The eruption of a new military conflict between Israel and Hamas, in the summer of 2014, was first followed by unequivocal European support (Germany, United Kingdom, and France) for Israel and its right to defend itself. However, in France, President François Hollande’s first remark, which was released after a phone call from Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, provoked strong controversy. Seeming to provide Israel with a « blank check » to retaliate, the text omitted to mention the Palestinian civil population. Despite the fact that Hollande progressively readjusted his discourse in the face of the rising death toll in Gaza – as did his European counterparts – the French President struggled to convince his government and the local press, that his position was still in line with his country’s traditional stance regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In parallel, the spreading of a pro-Palestinian protest movement across France, that was partially tarnished by violence and anti-semitism, emphasized the lasting emotional impact exerted by the Mideast issue over French society, and the necessity to handle it carefully. This article aims at analyzing the repercussions of the 2014 Gaza war on France’s foreign and domestic policy, from a historical perspective. Through the analysis of French official statements as well as interviews with diplomats, journalists, and scholars, it shows to what extent France’s attitude regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue was modified by this conflict, right until the end of Hollande’s term, in May 2017. Furthermore, this research tackles the question of the influence of French public opinion over the country’s foreign policy and decision-making process at that time.

On 19 November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat shocked the world with his historic visit to Israel. His initiative paved the way, after extended negotiations to the conclusion of the peace treaty on 26 March 1979. A wide range of studies has been written on a variety of aspects related to Israeli–Egyptian relations mainly the formative period (1977–81). Yet, many of these studies focused on one central theme and had no access to the indispensable source material which is now available. Based on an ongoing study, the proposed paper will be the first comprehensive attempt to offer an historical account critically examining the complex Israeli–Egyptian relations since the two countries began peace negotiations through clandestine channels. Although the paper will examine the nature and quality of the relations between the two countries, Egypt’s policy toward Israel is the central theme of this paper. In other words, it will review Israeli–Egyptian relations through Egyptian lenses. The proposed paper will examine how Egyptians, both the political elite and members of the public, perceived Israel, its ruling elite and its society. As for the timeframe, the proposed paper begins with the period following the interim agreements of 1974 and 1975. At the time, Egypt witnessed, politically and intellectually, a conspicuous change of attitude toward the feasibility of a peaceful solution to its conflict with Israel. The concluding point of my presentation is the January-February revolution that led to the overthrown of President Mubarak, which opened a new era in Egypt’s modern history. Israeli–Egyptian relations have known many ups and downs since the conclusion of the peace treaty. The proposed paper aims to pinpoint each phase, identifying its character politically, economically, and culturally. It will employ historical methods paying careful attention to the interrelations between political and social history and the history of ideas. It will also rely and utilize theories and approaches drawn from social sciences disciplines such as International Relations and sociology in order to resolve some of the thematic issues deriving from the study. Much of the study is based on untapped primary sources gleaned from a variety of archives and libraries – mainly Egypt and Israel.

Ten years ago, President Barack Obama’s unprecedented address to the Muslim world from Cairo was hailed as a landmark in US–Middle Eastern relations and described by contemporary observers as a historical break in US foreign policy in the region. Yet it soon became clear that the president’s vision for a “new beginning based on mutual interest and mutual respect” would face many practical constraints. Analysing the thematic and rhetorical development of Obama’s speeches during the formative period between summer 2008 and 2009, as well as the public (news outlets and polling data) and academic (think tank publications) perception of and reaction to these moments, the paper examines the underlying interests and motivations for the president’s foreign policy approach in the Middle East. It argues that despite the low priority given to foreign policy issues during the economic crisis occurring at the time, the key pillars of Obama’s ambitious vision for the Middle East were rooted in pronounced US interests as well as the president’s personal convictions, rather than opportunistic calculations. It thus counters retrospective post-2011 criticism which argues that Obama’s words were never meant to be put into practice. The study contributes to the establishment of a solid empirical and conceptual base for further research on the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East under the Obama administration. Keywords: US foreign policy, Barack Obama, Middle East, New Beginning, Cairo, rhetoric

In the aftermath of the 2013 military coup in Egypt, the Obama administration withheld the delivery of certain weaponry to the Egyptian military for eighteen months. In response, the Egyptian regime immediately hired a public relations firms in Washington and invested in lobbying the United States government. The extent literature has not studied Egyptian lobbying following the military coup. Grounded in the scholarship on global hierarchies in International Relations (IR), this paper makes the argument that the post-coup Egyptian regime has adopted a sovereigntist stance vis-à-vis the United States. Sovereigntism aims to secure a better position for a state within the global hierarchical order, both vertically (by propping up its status) and horizontally (by gaining greater political leverage, whether internally or externally). Countering military sanctions which the regime perceived as a curtailment of its sovereignty, Egypt’s lobbying, it is my contention, was sovereigntist. The paper carries out a systematic examination of official documentation submitted by Egypt’s lobbying firm in Washington—The Glover Park Group—to the Department of Justice and relies on extensive interviews conducted in 2019. Interviewees include government officials who have held positions in the White House, Congress, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, and think tank scholars who have been targeted by Egypt’s lobbyists. The paper shows that the Egyptian regime lobbied Congress more than the Executive, Republican Members of Congress more than their Democratic colleagues, and the media more than think tanks. In addition, it demonstrates that it attempted to draw advantages from its recognition by regional United States allies—Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—which it mobilized to support its four claims: 1) framing the coup as a ‘revolution;’ 2) reinstating the normal flow of military aid; 3) recognizing the leadership of the new de facto leader, then president, of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; and 4) designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. In making this argument, the paper offers the first systematic and theoretically informed study of Egyptian lobbying in DC after the military coup, revealing how the new regime attempted to secure international recognition amidst its domestic authoritarian consolidation.