From a comparative perspective on the authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa, Islamist movements differ tremendously with respect to their relationship with regimes. While relations are largely characterized by contentious politics, three distinct strategies can be identified through which authoritarian elites respond to Islamists' claim for political participation: (1) integration of Islamists in political regimes as part of ruling coalitions; (2) partial inclusion of Islamists by accommodation in political institutions or power-sharing arrangements; (3) exclusion of Islamists from political institutions, accompanied by high degrees of coercion towards their demand for political outreach. Thus, according to the form of (contentious) relationship with regimes, Islamists in the political arena perform (1) governance, (2) opposition, or (3) resistance. The paper applies this framework--supported by explanatory evidence from a comparative perspective at Islamist movements in the MENA--to understand political action of Hamas in the contemporary political context. My hypothesis is that Hamas is a unique example of an Islamist movement that has incorporated all three forms of interaction concurrently. Hamas has emerged as an opposition movement towards the PLO-controlled proxy-authoritarian regime of the Palestinian National Authority, as a resistance group towards continued Israeli occupation, and--since the parliamentary elections of January 2006--as a political force executing governance. The paper will account for the dynamics of Hamas' contentious relations and, to this aim, take into account domestic and international factors. Another hypothesis is that the prominence of engagement of Hamas in any of the above mentioned forms of contentious relations ultimately depends on one another. It seems, for instance, that a 'zero-sum game' of political contention can be identified in Hamas' relations with various opponents: The more Hamas emerges in its opposition towards PLO, the less pronounced becomes its resistance activities towards Israeli occupation, and vice versa. In order to test these hypotheses, a qualitative analysis of the emergence of Hamas since its inception in 1987 will be based on existing academic sources as well as on the profound discussion of indicators accounting, over time, for the strength of opposition politics (election results) vs. militant struggle of resistance (number of militant attacks carried out against Israeli military forces and civilians). While the analysis provides insights into the constraints and opportunities of political activism of Hamas, the movement will--as a unique case--provide challenging insights for a more profound understanding of Islamist-regime relations in Middle Eastern politics at large.

The quest for specifically "Islamic" alternatives to secularized sociopolitical orders has, according to Olivier Roy, shifted to the Muslim diaspora in the West, where many "deterritorialized" Muslims have embraced "neo-fundamentalism" (2004). Neofundamentalism, as Roy defines it, is a reaction to "the end of Dar-ul-Islam as a geographical entity" (233). A form of revivalist religiosity, it addresses "a westernization that is now at the core and no longer at the frontiers of Islam" while "conversely ...dealing with a religion that is no longer embedded in a given society and thus is open to reformation" (234). If Roy is right, the question of Islam and politics in Palestine is much more complicated than what most current discussion, focused narrowly on Hamas, allows. Among groups like the Palestinians, whose existences have become trans-regionalized, national conflicts remain a concern but the more immediate challenges of minority life in Europe or North America have become primary; consequently, the "politics of Islam" in these settings has shifted because objective life conditions have changed. This paper, a first "report from the field," will explore the impact of diaspora experience on the politics of Islam among Palestinians and Somalis in Chicago, IL and Columbus, OH, respectively. My project examines how mosques orient immigrants in these two communities relative to a host of competing institutions and value frameworks in the dominant non-Muslim culture as well as toward contending formations (other political movements, clans and families, etc.) within the communities themselves. Data will include transcriptions of sermons and Qur'an lessons and other public lectures; transcribed conversations with mosque leaders; and life-history interviews--at least 20 to 30 in each city--focusing on the religious upbringing and religiosity of mosque attendees. These interviews also will elicit stories of daily life and how individuals have responded to the challenges of social marginalization, suspicion, and surveillance. My analysis will aim to (a) determine the extent to which the discourse and practice institutionalized in mosques coheres with the orientations of individual attendees as revealed in their interviews, actions, and activities and (b) examine how this process manifests across the Palestinian and Somali communities. My objective will be to map the range of outlooks that emerge across these "deterritorialized" communities. Is "neofundamentalism" the overriding trend? Or, do nationalist politics continue to predominate as the frame within which Islamic politics is articulated? Or, still yet, do other orientations appear to manifest alongside nationalist and neofundamentalist ones?

Hamas is treated internationally as a pariah because of the perceived terroristic behavior and extremism of its program. Yet Hamas presents itself quite differently: as a "centrist" (wasatiyya) organization spawned by its "mother movement," the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Yet even this alternative image of Hamas has its limits: while the movement has recently moved to achieve full membership in the Muslim Brotherhood and has increasingly stressed its fealty to the international confederation of Brotherhood organizations, Hamas was also born in partial reaction against the patterns of behavior established by the Palestinian Brotherhood. And its current status as a majority and governing party in Gaza is forcing it to depart from the Brotherhood model; most Brotherhood branches have deliberately limited their participation in elections (in order to guarantee minority status) and react somewhat warily to the prospect of participating in government. This paper will place Hamas in comparative perspective to other Muslim Brotherhood movements in the Arab world. Four elements will receive special attention: organizational structure, ideology, electoral participation, and attitude toward governing. The goal is to understand the extent to which Hamas's self-image as a Brotherhood movement elucidates the movement's behavior and the extent to which Hamas's behavior must be explained by other factors. The paper will rely on a study of ideological documents emanating from the movement, statements of leaders regarding movement goals and decisions, and a close examination of the pattern of Hamas decision making at critical points (the decision to form Hamas; the construction of a separate armed wing; the establishment of the Islamic complex in Gaza; the decisions to abstain from and enter elections at various points; the composition of an electoral platform; the seizure of power in Gaza in 2007; the decision to seek separate status within the international Muslim Brotherhood organization).