In the last three years alone, the approach of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) towards the country’s Kurdish population has swung from substantive overtures appearing to address the minority group’s main concerns to highly polarizing nationalist rhetoric, deadly sieges targeting Kurdish cities, and the persecution of individuals demonstrating support for the Kurdish cause. Prior to this devolution into crisis, the AKP had taken unprecedented steps toward resolving the decades-long conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) with the “Solution Process” (Çozüm Süreci) approach it announced in 2013. Most notably, the AKP crossed a former political red line in Turkish politics by holding secret negotiations with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. In return for promises to make concessions such as allowing legal defenses to be in one’s mother tongue, the Kurdish delegation – comprised, importantly, of politicians who publicly advocated a peaceful resolution to the conflict – promised to work towards the PKK’s laying down of arms and withdrawal from Turkish territory. While a solution to the “Kurdish Question,” whose contestation has cost tens of thousands of lives and has plagued the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923, seemed closer than ever in 2014, by the end of 2015 the country seemed poised on the brink of civil war. How are these political and societal swings possible? Rather detail the bafflingly intricate set of back-and-forth gambits in the rise and fall of the Kurdish Question under the AKP – many of which are disputed by each party to the renewed conflict – this paper explores the conditions of how the shift in perceptions of Kurds from enemies to allies to enemies again takes place. I employ social identity theory, an approach ideally suited to grappling with questions of Ingroup-Outgroup relations, to explain both how the initial, ground-breaking overtures by the AKP toward solving the Kurdish Question were possible, as well how Kurds went from partners to traitors in the government’s eyes. In brief, I argue that nothing inherent in the AKP’s understanding of Turkish national identity precludes the political expression of Kurdishness, but that failure to support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s vision of a presidential system that consolidated power in his own hands generated a shift in the AKP’s attitude toward Kurds from one of pride to one of prejudice, scuppering a prime opportunity to resolve the Kurdish Question.

A New Approach to Solving Turkey’s Kurdish Issue Turkey’s unresolved Kurdish issue has led to more than 40,000 deaths since 1984. After the latest ceasefire and renewed fighting, the devastation of major cities in the majority Kurdish area of the Southeast and the recent bombings around the country including cities such as Istanbul and Ankara it is starkly clear that this ethnic dispute continues to cause death and build anger and despair. This paper offers a different framework to restart negotiations and a renewal of hope to prepare the country for more successful negotiations through Track II diplomacy and “interactive problem-solving” as developed by John Burton and Herbert Kelman. Since 1984 there have been numerous attempts to negotiate a solution between the government and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Although there have been ceasefires they did not produce permanent resolutions. Most Turkish governments were reluctant to renounce a military solution or to abandon their “no negotiation with terrorists” policy. The present governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) seemed to be taking a different tack by convening secret talks from 2009-2011. Because of public disclosure these were abruptly ended. Negotiations were resumed in 2013 including high level AKP government officials, the main Kurdish political party, the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) and the jailed leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan. In 2015 these lagging negotiations were called off when the PKK violently reacted to an attack by Islamic State fighters at a rally for young Kurds preparing to bring aid to the civilians of the predominantly Kurdish Syrian city of Kobane. The PKK believed the government should have provided more protection for that rally and other earlier Kurdish rallies targeted by Islamic State. The chasm of distrust between the PKK, the HDP and the government does not bode well for the reopening of Track I negotiations between the policymakers on both sides. Track II diplomacy, as formulated by Burton and Kelman involving influential civil society representatives from various segments of society, but not themselves part of the government, could provide the momentum needed to bridge that chasm. Meeting together, they could better understand the “other” and develop creative ideas through which to move a possible peace process forward. As opinion makers in their own constituency groups they could pass along these ideas to government officials and influence public opinion, building trust for Track I negotiations between the decision makers.

