State authority is defined to a large extent by its monopolization of legitimate violence. But sometimes regimes allow, and even encourage, extremist groups that represent narrow interests to take ownership of the pursuit of state interests. Such behavior resembles ‘Riding the back of the tiger’ (RBT) and is a highly risky strategy that can backfire with grave repercussions. These ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ can gain veto power over regimes’ actions, limiting their freedom to design policies that are responsive to environmental changes and work for the broader good of the country. Regimes find their goals harder to attain, the conflicts they hoped to resolve even more intractable, and international pressures mounting. Moreover, having developed intimate relationship, the non-state actor gradually gains great ability to resist the regime’s efforts to change course and can even target its former patron with lethality and effectiveness. Changes in established social and economic arrangements inside the state, as well as challenges to state identity, are additional possible consequences. To explore the causes of the RBT phenomenon and its dynamic, the proposed paper will examine two cases in which the state of Israel responded in a dissimilar way to ‘tigers’; in one case it confronted the non-state actor head-on, while in the second the government succumbed to it and compromised its own authority. In the first, the Israeli provisional government, insisting on imposing its authority on all Jewish paramilitary groups, confronted the underground ‘Irgun’ group. The conflict between the state and the Irgun peaked with the 1948 ‘Altalena Affair,’ in which the provisional government demanded that the group hand over to the Israel Defense Forces all weapons on board its cargo ship Altalena. When the Irgun sought a compromise and refused a complete surrender to the state’s demands, the government authorized the use of lethal force and sank the boat. By contrast, successive Israeli governments since the 1970s have declined to reaffirm state authority against radical and messianic groups in the West Bank. Both right- and left-wing Israeli governments have pandered to ultra-nationalist settlers despite their subversion of state authority. Israel’s policy has not offered significant strategic benefits and, in fact, has been self-defeating: Rather than ameliorate the Palestinian problem, it has intensified the conflict. In addition, the hands-off policy has weakened Israel’s international standing while deepening domestic divisions that cloud the state’s internal unity.

Religious preaching (da'wa) has been the primary mode of action of the Islamic movement in Israel since its very beginning in the early 1970s. As part of the larger Islamic movement inspired by Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers society, however, the Israeli Islamist activists understood da'wa as an inclusive practical project of social welfare, community building, and political involvement rather than as mere speech act. Curving themselves a space between the nationalist and communist movements, they called upon the Palestinian Arabs to return to Islam as the key to personal and collective salvation. Ideas of jihad entertained among some youth in the movement, especially in the wake of the Islamic revolution in Iran (usrat al-jihad), were quickly suppressed by the Israeli security forces. Still, like in other countries the Islamic movement in Israel is divided between two wings. One, the so called northern faction, is more radical and under the leadership of Ra'id Salah espouses a confrontational attitude toward the Jewish state. The other – the southern faction – follows the moderate course suggested by Abdallah Nimr Darwish and seeks accommodation. The split occurred in 1996 over the explicitly political question of participation in the national elections to the Knesset. While the radicals boycotted them to avoid recognition of the Jewish state, the moderates saw them as a golden opportunity to advance civil rights and equality for Israel's Arab citizens. The aim of my proposed presentation is to analyze the interface between religious preaching and politics among the two factions of the Islamic movement in Israel. I argue that their religio-political position are reflected as well as shaped by their divergent ideological and practical conceptualizations of da'wa. My sources include published materials of and on the two factions – books, magazines, newspaper reports etc. – along with interviews with their principal leaders and ideologues, and observations of their activities in the Knesset, in civil society, and among the Arab community in Israel at large.

Like other 20th century Middle Eastern elites, the Palestinian leadership of the West Bank was based on leading families until the early 1970s. Since the 1980s, many observers have argued that these families have lost their positions due to the rise of the PLO and the major political, economic and social changes experienced by the Palestinians following the Israeli occupation in 1967. The implications of such conclusions were far-reaching; they encapsulated the ideas that the political culture of the West Bank underwent a significant modernization, and that the status of the family – as a central social, cultural, political and economic institution – has declined. The proposed paper argues that the processes that the West Bank elite underwent were milder than they are usually perceived to have been. Contrary to common opinion, major shifts of the 1960s and 1970s did not compel the leading families to give up their positions as important players in the socio-political theater, as long as they were ready to adapt themselves to the changing realities. Yet choosing to adapt was not necessarily obvious because each family behaved as a different organization with disparate structures, goals and strategies that affected its adaptive skills. The proposed paper traces the story of the al-Masri family from Nablus, one of the most influential Palestinian families during the 20th century. The paper depicts and analyzes the developments that occurred in the family's connections to its support bases (such as the Fatah movement, Jordan, Israel, the merchants, the intelligentsia and others), and explain what can be learned from this network about the al-Masris' successful ability to adapt to the changing realities. On a broader level, this case provides another example of the ability of traditional forces in the Middle East to combine themselves into new elites. The sources for this study include a wide range of Jordanian, Palestinian, Israeli, British and American documents, as well as newspapers and oral testimonies. Methodologically, the study combines tools and concepts from the fields of family history and network analysis, as the latter is becoming increasingly prevalent in the humanities.