident to third parties in pursuing an iterated analysis of a series of negotiations charted overtime.
