The later reign of Mahmud II proved extremely tumultuous for the Ottoman state and society. Facing external and internal threats to their authority and the empire’s territorial integrity, the Ottoman political elite in Istanbul launched an unprecedented agenda of institutional reform, centralization and military mobilization. In 1826, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) destroyed the Janissary Corps, a potential threat to his power and policies, and ordered the creation of a disciplined, European style army. By the mid-1840s, perhaps as many as 300,000 men in total had been pressed into the regular and reserve formations, with the drilling, marching, and parading uniformed soldiers a common sight in Istanbul and in many of the provinces. This figure represented more than one-tenth of all Muslim males and one-fourth of all men considered eligible for military service by contemporary Ottoman censuses, which makes the Ottoman military mobilization from the 1820s to the 1840s comparable to that of France during the Napoleonic Wars. Ottoman decision-makers and ideologues, who demanded absolute loyalty and sacrifice from their conscripts as well as other subjects, repeatedly presented the era’s armed conflicts as ones waged between the rightful “Islamic State” and “foreign infidels,” “enemies of Islam,” “heretics” (i.e. Bekta?i Janissaries) , or, in cases such as the war against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt (g. 1805-1848), as against rebels who had taken up arms against their legitimate Islamic ruler and the caliph, Sultan Mahmud II. Ironically nicknamed the “infidel sultan” by his critics, Mahmud II continuously used Islamic symbols and propaganda to legitimize his actions and actively presented himself and his new regime as the rightful promoters and protectors of Sunni Islam. This paper aims to account for how Mahmud II and his ideologues articulated and legitimated their wars, institutional reforms and unprecedented mobilization of ordinary subjects via Islam. Secondly, it will also probe how various groups of Ottoman subjects responded to the state policies and discourse, which will help determine their effects and limits within the empire. The research is based on primary sources from the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office (sultanic opinions and decrees, memoranda and correspondence on various state affairs), manuscripts from Süleymaniye Library, and printed pamphlets, military manuals and codes published by the Mahmudian state.

Questions about the authenticity and reflexivity of liberal and secular thought among Arab intellectuals have been widely debated in the disciplines of history and anthropology. Scholars such as Joseph Massad (2015) and Saba Mahmood (2006) critique Arab liberal and secular thought as derivative of an imperial Western tradition. Thinkers among the Arab Christian clergy are especially vulnerable to the charge of acting as pawns of Western imperialism (Mahmood, 2016) or as passive victims of discrimination. However, these perspectives have not sufficiently considered the diversity of thought and action within the Coptic clergy and the reflexivity of individual church leaders in responding to shifting problem-spaces (Scott, 1999). My paper examines how Coptic bishops and priests in provincial Egypt reacted to the substantial political, economic and social changes Egypt experienced between 1970 and the present. I show how Church leaders in Beni Suef instituted widespread reforms (such as education and social welfare programs) in interfaith settings in order to spread a secular/liberal ethos among Christians and Muslims. Through an analysis of Bishop Athanasius writings (specially al-sul?k al-sal?m f? al-mujtama? il-mukhtala?, 1972), provincial church administrative documents, and interviews with the interfaith NGO administrators, I will trace a genealogy of the intellectual and institutional forces that shaped the liberal/secular ethos at Coptic interfaith sites. This material will illuminate if and how a diverse group of Egyptian liberal intellectuals, Coptic reformers, and Western thought inspired the Beni Suef church’s interfaith projects. Moreover, I will discuss the relationship church leaders developed with the Western NGO Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), juxtaposing the liberal and secular thought evoked in their own writings against MCC’s organizational mandate. I argue that, rather than acting as mere puppets of Western organizations and ideas, Beni Suef church leaders solicited various forms of Western financial and logistical support in order to help promote a secular/liberal ethos at their interfaith NGOs. In conclusion, this project, by scrutinizing church leaders’ writings, church documents, and interviews with NGO workers and administrators, sheds new light on the Coptic church’s reflexive adaptation of liberal and secular thought in a provincial setting, thereby heeding recent calls (Sedra, 2009; Robson, 2011) to study modern Copts as actors, rather than mere victims or pawns.

