Since the Arab Spring in 2011 the Gulf States, especially Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have been prominent in the region's foreign policy and military activities in ways which were inconceivable even a decade ago. The participation of Gulf States within outside-in coalitions like the US-led campaign against Daesh and with the UK-France led intervention against Ghadaffi, were significant enough, but more important was the formation of an inside-out coalition of the willing to intervene in Yemen in 2015, followed by the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism in December 2015. These Saudi-led initiatives are radical departures drawing in wider regional and extra-regional adherence. Rather than focusing on the pure-geopolitical explanations for this phenomenon however, this paper explores the drivers of the new Gulf-led process of 'coalitions of the willing' across different levels as expressions of multiple dimensions of attempts to shore up regime security. This new military adventurism meshes with the introduction of conscription in three Gulf States and a plethora of projects designed to re-enforce national identity. These are clearly aimed at boosting national sentiment in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and coupled with increased securitisation of discourses across the GCC. While these new 'coalitions of identity' can, partly, be explained by the traditional notion of the diversionary theory of war, they also represent two further processes. The first is ideational. The traditional desire of the region's citizens to be part of something bigger, a Gulf-based identity is however limiting in terms of foreign policy, thus an additional identity structure based on Sunnism creates a wider connection useful in terms of joining localised identities to something bigger, offering tools to develop Gulf leadership over the wider Arab and Muslim worlds. Not coincidentally, these are forms of identity which re-enforce the leadership of the Gulf States cementing the influence of monarchical systems of rule. The second process is a more pragmatic reaction to a realisation that with the threats and opportunities now present, Gulf leadership is essential. It seems that, 'stepping up to the plate' can re-enforce regime security in Gulf States on a number of levels. The paper encapsulates these complex dynamics within the development of a new diversionary theory of regime stability, assessing the impacts and complexities of these processes in the short term, and examining the potential of these processes of change to transform the dynamics of regional politics over the longer term.

Following the fall of Saddam Hussain in 2003, Ayatollah Sistani (b.1930) has had a significant impact on the political climate of Iraq and holds the greatest following as the high jurist within the Shia world. Sistani’s political involvement has developed from strong interventions in the creation of a new political system post-2003 to a period of less involvement until the rise of ISIS and his crucial fatwa urging Iraqis to rise and defend the state. Sistani was fundamental in the drafting of the Iraqi constitution in addition to supporting the democratic transition of Iraq by encouraging his followers to participate in elections. As Sistani ages, the question of who shall succeed him surfaces. One finds a number of qualified individuals such as Sheikh Ishaq Al-Fayadh (b.1930), Sayed Mohammed Saeed Al-Hakim (b.1934), and his son and head of his office Sayed Mohammed Ridha Sistani. Through investigating the political capabilities of names such as this as well as the political relationships, if any, formed with relevant political authorities, this paper will seek to establish the likelihood of names such as this succeeding Sistani. In addition to this, this paper will consider names such as Sheikh Baqir Al-Irawani who are equally capable of succeeding Sistani but are not as known to the general public. Accomplishing this requires incorporating established norms within the clerical establishment, and this paper will use original interviews conducted with clerics close to Sistani and prominent Iraqi politicians.

Histories of the 1971 independence of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar generally focus on the agency of the United Kingdom and a group of local sheikhs in these states' construction. This paper draws new attention to the roles of Saudi Arabia and Pahlavi Iran in the consolidation of a monarchical order in the Persian Gulf, arguing that projects of state formation from 1968-1971 succeeded only by gaining the support of these two regional powers. By the late 1960s, Iran and Saudi Arabia lost confidence in Britain’s political and military role in the Gulf. Although both states had benefited from British military protection, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi of Iran concluded that the British were managing their withdrawal from the region in a way that would both favor the interests of the Gulf sheikhs over their own and undermine their shared pursuit of a counterrevolutionary order in the Gulf. As the Shah complained to King Faisal in a 1968 meeting, British policy stemmed “either from their weakness or from their conniving nature. After leaving an area, they are accustomed to creating a baffling mess and disarray.” As such, from 1968 to 1971, Iran and Saudi Arabia put aside their initial opposition to Britain’s federation schemes to collaboratively influence British policy, forcing London to reshape its political strategy. As is evidenced in the records of their private consultations, King Faisal and the Shah overcame mutual Saudi-Iranian suspicions and collaborated to constrain London’s influence while taking into their own hands the British project to fortify the Gulf states against progressive or leftist revolution. To shed new light on Iranian and Saudi diplomacy, this paper employs the Persian-language archive of the Shah’s Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi, which opened in 2018. The Zahedi archive includes records of myriad high-level Saudi-Iranian consultations and of Iranian meetings with the Gulf sheiks. These documents provide an opportunity for historians to overcome their previous dependence on British sources. Drawing on these records, this paper shows that the independence of the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain should be seen as part of a wider regional project to construct a counterrevolutionary and monarchial order in the Persian Gulf on the eve of Britain’s withdrawal.

Previous research on Middle Eastern foreign policy has focused on religious, ethnic, sectarian and ideological identities as factors influencing the execution of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the importance of tribes in the Arabian Peninsula has not been extensively examined, despite its penetration of many levels of society, from the ruling families to grassroots components of society. This paper aims to focus on tribes as a major factor in explaining the foreign policies of Gulf countries. The paper will work on developing a theoretical framework, which will be multi-level starting from the decision-making structures to the regional environment and transnational identity, here tribalism. Process tracing and case study methods will be in place to refer to the development of tribal history and relations among GCC leaders and states plus putting the framework into test by having a case study, the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Moreover, the paper will draw on information that the researcher expects to find when he starts his fieldwork in the region in March. The decision-making level will focus on the policymakers and the tribal history they share together. Most ruling families used to live in areas that do not belong to their modern states and used to deal with each other under the British protection. The study of leaders is necessary if we are to understand the formulation of foreign policy regarding threat, friendship and alliance. This is important with regard to the Gulf: such is the under-development of foreign policy bureaucracies. The regional level is the immediate environment of states and the transnational identities. The paper will focus on the transnational nature of tribes given the role they played in the formation of the state. This has helped tribes to penetrate the political system and created a new source of threat to the state given the nomadic nature of tribes before independence, which resulted in having branches of the same tribe in different countries. Such phenomenon can undermine the state’s sovereignty and also gives a way to some countries to intervene. By incorporating this theoretical framework into foreign policy analysis in the Gulf, we may be able to better explain certain foreign policy actions. According to the Omani foreign minister, the Gulf crisis has to do with tribal affairs among Gulf countries. Therefore, developing a new theoretical framework where tribal identity is a major factor to explain foreign policy actions can help understanding the inter-Gulf politics.