Much of the focus of the discussions about Tunisian Islamism has been on Ennahda, the ‘Renaissance’ party led by Rachid Ghannouchi. As the leading Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda has a long history in the country, and after the return of its leaders from exile to rapturous receptions, the party is playing a significant role in the construction of a new political system following its electoral victory in October 2011. The focus on Ennahda and Rachid Gannouchi is certainly legitimate because it represents the most popular political force in the country, but, as this paper will illustrate, attention should not be paid exclusively to Ennahda and Ghannouchi for two reasons. First, there are other Islamist formations that have emerged in the country since the democratic transition with some of them becoming increasingly relevant in the public debate despite their relative small size. Second, Ennahda itself is not the party of Ghannouchi exclusively and different factions are contained within it. This paper, building on field-work carried out in the country since 2008, offers an explanation for the transformation of Ennahda into a catch-all party with different and competing factions and provides some insights related to the emergence of alternative Islamist formations to Ennahda.

The events that occurred in 2011 in the Arab world lead to the coming to power of various Islamist political movements across the MENA region reactivating the debate about their genuine commitment to the concepts of both democracy and human rights. The Islamists strike back into politics was the consequence of electoral processes which took place not only in contexts of regime change but also in Morocco, which, despite being considered an ‘exception’ to the dramatic events that have occurred in other parts of North Africa, has nevertheless undergone an adjustment of its political system. It could be argued, in fact, that the main result of the Arab Spring in Morocco has been the creation of a new government in power led by the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Despite being allowed to participate in institutional politics as a ‘loyal opposition’ party since 1996 (Zeghal 2005), the PJD has had to self-limit its political activity in order to be tolerated by the regime (Willis 2004). With the aim of fully integrating into the political sphere, part of the PJD strategy has been the acceptance of the democratic and human rights discourses promoted by the regime (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2011). Nevertheless, only as a consequence of the events of 2011 was the PJD allowed to integrate into the official political game at the highest level. The appointment of a PJD prime minister by the King and the creation of a PJD government followed two main political events: the constitutional debate reform and the elections of 25th of November 2011. Through an analysis of the PJD’s role within the constitutional reform debate and of its 2011 electoral campaign, this paper will demonstrate how and to which extent the PJD’s embrace of the regime discourses concerning democracy and human rights has been internalized within the PJD. The paper first focuses on the programmatic choices and concrete actions that it argues are the result of the party’s ideological shift. Second, the paper examines how the practical adoption of human rights and democratic concepts have impacted the behavior of PJD leaders and members both in their internal party interactions and with other political and social actors. This research is based on interviews with PJD leaders and members between 2008-2012.

Concerns about the democratic credentials of Islamist political movements have long existed. Whether, and to what extent, Islamists have genuinely embraced notions of democracy, human rights, toleration of minorities and political pluralism have been sources of concern to a range of actors from the national to the international levels for many years. These concerns have been given renewed vigour in the aftermath of the events of 2011 in the Arab world as Islamist movements have seized the opportunities created by recent political openings across the region. Such concerns have particular resonance in the case of Yemen’s Islah party. The departure of long term president Saleh, the subsequent transfer of political power to his deputy and the installation of a government of national unity paved the way for the entry into government of Yemen’s largest opposition party, Islah. Islah, as originally established, brought together a number of strands in Yemeni Islamism from Salafi to the Muslim Brotherhood. The party had a close relationship with the ruling General People’s Congress and served in government with it in the 1990s. However, in recent years the party has espoused the discourse and practice of multiparty democracy and human rights. It has entered into coalition with a number of other opposition parties in Yemen, including the Yemen Socialist party and it is as part of this coalition that Islah has now re-entered government. This paper will explore the ideological and political shifts undergone by Islah in the past two decades. It will investigate the motivations for its democratic reorientation and will critically examine both the understanding of the concepts of democracy and human rights advocated by the party and the impact of their adoption on the political practice of the party. Finally, the paper will examine the relationship between the party and other political actors in Yemen, both inside and outside the formal political system in the context of its return to office. The paper will be based, in part, on primary research to be conducted in Yemen in the late Spring of 2012.

It is widely assumed that the 2009 massive protests in Iran called for more democracy and respect of human rights against Ahmaedinejad’s government and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. On that occasion, the rhetoric of democracy and human rights seemed to be a powerful tool against the regime. Yet a closer investigation reveals that the regime itself has adopted the ‘rhetorical tools’ of democracy and human rights, be this move either a mere tactics or a sincere belief (Schwedler 2011). Within the literature concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ‘democratic turn’ in the rhetoric of Iranian reformist groups and parties has been analysed extensively (Ansari, 2006; Khosrokhavar, 2000; Bayat, 2007), yet the same has not been applied to specific institutions of the regime, despite the fact that broad trends towards the employment of the same language have been detected (Osanloo 2009; Mahdavi 2011). In particular, ‘democracy’ has become a necessary reference within the political discourse: in order to be ‘legitimate’ and ‘authentic,’ political actors feel the need to refer to and engage with ideas and practices associated with the concept of ‘democracy’ (Holliday forthcoming 2012). This paper aims at examining the adherence of the regime itself to the rhetoric of democracy and human rights. In particular, the work of the Iranian Islamic Human Rights Commission, an institution founded by the regime in 1995, will be followed and analysed. Going beyond the debate on the compatibility between Islam and democracy, or the dilemma of moderation, this contribution wants to shed light on (1) the process of the translation of the notions of ‘human rights respect’ and ‘democratic government’ within the ideological system of the Islamic Republic and (2) on the space and ‘red lines’ associated to the adherence to human rights and democracy, thus analysing the interactions with other political and social actors as well. This investigation will be carried out through interviews to the members of the Islamic Human Rights Commission and the analysis of its documents (also available on the IHRC website).