Populism eats its children: Tunisia’s case Tarek Kahlaoui The results of the 2019 elections in Tunisia show without doubt the overwhelming tendency of the electorate’s rewarding of “new” faces and political formations. The “band new” is not itself guarantee of victory. But not being new became an handicap. But let’s make it clear “New” is not the unknown. Actually being known and famous is a condition of success. “New” means essentially, the appearance of novelty in traditional politics, party politics to be precise. The perception of party affiliation was the keyword of political rejection in 2019. Since 2011, in just eight years, the notion of hizb went from being the novelty to be discovered after so many decades of oppression and anti-parties politics to the old unwanted witch to be buried. What happened in these “quick” eight years is devastating to politicians and political parties. For the perception of the electorate they englobe the whole elite (sidelining other elites including economic and cultural elites). They are “the elite.” They are not only useless in their eyes but also corrupt; wholly corrupt regardless from factual information. The Tunisian case of populism proves without doubt Cas Mudde’s proposal of definition in his 2004 “Populism Zeitgeist”. Populism is not simply “the highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the people,” Nor is it “opportunistic policies with the aim of (quickly) pleasing the people/voters – and so ‘buying’ their support.” It is rather “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” Whether in perception or discourses that’s the common point between what seems to be contradictory examples such as Kais Saied and Nabil Karoui. All of them express in different forms and with different nunaces the same tendency: they are the pure representation in an increasing number of the electorate of “the people” against a sick and declining elite. Yet as they got into power their outmost dream is to become successful politicians and the new elite. In a difficult political system in which delivering is not easy their fate is sealed: they are representing another version of failure. By the end populism eats its children.

How have the economic and security challenges that have accompanied Tunisia’s transition affected the social cleavages underlying its party system? A number of scholars (Zeghal 2013; Lust and Waldner 2016) have observed that conflicts between Islamist and secularist elites structured Tunisia’s party system in the initial years following its uprising. But we know little about the degree to which this conflict is salient beyond the political elite (Gorman 2018) or about the degree to which perceptions of economic and security deterioration have undermined or strengthened the appeal of political secularism and political Islam. These questions evoke broader ones regarding the balance of “values” and “interests” in the party systems of other new democracies (Tavits and Letki 2013). In this paper, I argue that widespread perceptions of deterioration have neither reinforced the conflict between secularism and political Islam nor replaced it with the type of economic left-right conflict that is commonly the focus of comparative politics. Rather, these perceptions have fostered support for anti-system politicians of various stripes. I support this argument through evidence drawn from a nationally representative, in-person survey conducted in the wake of the 2019 presidential and legislative elections.

The study of political ideologies has been a major concern for political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and even philosophers. Two major strands can be identified from the literature on ideologies. Proponents of the first strand of literature argue that political ideologies are structured according to the traditional left-right political continuum (Bobbio, 1996; Jost, 2003, 2006; Treier & Hilygus, 2009). They propose to measure political ideologies by asking respondents to position themselves on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. By contrast, proponents of the second strand of literature argue that a unidimensional scale cannot accurately capture the variations that exist in political ideologies (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman 2003; Jacoby, 2009; Maynard, 2013). Some studies have shown that ordinary citizens do not know how to explain the left-right distinction even if they use theses labels and self-identify on such scales (Converse, 1964; Conover & Feldman, 1981). Proponents of the second strand of literature thus propose a multidimensional scale based on positions about social and economic issue to operationalize political ideologies. Most of the research on how to measure the dimensions and structure of political ideologies is however focused on Western cultures. Little is known about non-Western countries, especially the Arab world. This paper investigates the dimensions of political ideologies in Tunisia in order to understand what constitutes a left-wing or right-wing political ideology in the Tunisian political culture. Using representative face-to-face survey data collected in December 2019, I test the unidimensional and multidimensional structure of ideologies among ordinary Tunisian citizens. A factor analysis is applied to 22 positions about social and economic issues, which were derived mainly from the Wilson and Patterson Attitude Inventory (1968).

Political socialization is identified as a key mechanism for the transmission of political attitudes and behaviors. Work in developed democracies highlights the role of socialization in the stability of partisanship within families. And work in autocracies highlights the role of political socialization in the continuity of political values, such as authoritarianism. In this paper, we examine how individual-level experiences with autocratic state repression shape political behavior and partisanship after a democratic transition. On the one hand, research in the United States indicates that interactions with the criminal justice system can have a negative effect on future political participation. In repressive contexts, on the other hand, the regime may seek to arrest individuals precisely because of their increased engagement in or capacity for political activism. Moreover, experience with repression may mobilize individuals especially once the authoritarian threat is absent. Examining the case of Tunisia, we find that Tunisian citizens who were arrested under Ben Ali’s regime are less likely to turnout to vote in democratic elections; however, those who know family and community members who were arrested are more likely to vote. The mobilizational effects of autocratic repression after democratization are more pronounced in the case of partisanship. Those who were arrested under Ben Ali or who knew people arrested are more likely to vote for the anti-old regime parties. This work is part of a broader project on how the different socialization processes in autocracies affect political attitudes and behaviors after democratization.

Political socialization is identified as a key mechanism for the transmission of political attitudes and behaviors. Work in developed democracies highlights the role of socialization in the stability of partisanship within families. And work in autocracies highlights the role of political socialization in the continuity of political values, such as authoritarianism. In this paper, we examine how individual-level experiences with autocratic state repression shape political behavior and partisanship after a democratic transition. On the one hand, research in the United States indicates that interactions with the criminal justice system can have a negative effect on future political participation. In repressive contexts, on the other hand, the regime may seek to arrest individuals precisely because of their increased engagement in or capacity for political activism. Moreover, experience with repression may mobilize individuals especially once the authoritarian threat is absent. Examining the case of Tunisia, we find that Tunisian citizens who were arrested under Ben Ali’s regime are less likely to turnout to vote in democratic elections; however, those who know family and community members who were arrested are more likely to vote. The mobilizational effects of autocratic repression after democratization are more pronounced in the case of partisanship. Those who were arrested under Ben Ali or who knew people arrested are more likely to vote for the anti-old regime parties. This work is part of a broader project on how the different socialization processes in autocracies affect political attitudes and behaviors after democratization.

Political socialization is identified as a key mechanism for the transmission of political attitudes and behaviors. Work in developed democracies highlights the role of socialization in the stability of partisanship within families. And work in autocracies highlights the role of political socialization in the continuity of political values, such as authoritarianism. In this paper, we examine how individual-level experiences with autocratic state repression shape political behavior and partisanship after a democratic transition. On the one hand, research in the United States indicates that interactions with the criminal justice system can have a negative effect on future political participation. In repressive contexts, on the other hand, the regime may seek to arrest individuals precisely because of their increased engagement in or capacity for political activism. Moreover, experience with repression may mobilize individuals especially once the authoritarian threat is absent. Examining the case of Tunisia, we find that Tunisian citizens who were arrested under Ben Ali’s regime are less likely to turnout to vote in democratic elections; however, those who know family and community members who were arrested are more likely to vote. The mobilizational effects of autocratic repression after democratization are more pronounced in the case of partisanship. Those who were arrested under Ben Ali or who knew people arrested are more likely to vote for the anti-old regime parties. This work is part of a broader project on how the different socialization processes in autocracies affect political attitudes and behaviors after democratization.