Responding to the increasingly precarious humanitarian situation, Syrian activist groups and Community Based Organisations (CSOs) have become active in governance, distributing food aid and providing medical, educational and other services in areas under the control of the Free Syrian Army. This paper is focused on the role of civil society in the Syrian war between 2012 and 2016, specifically in the so-called “liberated areas” under the control of the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition in northern Syria. A postdoctoral research project of Copenhagen University carried out between 2014 and 2016, has investigated the role of citizen video journalists and civil society activists in the Syrian uprisings. One of the methods used was the systematic observation of Arabic language video content uploaded by protesters and media activists from Syria, on a daily basis. Much of the audiovisual data set contains graphic footage of war events and experiences, however a sizeable part of the video material that was analysed during the research project, also contains local reports of community meetings, local elections and institutional buildup. This finding indicates that democratic experiments have been taking place on a day-to-day basis in certain geographical areas inside Syria. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the social political challenges and impact of the activities by Syrian civil society activists throughout the Syrian uprisings. The research methodology is based on media ethnography, semi-structured interviews with civil society actors inside and outside Syria and an observational fieldtrip in the Kurdish and FSA controlled “liberated areas” of Syria, during the summer of 2014. The research project has found that despite the major challenges, civil society groups are still active in Syria and continue to play a crucial role in bringing normalcy to a politically charged situation, resisting both the rule of extremist Islamic groups inside Syria, as well as the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

From the early 2000s to the establishment of the third Justice and Development Party (JDP) government in 2011, one can observe a compromise between the state and right-based organizations characterized by conflictual yet cooperative relationship. Despite the legal and political achievements regarding the empowerment of civil society in the EU accession process and the prospects for Turkey’s becoming a model for the Islamic countries for being secular and Muslim country, particularly in the last four years, due to the prevalence of an authoritarian tendency on the side of the JDP government, Turkey has been experiencing serious limitations in terms of providing an enabling political environment for the flourishing of a democratic and participative civil society. In this context, this paper aims at exploring the patterns of civil society and government interface in Turkey since 2011, with reference to the two major roles of the civil society organizations (CSOs), influencing decision and policy-making processes and monitoring and controlling state policies and activities with a particular focus on the rights-based CSOs that operate for the protection and promotion of women’s and human rights in Turkey. The CSOs within the scope of the research comprise KA-DER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates), MOR ÇATI (Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation), MAZLUMDER (The Human Rights and Solidarity Association for the Oppressed) and ?HD (The Human Rights Association). The data for this paper are derived from the findings of a qualitative study funded by the Oxfam and pursued through documentary analysis as well as semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with the chairpersons of the mentioned associations and with key informants from the selected state departments as stakeholders of the selected CSO. The findings of the research elicit the significance of a consolidated democracy with the constituent principles of rule of law, independence of the media, respect for differences and rights-freedoms, system of checks and balances as well as the determination of the state authorities, politicians, and the society to adopt and internalize democratic values for a well-functioning civil society and the sustainability of achievements for the democratization process in theTurkish case.

In the late 1990s, as the Mubarak regime accelerated the implementation of market reforms the number of labor protests grew significantly. The wave of protests continued in the 2000s, reaching 3.9 a day in 2008, 4.4 in 2009, and 5.8 in 2010. Following the 2011 uprising the number of labor protest rose significantly averaging 38.6 protest per day during Morsi’s tenure. This high rate of strikes has persisted since Sisi’s coming to power despite growing repression. Although the number of labor protests has declined compared to Morsi’s time in office, they remain significantly higher, at more than 29 per day between mid-2014 and the end of 2015, than during the last years of the Mubarak regime. Even as repression intensified in 2016, 493 labor protests were recorded between January and April of that year. This paper will rely on Global Database, Language and Tone (GDELT) and Land Center for Human Rights in Cairo among others to document the patterns of labor protest since the late 1990s. It will focus on two questions: 1) Why do high levels of labor protests continue in Egypt despite the increasing repression? 2) Are blue-collar workers in all sectors equally likely to engage in protest actions, and relatedly do they utilize the same protest tactics across sectors? In answering the first question, the paper will draw on prospect theory to explain the continued willingness of workers to mount protests despite growing repression. This theory argues that people respond to and act differently depending on whether they perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses or the domain of gains. When in the domain of gains, people tend to act to protect what they have and thus are more risk averse. Because workers in Egypt have found themselves in the domain of loss, their assessment of risks associated with staging protests have shifted and they have become more willing to engage in high risk activities. Paradoxically, the heightened repression under Sisi may well be pushing more workers into the domain of loss and thus is making them more not less willing to engage in protests. In answering the second question, the paper will map out the patterns of protest across different sectors of the economy and argue that prospect theory can help us better understand why particular groups of workers are more willing to engage in high cost protest actions.

