Between the Armistice and the Treaty of Sèvres in August of 1920, there was a vigorous debate in the Istanbul press on how best to secure the future of the Ottoman domains. Two organizations led this effort and each were determined to maintain the Ottoman Empire through American and British financial aid and expertise respectively: the Wilsonian Principles Society and the Society of the Friends of England Association. These organizations emerged at the precise moment when the press flourished between Ottoman wartime and Allied occupation censorship regimes. While many of the supporters of these societies were liberals and former members of the of the pre-war Freedom and Accord Party, others would quickly become the mouthpieces of the nationalist regime in Ankara. Historians have treated the Wilsonian Principles Society and the Friends of England Association as a coherent political bloc that agitated for American or British intervention in order to secure a Turkish national state or in some cases a Turkish lead Pan-Islamic state. These studies by and large have assumed that the state fought for by partisans of each society was a Turkish national state, rather than the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. But a close examination of the press shows more diversity of opinion and a far greater inclination to remake the empire rather than make the state—a point that Mustafa Kemal fixated upon in his critique of the Istanbul press during the Armistice. This paper examines the mandate question as well as varying understandings of “Wilson principles” in the Istanbul press from October 1918 through the aftermath of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920. It looks at proposals for reorganizing the Ottoman Empire as well as how intellectuals understood the meaning of the mandates systems under the League of Nations. Well before the Supreme Allied Council publicly announced that the German colonies and Ottoman Arab provinces would become League mandates in late January of 1919, Ottoman intellectuals had debated the merits and dangers of American or European administrative and financial oversight in the Ottoman Empire. Some writers viewed the mandate idea as nothing more than a cover for the formal extension of European empire into the Middle East. Whereas other publicists understood the mandate idea as an internationally guaranteed state development project. I show that Ottoman intellectuals embraced “Wilsonian principles” as a pragmatic tool to maintain the empire, rather than make the Turkish state national.

Founded in the mid-nineteenth century in London as a Christian organization committed to helping young men develop a healthy “body, mind, and spirit,” the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) quickly evolved into a transnational organization with branches around the world. During the early twentieth century, the YMCA opened branches in urban centers throughout the Middle East, such as Istanbul, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. This paper focuses on the formation and expansion of the YMCA after the First World War in Istanbul. Specifically, it examines how the signing of the Armistice in 1918, which brought an end to the war and the Allied occupation of the capital, radically reconfigured the social, political, and cultural landscape in which the YMCA and other voluntary associations operated. According to an Armenian member of the YMCA in Istanbul in the early 1920s, “by the signing of the Armistice a new life came into the Association. New men began to come in bringing with them fresh power and enthusiasm. Members began to flock in again and the work was on a fresh start.” Prior to the war, the YMCA focused its energies on providing its members with Bible classes, concerts, excursions, and reading activities. After 1918, it embraced a more public role, by expanding its activities beyond reading and discussing religion, to include a diverse array of educational, social, and physical activities. This paper examines the relationship between the sociopolitical landscape of the period and the institutional and discursive shifts of the YMCA in Istanbul. Drawing from a diverse array of multilingual unpublished reports, surveys, newspapers, and vernacular photographs, this paper argues that the institutionalization and expansion of the YMCA during the armistice offers unique insights into the period, the city, and the formation of the organization as a transnational brotherhood. The argument advanced is part of a broader book project project, which examines the transition from empire to nation-state through the lens of the YMCA.

World War I was a turning point for millions of people in the Middle East. This paper will analyse the Armistice period from an Ottoman the point of view, especially from the one adopted by Ottoman subjects abroad at the end of the war. I will present case studies of Ottoman officers serving or living in Neutral Spain during the World War I. Combining the history of individuals with life stories, this contribution illuminates the lives of characters, with a micro-historical approach. How did these Ottoman officers respond to sudden collapse of their empire? Through Ottoman officers trajectories we will better apprehend the broad spectrum of the Ottoman army during the Armistice period. What were the opportunities at the present moment and the future for their future lives ? What were their visions for the post-war state? How were they involved in the continued warfare and violence? The trajectories of Aziz Ali al-Misri and Aref Bey will be presented. Aziz Ali al-Misri (1879-1965) is a controversial figure. Arab-Circassian, Ottoman Staff officer, he became general in the Sherifian Army of Sharif Husayn. Aziz Ali al-Misri came back to Egypt in February 1917 and then went to Spain in January 1918 where he stayed until the end of WorId War I and during the Armistice period and was networking with the British and German Embassies. What were Aziz Ali al-Misri’s projects during the Armistice period? During World War I, Aref Bey was based in Madrid at the Ottoman Embassy, working with Teskilat-i Mahusa (Ottoman Special Service) on a German-Ottoman subversive program in Morocco. During the summer of 1918, he returned to Istanbul where he became aide-de-camp of the new Sultan Mehmed VI Vahidettin. He participated in the Forces of Order, founded on April 1920 by the Ottoman government in Istanbul, a semi official military organization. Afterwards, he had to again seek exile in Europe with the ex-sultan’s retinue, not allowed to return to the Republic of Turkey, being on the list of the Yüzelliler, the hundred and fiftyers. This paper draws from various archives and documents throughout the different areas of the conflict, such as France, the Ottoman Empire, Morocco, Germany, and Great Britain.

This paper examines the Ottoman surrender of Medina to the leaders of the British-backed Arab Revolt, the Hashemites, in light of the waning confidence in their claim to be true Arab leaders to take the city at the start of the Arab Revolt in June 1916. With the signing of the Mudros Armistice on October 30, 1918, all hostilities with the Ottoman empire ceased and forces were called to surrender; however, a rogue Ottoman commander in Medina refused to give up the city until January 13, 1919. Those months negotiating the surrender of the city were more than just a curious episode in the history of the Middle East theatre. They revealed an underlying anxiety for the Hashemites, whose claim to authority in the Arab world rested in part on their descent from the Prophet Muhammad, who was entombed in Medina. The Hashemites had tried numerous times to take the holy city since the start of the Arab Revolt in June 1916 but failed to claim it despite making gains northward in Aqaba and in Syria. This inability ultimately represented a constant vulnerability for the Hashemites whose leader, Husayn ibn ‘Ali, had crowned himself King of the Arabs in October 1916. By tracing the arc of criticisms for the Hashemites in regards to Medina--how their rivals, Ottoman, Arab, and European, discussed their failure to take the city to how the resulting looting and pillaging that marked their entrance was discussed among Arab and Muslim circles--this paper challenges narratives and timelines that considered the end of the Arab Revolt to October 1918 with the triumphant entrances of Arab forces into Damascus and Aleppo. By focusing on events in the Hijaz at the end of World War I, this paper examines how the Hashemite project had already faltered before the colonial period that would see the Arab Middle East divided into British and French Mandates and their reputation besmirched by colonial collusion. For the Hashemites, Medina became a failure that besmirched their reputation as Arab leaders and the global protectors of Islam and would haunt them into the colonial period.