The nominally-secular Turkish Republic is characterized by a sectarian regime that systematically excludes and discriminates against Alevi citizens. Although there have been various attempts to reform Turkey’s discriminatory system over the course of the republic, none of the attempts succeeded so far in remedying Alevi grievances. The last major reform initiative targeting Alevi citizens was the Alevi Opening, designed and implemented by the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had risen to power in 2002, in part owing to its promise to overhaul Turkey's exclusionary regime and discriminatory policies. The AKP’s outreach to Alevis, an ill-designed initiative unaware of and insensitive to basic Alevi sensibilities, was welcomed neither by the Alevis nor by the AKP’s Sunni support base. The Alevi Opening, despite raising expectations at the outset, failed completely, and ended up marginalizing Alevis to an even greater extent. The AKP’s sectarian limits, governance deficit, and lack of conflict resolution competence were the key reasons of the initiative’s failure. Based on a study of the Alevi Opening, including participant observation in some of the deliberations, this paper aims to examine the political, cultural, and religious obstacles that derailed the Turkish government’s Alevi outreach, and the prospects of future reconciliation attempts. As successive Turkish governments and their reform attempts failed to incorporate Alevi citizens in the 1960s, 1990s, and finally with the Alevi Opening, Alevis turned to the exploration of and experimentation with a range of strategies to ameliorate their situation. Especially since the 1990s, a key Alevi strategy has been to establish nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations, namely associations, foundations, federations, and confederations, to attain quasi-legal persona, provide faith services, and to resist Sunni discrimination and assimilation. Through these faith-based organizations, Alevis have established formal and informal negotiation channels with government officials and civil servants to wrestle rights and freedoms from Turkey’s exclusionary establishment. In a political context where Alevis failed to achieve de jure granting of equal citizenship rights, they turned to securing de facto concessions for their faith and community. These makeshift tactics, born out of a learned skepticism towards Turkey’s Sunni-dominated regime, ensure day to day survival for Alevis while also impeding the prospects of future reconciliation attempts. The recurrent failures of reform initiatives over the years have not only exposed the sectarian limits of Turkey’s incorporative capacity but also undermined trust and will required for future initiatives.

Religious heritage sites play a key role in both the escalation of intercommunal conflict and facilitation of reconciliation. By focusing on two Armenian churches in Turkey, Akhtamar in Van and Surp Giragos in Diyarbak?r, I examine how amend-making attempts in and around these religious heritage sites failed. Akhtamar and Surp Giragos churches went through extensive restorations, by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and by the Armenian Surp Giragos Pious Foundation, respectively. Following their restoration, both churches came into service in 2011 but with significantly different functions. Akhtamar reopened as a museum, and the Apostolic Armenian Church was allowed to host a liturgy on a designated day each September until 2015. This annual event attracted numerous Armenians from different parts of Turkey, and the world, as well as locals and curious tourists. On any other day, the site can be visited as a museum. By contrast, Surp Giragos was restored as a worship hall in which rituals can be held around the year. Although very few Armenians currently reside in Diyarbak?r, the church held liturgies, weddings and baptisms, which were attended by a diverse group, including local Muslims, both Kurdish and Turkish, as well as descendants of Armenians from the region. The Easter liturgy held at the church in April 2015 was a spectacle of reconciliation. Diyarbakir’s historic Sur district, where Surp Giragos is located, however became an active warzone in September 2015 following an outbreak of violence between the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish security forces. The six-month-long armed struggle claimed many lives and caused massive damage to heritage sites. In April 2016, the Turkish government announced its decision to expropriate the Sur district as part of an urban renewal program, which was perceived by skeptics as gentrification and war profiteering. Surp Giragos Church was also part of the expropriated properties, raising concerns as to the future status of these religious minority sites. Likewise, the annual liturgies performed at Akhtamar, which were once the symbols of hope for coexistence in Turkey, were cancelled in 2015 and 2016 due to security concerns in the region. In this paper, I analyze the dramatic reversal of fortunes of Akhtamar and Surp Giragos churches, where hope for reconciliation and amend-making was eclipsed by policy shortcomings and the ensuing escalation of violence.