In February 2017, in a case brought forward by HELEM, Lebanon’s first LGBTQ advocacy group in Lebanon, on behalf of the arrested transgender women and men, a Lebanese court ruled that homosexuality was not a crime but rather a personal choice. The ruling was the fourth of its kind since 2009. Helem members and supporters hailed the 2017 ruling as critical to ongoing efforts to decriminalize homosexuality. Yet despite these landmark rulings in region that almost uniformly criminalizes homosexuality or “unnatural sex”, we know very little about the strategies or the factors that shape the strategies of LGBTQ organizations in the region (Massad 2002, 2007, 2009; Long 2005, 2009; El Menyawi 2006; Whitaker 2006; Dabaghi et al 2008; Drucker 2008; Moumneh 2008; Makarem 2009, 2011; Ritchie 2010; Naber and Zaatari 2013; Needham 2013; Fortier 2015; Saleh 2015; Nagle 2016). The paper has two main aims. The first is to explore the strategies that Helem has adopted to eliminate Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code which states that any sexual intercourse “contrary to the order of nature” is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year and to explore the factors that have shaped its strategy. The second is to highlight the debates within the organization regarding these strategies and which continue to divide the organization. The paper argues that Helem has adopted, broadly speaking, a two-pronged strategy of collaborative networking and of advocacy work that informally targets sympathetic individuals. This strategy is shaped by two primary factors: 1) the organization’s concern that it not be marginalized within the civil society community; and, 2) the restrictions and opportunities presented by the country’s consociational political system. In regards to the latter, Helem primarily has sought de facto as opposed to de jure change to Article 534 and has relied on personal meetings with decision makers for lobbying, focusing on judges, lawyers, journalists in order to render Article 534 obsolete. The paper further argues that the evolution of Helem’s strategy has not come without its disputes, including the splintering of the organization. These have primarily revolved around four main axes: 1) sectarian divisions; 2) class differences; 3) prevailing societal attitudes towards women, including lesbians and trans-women; and 4) differences over relations with and influence by Western/international LGBTQ advocacy organizations. The proposed paper is based on interview conducted in 2010, 2012 and 2016 with LGBTQ activists in Lebanon and on secondary literature.

Straddling, linking, and blurring the distinction between the categories of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, labor movements and trade unions have been relatively neglected in the study of Middle Eastern and North African politics in favor of scholarly focus on states, militaries and elites, rentier economies, identity politics, and Islamic movements. Taking as its primary case study the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), we draw on extensive recent fieldwork to argue that under appropriate conditions, trade unions and labor movements can acquire sufficient power and material resources to operate as leading political actors during periods of ‘transition’, and political change more generally. Our analysis focuses on four specific features of the UGTT, features that are the conditions of possibility of its political agency. First, its extensive and longstanding organizational structure allows it to initiate, frame, and control collective action through the organization and mobilization of the labor force. Second, it possesses major economic and social clout, giving it leverage to pressure and enforce change on the ruling regime. Thirdly, at moments of political upheaval, it has drawn on its mastery of the art of negotiation and mediation to act as an effective arbitrator between different political factions. Lastly, representing members from diverse ideological, social, and religious backgrounds, its heterogeneity gives it legitimacy across the population in a way no political party can rival. The influence of the UGTT, we argue, as a potent actor both purportedly above politics and profoundly political, accounts in large part for the relative success of the Tunisian revolution as opposed to other contemporary Middle Eastern uprisings, as well as for many of the inadequacies of post-revolutionary politics.