Despite the intensely religious language used by Iranian leaders and soldiers, which permeated war rooms, negotiating tables, battlefields, and streets, the role of religion in the Iran-Iraq War remains underexplored. Some scholars have focused on the pragmatism of Iranian clerical rulers in pursuing the war and ignored their systematic construction of religious legitimacy. Others have examined how religion materially or ideationally constituted the Iranian and Iraqi leaders’ threat perceptions. This article, by contrast, studies how Iranian elites developed and deployed religious narratives according to their internal and external threat perceptions. It uncovers their use of religion ranging from manipulating existing narratives to altering old theologies and crafting new doctrines. Finally, it reveals that the Iranian militant clerics’ instrumental use of religion had unintended theological consequences. I process trace discussions among Iranian political and military elites during the war, their analyses of their own performance on the battlefield after the war, and finally their revealing public disputes and blame-game decades later. Much of the empirical evidence that I have used for this study was not available until recently. It includes Persian books, journals, newspapers, policy papers, memoirs, and interviews by Iranian political and military officials. It is noteworthy that many Revolutionary Guards commanders took advantage of the post-war Iranian version of the G.I. Bill to attend universities. Majoring in social sciences, the humanities, and war studies, many sought to shed academic light on their war-time experiences. Moreover, the intensification of competition between political elites in the past decade has led top officials and military commanders to reveal untold details of their strategic and tactical decisions in an attempt to absolve themselves of wrongdoings. The fruit of the aforementioned academic exercises together with these public debates has been an incredible amount of information, which allows me to reconstruct the war room in Iran.

Hamas is one of the primary Palestinian political actors, and while much has been written about the organization this literature tends to address the group as either a terrorist organization or an Islamic social movement. Very little has been written that addresses the impact that the personal background and experiences of senior level members has on the goals of and approaches used by the organization. While the existent literature discusses both the political and militant branches of the organization, at a person-based level much of the focus has been on the founder, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, and very little has been written to addresses the role and influence of other senior level members of the group. This project fills this gap through an examination of the memoirs and published speeches of senior level members from the internal (Gaza and West Bank) and external (outside of the occupied Palestinian territories) branches of the political wing of the organization. These two branches were chosen over the prison branch because of realistic access to source material. Through an analysis of these memoirs and interviews, this project argues that the competing interests of the internal branch (particularly as espoused by those senior members in the Gaza Strip) consistently put the organization at odds with itself. In particular, these internal conflicts occur over policies related to the organizations broader ideology, as defended by those in the external branch, versus the need for compromise as a pragmatic approach to governance, as favored by those in the internal branch. Additionally, those senior level members who rose through the ranks of the military branch (rather than the political branch) or who have spent time in jail promote a more hawkish policy, regardless of their background. This project promises to offer new insight into and explanation of the policies and approaches offered by the leadership of the internal and external branches of Hamas’ political wing.

Sufis have strong spiritual connections to Jerusalem. Within Islam, Muhammad’s night journey - al-Isra’ wal-Mi’raj - is a baseline typology for mystical encounters with the divine. As such, Jerusalem has had long historical links to Muslim mystics and their religious institutions. But what about Sufism in Jerusalem today? Since 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the city has experienced massive upheavals and transformations. Tragically, all Sufi institutions in Jerusalem have perished except for two. How have the Zawiya al-Naqshbandi and the Zawiya al-Afghaniyya managed to survive the occupation? In this paper, I argue that the have survived by reframing their religious practices and taking distinct approaches to the Israeli State. Beyond adapting to the challenges of global anti-Sufism, both institutions have allowed traditional Sufi practices around minor Islamic holidays (al-Isra’ wal-Mi’raj, Mawlid n-Nabiyyi, and Hijra) to be reinterpreted and repurposed to fit within the Palestinian national framework. Both institutions, however, have diverged in their approach to the Israeli State, divergences which have determined their fate. The Zawiya al-Naqshbandi has survived by forging alliances with Jewish individuals and groups, intentionally cultivating interfaith relationships to promote peace-building and reconciliation. While this path has kept the Israeli State at bay, it has undermined the Naqshbandi’s standing with Palestinians who view these efforts as tools to foster servile attitudes toward the occupation. Normalization is disruption. The Zawiya al-Afghaniyya has taken a different approach. They have combined political-quietism with deliberate religious practice which cultivates personal, ethical formation. Although members of the institution deal with the daily frustrations of life under occupation, they are equipped to transcend the everyday disruptions of life under occupation. Consequently, Israel perceives no threat and doesn’t interfere. The study is based on ethnographic material - participant observation, ethnographic interviews, and additional sources - collected in Jerusalem between 2013 and 2016.