Ibrahim Tuqan's poem of Mawtini has been used as an expression of Palestinian nationalist feelings since the 1930s. A few years after the Palestinians used the words of Mawtini during the Arab revolt (1936) against the British colonialism, Iraqis experienced a revolt against British increasing intervention in their political affairs. With the beginning of the revolt, the tune and the words of Mawtini were heard across the streets of Baghdad to unity the people against the British. This paper explores journey of this powerful song from Palestine to Iraq. While Rashid Ali al-Gailani's revolt in April of 1941 was perceived by most Arab political elite as a call for provisional nationalism "Wataniyah" instead of "Qawmiyyah," some Palestinian political and nationalist leaders had to flee from Palestine to Iraq, escaping British prosecution for their involvement in the revolt of 1936-1939. Along with them, these leaders brought the song that was used to mobilize the Palestinians. Al-Gailani's usage of Mawtini represents the first attempt to use the calls of Arab unification along linguistic and cultural factors in a local attempt to achieve provisional nationalism. How did the leader of the Gailani revolt reconcile the rather opposing calls for Arab unityf Was the Iraqi revolt a product of Palestinian nationalist aspirations that were coded into the words of a popular poema Today, both Palestinians and Iraqis view Ibrahim Tuqan's poem as a product of their aspiration of independence, and as their first national anthem. This represents the internal debate within Arab Nationalism (Qawmiyyah versus Wataniyyah). The implications of the paper provide a better understanding of the Palestinian nationalist movement's attempts to rally outside support for their plight and the alliances that they made with other Arab nations, even when most Palestinians hoped for an all-inclusive struggle against colonialism. The mobilization of the populace (on two occasions) in both Palestine and Iraq through the use of Ibrahim Tuqan's poem "Mawtini Mawtini" shows that the colonial struggle and the strength of Arab Nationalism transcended geographic boundaries, even before the emergence of Baathism and Gamal Abdul Nasser in the Arab world.

In the field of Palestinian studies today, historical, cultural and political questions on nationalism in Palestine from the end of the Ottoman Empire, through the Mandate, and certainly after 1948, have been touched from nearly all angles. The historiography of Palestinian nationalism is certainly saturated with studies. My paper focuses on citizenship discourses and practices that led to the 'invention' of a Palestinian citizenship under the British administration of Palestine, from 1918 to 1926. The paper will re-examine this period of the mandate in terms of citizenship. Though this paper's main focus is on actual legislation, I am also interested in how citizenship discourses were internalized, normalized and then mobilized by the popular classes through social organizations under the leadership of the radical populists in Palestinian society. Further, how did the British administration in Palestine and London, the League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, and the leaders in the Palestinian political factions conceptualize citizenship and nationality? The answers to questions regarding citizenship as it pertained to indigenous inhabitants and to the mandatory authorities are important in the general study of mandates and for the unique situation of Palestine as a trusteeship whose mandate text included the allowance for the establishment of a settler nation-state. Importantly, I will explore the understanding of citizenship as such during the early mandate and how best researchers can approach this topic. For this paper, I use a minimal amount of secondary sources, as the majority of my research is based on official British correspondence and memorandums and the early Arab reactions to them. The transition from subject status in an empire to 'modern' citizen status in a nation-state occurred under the British administration, and so the evolution took place in a colonial context. Yet can we deduce how deeply linked citizenship and colonialism in Palestine were, or was territorial and communal belonging more of an influence than western concepts of communities with legal rights, protections, and obligations vis-a-vis a state? An important aspect is also the Arabic definitions of citizenship versus nationality, and how citizenship as an invented legislation contributed to nationalist consciousness expoused by the populist leaders. Certainly, this paper poses quite a few questions on the topic, and this is exactly the reason for further research into citizenship discourses under the Palestinian Mandate.

This study engages in the period of inter-communal war in Palestine, from December 1947 to May 1948. The belligerents in this conflict were the Yishuv (pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) on one side, and the Palestinian Arabs, aided by some volunteers from Arab countries, on the other side. During this war, the larger 'mixed' cities, Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, became a main battlefield. The Palestinian Arab communities in Jerusalem and Jaffa were chosen as a case study for their size, centrality, and significance to the Palestinian Arab community and national movement. A well-known Palestinian Historian called for research to uncover the internal reasons for the Palestinian debacle in 1948, alongside the well-known external reasons, particularly the Yishuv's military superiority. This study, in response, engages in the Palestinian local arena by using a comparative approach, in order to find better explanations for this military and social collapse. The main hypothesis is that social and geopolitical characteristics, accruing especially to Jaffa, led to the rapid and total collapse of this city vis-y-vis Jerusalem. On a countrywide scale, those traits brought about the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Arab Society under Jewish military pressure. The findings show differences in patterns of political, social and economic organization, stemming out of different characteristics of the population and the social changes undergone during the Mandate era. This study describes, in addition, how the rise of a middle class under the Mandate, mainly in the larger cities, accelerated the fall of the Palestinian Arab society in 1948, since members of this class tended to abstain from taking part in the national struggle and the war effort. The research is based on: Arab documents; Palestinian and Arab press of the time; diaries, memoirs and testimonies; and intelligence archival material (Israeli and British). Most researches on the 1948 War period had focused, so far, on the political and military aspects. This study contributes to the study of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948 from the social point of view, which was mainly neglected by research so far

Rashid Khalidi has written poignantly that under the British Mandate the Palestinian national movement was crippled by its lack of purchase on state institutions. Without denying his claim, this paper nonetheless challenges this view by looking at the rebel courts established during Palestine's Great Revolt (1936-39). In older scholarship the revolutionary courts were largely seen as showpieces where vengeance was meted out to suspected collaborators or familial opponents of rebel band leaders. In recent years some accounts have credited the courts with greater scope, and offered some detail on their operation and the regard given them by the population. This paper proposes to further augment understanding of the rebel courts, and with them the Great Revolt more broadly, by approaching the courts as an aspect of a larger process of state formation from below, while supplementing existing accounts of their operations. Using Arabic memoirs and newspapers and Zionist and British intelligence as sources, its aim is to illuminate the efforts during the revolt of popular and peasant-based forces to reconstitute and reshape their communities and society. The revolutionary courts were part of a larger counter-state apparatus that rebel bands constructed in the villages and countryside of Palestine. The insurgents, composed largely of rurally-based, peasant bands, not only attacked British and Zionist interests, but they built their own proto-state apparatus, including intelligence organs and local administration as well as the courts, while levying taxes and applying conscription. At its apex in 1938 the revolt briefly threatened British Mandatory rule. The Palestinian insurgents' appeal and the successes they achieved during 1938 were not solely the fruits of growing military prowess. The erection of rebel institutions represented and effected the spread of an insurgent sovereignty predicated on invalidating, voiding, and replacing the sovereign powers and capabilities of the colonial state. The drive towards creating an indigenous popular sovereignty built on growing patterns of assertiveness and activism by non-elites. Throughout much of the revolt 'youth' and peasants prevailed in various fashions upon their social superiors, ultimately bringing about the fleeting rise of what Ted Swedenburg has termed 'the peasant agenda': a loose program of radical social reform targeting debt, money-lending, and even rent. In examining the rebel courts, this paper intends to investigate the inter-relations between anti-colonial insurrection, state formation from below, the rise of popular power in the nationalist movement, and agendas of social reform and communal reconstitution.