This article assesses the prevalence and implications of the research foci methodological nationalism, methodological globalism, and transnationalism in publications regarding the 2011 Arab uprisings. We propose a new typology that contrasts state-centered methodological nationalism with the cosmopolitan lens of methodological globalism as two opposite ends of a spectrum. Transnationalism is conceptualized in between these two, due to its sensitivity to multiple localities and cross-border variables. We compare the merits and limits of these three research foci through quantitative research and content analysis. Our systematic review of one decade of scholarship on the Arab uprisings suggests a consistent trend toward the dominance of methodologically nationalist research approaches in Middle Eastern studies. This is surprising because the multilocal nature of the Arab uprisings suggests that it can best be analyzed transnationally. This article, therefore, critically discusses the methodological nationalist bias to better understand and illustrate the trend. We conclude by highlighting some comparative advantages offered by transnational perspectives on actors and processes in the Arab uprisings and its aftermath.

This paper reflects on ongoing research carried out with and by Palestinian Citizen Social Scientists based in the West Bank before and during Israel’s war on Gaza. We argue that community-based Citizen Social Science can offer unique insights into complex, shifting local attitudes to the heightened forms of violence currently being inflicted on Palestinians by the Israeli occupation. Citizen Social Scientists’ embeddedness enables them to not only coproduce knowledge about violence in both its spectacular and more mundane forms, but also to develop affective data from experiences of vulnerability, empathy, and resilience. The paper is based on 40 interviews conducted by Palestinian Citizen Social Scientists in their own communities in late September and early October 2023. The hour-long, in-depth discussions focused on the meaning of a ‘good life’ and how to build it in a situation of ongoing settler colonial occupation. The joint analysis of these interviews is supplemented by reflections from a series of workshops in which Citizen Social Scientists considered the altered meanings of the data they had collected under the new circumstances. These give insight into how Palestinian residents view periods of relative calm vs. outright war in a long-standing situation of settler-colonial occupation. The complexities of coordinating Citizen Social Science research in Palestine after 7th October 2023 draw attention to differential psychological, economic and group dynamics alongside physical dangers. The findings highlight gaps in existing methodological literature about Citizen Science and research in violent contexts. We show that Israel’s war on Gaza has led to nuanced re-evaluations of conceptualisations of, and feelings about, quality of life under colonial occupation in the West Bank. These rework rather than replace understandings developed before the war. The paper therefore argues that literature on extreme Citizen Science and ethnographic fieldwork in situations of conflict and violence needs to take account of transdisciplinary teams that coproduce knowledge. Citizen Social Science methods thus enable a nuanced approach to studying visions of a ‘good life’ in Palestine in relation to changing levels in the Israeli occupation’s violence. Such methods demand heightened attention to risks and expanded care practices.

This paper explores the manifestations of sectarian and national identity in Lebanon through an analysis of the results of an independent and experimental public opinion survey conducted in 2024. Lebanon has preserved sectarian and religious-based identities through the confessional political system since its independence. While Lebanese national unity has been promoted, Lebanese citizens are institutionally expected to identify with their own sects, and this has sometimes fostered political conflicts and violent civil wars. However, the manifestation of sectarian identity has not always been constant throughout time. For example, political elites such as party leaders tend to refrain from sectarian attitudes and to provoke nationalistic narratives in the run-up to elections when the electoral system makes cooperation with other sects crucial for victory. Previous studies have pointed to such institutional factors as one of the determinants of Lebanese political orientation toward sectarianism or nationalism. Based on this, this study seeks to fill two research gaps: first, the impact of non-institutional factors, especially changes in the macro-political environment, on Lebanese sectarian and national identity, and second, not only the impact of elite discourse (e.g. mobilization strategies), but also non-elite perceptions of sectarianism and nationalism. Bridging these gaps will provide new insights into previous studies that have tended to discuss the reality of sectarianism in Lebanon from the perspective of elite-driven political dynamism, while at the same time contributing to a deeper understanding of the reality of Lebanon’s confessionalism. By analyzing the results of a survey experiment using two scenarios, one of growing domestic political instability and the other of increasing foreign military threats, this paper analyzes trends and patterns in the changing attitudes of non-elite Lebanese (citizens) toward sectarianism and nationalism. The question is: under what attributes and under what conditions do citizens tend to gravitate toward sectarianism and/or nationalism? Previous studies on Lebanon’s sectarian politics have been enriched with mainly qualitative methods such as discourse analysis. However, or because of it, few have sufficiently dealt with the perceptions of non-elite citizens. This is likely due to the limitations of reliable data collections. In contrast, this paper conducts its own independent public opinion survey and also uses experimental methods to obtain answers to sensitive questions on sectarian and national identity.

The 1947-49 Zionist assault on Palestine’s Indigenous population, culminating in country-wide ethnic cleansing operations that brought about the removal of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their ancestral homeland, has been portrayed as a historical fabrication by all Israeli governments to date. Although the perpetration of the Nakba, regarded by some scholars as Palestine’s first genocide, has been definitively established by overwhelming and irrefutable evidence, Nakba denialism has been continuously supported by prominent Israeli academics and public intellectuals. How can this state of affairs be explained? Guided by Patrick Wolfe’s logic of elimination theory and Stanley Cohen’s states of denial theory, this paper examines Israel’s internal discourse of denial through analysis of Israeli Supreme Court cases from the 1950s concerning expulsions of Palestinians from Israeli-occupied territories that were allocated for a Palestinian state in the 1947 UN Partition Plan, a subject that has been examined only by a handful of studies. It argues that the Court employed three distinct strategies to legitimate the continuation of these ethnic cleansing operations following the establishment of the state: legalism (i.e., the formulation of expulsion-enabling legal arguments), denialism (of pertinent facts that cannot be convincingly depicted as legal state conduct), and pseudo-moralism (that is, depicting the Palestinians as treacherous, dangerous, and thus deserving expulsion). Nevertheless, the paper shows that in several cases the Court did recognize that the Israeli military carried out illegal deportations of Palestinians (e.g., from Majd al-Krum, Mazra‘a, and Fureidis). That recognition, the paper shows, has not prevented contemporary commentators from denying that these illegal expulsions took place, even when faced with first-hand testimonies by Palestinians who survived these ethnic cleansing operations and ultimately became Israeli citizens. The paper concludes by showing that the same legitimation strategies have been used to enable the 2023-24 Gaza Genocide, thereby illuminating the workings of Israel’s settler-colonial structure and the ways in which prevalent narratives of mass violence are being configured and disseminated to justify the perpetuation of violence through the constant manipulation of history, law, and morality.