The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the early 2000s, grew into amity after the rise to power of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 2002, and reverted to enmity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This paper suggests that a combination of structural and identity-based factors, at regional and domestic levels, induced the collapse of the decade-long amity. This paper builds on the notion of a “structure-identity nexus”; and determines the orientation of foreign policy outcomes from the 1990s until 2011. The discussion outlines the merits of a hybrid theoretical perspective which draws on two rival traditions, realism and constructivism. The structure-identity framework explains the double transformation in the relationship, considering the return to inter- and intra-state conflict in 2011. The research draws on extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews carried out with key figures. In addition to the relationship between Syria and Turkey, the structure-identity nexus provides potential broader explanations that fuel the shift from amity to enmity in the complex network of states found in the Middle East.

In recent decades much has been written about the role of sectarianism in Middle East politics and there is general recognition that there has been some kind of sectarian surge at the regional level. However, most research has focused on the obvious places where one finds either open conflicts with a clear sectarian dimensions (such as in Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain) or other places where the population is mixed (such as in Lebanon, Saudi, and Kuwait). Far less attention has been directed to the question about whether and how regional sectarianism has also had an impact on less likely places; e.g. countries with neither open sectarian conflict or mixed populations. This paper aims to address this gap in the knowledge about the role of sectarianism in current Middle East politics through a case-study of Jordan. The Jordanian case is especially compelling, because it has no significant Shia population, yet our research shows signs of rising anti-Shia sentiment at multiple levels: government, opposition (both Islamist and secular), and even in intra-Islamist discourse (between the Muslim Brotherhood and rival Salafi forms of political mobilization, for example). Yet the notion of ‘sectarianism’ in Jordan has historically been interpreted in intra-ethnic terms in the form of Jordanian-Palestinian fissures, not in Sunni-Shia terms. Finally, the Jordanian state – and the Hashemite regime specifically – has long supported inter-faith cooperation efforts and campaigns for religious tolerance. Yet the same state is also associated with warnings, as early as 2003, of a “Shia crescent”. So should Jordan be seen as a force for or against rising sectarianism? And to what extent has sectarianism increased in, or affected, Jordanian domestic politics? These are the key questions that gave rise to the current research project. Based on field work, interviews, and a workshop with leading Jordanian analysts, this paper examines to what extent, and in what ways, regional sectarianism has emerged even in Jordanian domestic politics, at both government and opposition levels, and what this means for the Hashemite Kingdom and the region at large. We argue, in our conclusions, that the pre-2011 data suggest an elite-driven, top-down, type of sectarianism that ultimately had little resonance within Jordanian domestic politics. But, perhaps ironically for the regime that coined the term “Shi’a Crescent”, the post-2011 evidence suggests almost the opposite: bottom-up or socially-driven forms of sectarianism that have had far greater resonance, affecting regime and opposition alike.

The literature on comparative authoritarianism (particularly Slater, Slovik, and Greitens) suggests three possible scenarios for Egypt’s future political development: - Continued economic stagnation and elite fragmentation that lead to ever-increasing dependence on the security apparatus to maintain order and to manage the affairs of state. This trajectory resembles Argentina or Brazil in the 1970s. - Implementation of partial economic reforms that generate some economic growth and create a segment of the elite that benefits disproportionately from this gain. This trajectory produces crony capitalism that resembles contemporary Russia. - Implementation of more comprehensive economic reform that strengthens private actors’ autonomy from the state including owners of capital as well as representatives of labor. These actors then become supporters of civil society and political parties that gradually facilitate the emergence of more participatory politics and, possibly, democracy. Chile and South Korea are examples of this trajectory. The paper proposes a theoretical framework for evaluating which scenario is most likely based upon the literature on comparative institutional development (Mahoney, Thelen, and Hall). This framework focuses on three institutions: security institutions, economic institutions, and institutions for political mobilization. It considers both domestic and international pressures on the development of each. The analysis considers the current condition of each of these institutions, their relative power to each other, and the likely future trajectory of their development in light of the policies adopted by the al-Sisi regime. It utilizes a wide variety of sources including interviews with party activists from all of the major political groupings, Islamic activists, NGO leaders, retired military officers, labor officials, police officers at all ranks, and former senior officials from the ruling party; archival material related to the emergence of key public sector enterprises, private firms, and major financial institutions; budget data; economic data; voting data from the 2015 parliamentary election; relevant actions by key international actors; and constraints created by the international economic and political system that shape the development of each institution. The analysis concludes that the second trajectory described above -- development of crony capitalism centered on the enrichment of a small elite -- is the most likely trajectory for the current regime. It then considers what conditions would need to change in order to facilitate the development of the third trajectory. It pays particular attention to the possible contribution of external actors to facilitating the development of a more participatory and equitable order.

Research in conflict studies and environmental security has largely focused on the mechanisms through which the environment and natural resources foster conflict or contribute to peace-building efforts. An understudied area of research concerns the ways in which warfare has focused on destroying infrastructure and the long-term effects on human welfare and ecosystems. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We focus primarily on better understanding the conflict destruction of water, sanitation, waste, and energy infrastructures, what we term environmental infrastructures, by drawing on an original database compiled by the authors of the post-2011 wars in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While research across the social sciences has examined the targeting of civilians and the environmental destruction during wars, including the issue of urbicide, we expand the study of targeting of environmental infrastructure to (1) examine the role of different types of actors (international vs. subnational), (2) document the type of infrastructure, form of attack, and impacts and (3) situate an increase in targeting environmental infrastructure within the changing context of warmaking in the MENA, marked by a multiplicity of actors at different scales. Through a focus on the conflict zones of Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, we show that the destruction of environmental infrastructure has become a prolonged feature of social and economic life in the region, with long-term implications for rebuilding states and livelihoods.