The Arab uprisings highlighted the deficiencies of governance and public welfare regimes across the Middle East. The decline of public services and programs was all the more egregious against the backdrop of post-independence social contracts, in which rulers across the region committed to providing social protection as part of state- and nation-building projects. Despite their centrality in everyday life, governance and the politics of public goods provision have received relatively little attention in research on the region. In particular, research at the micro- or local level remains limited and spread across disparate literatures (Alles 2012; Bergh 2010, 2012; Blaydes 2011; Bouziane 2010; Cammett 2010, 2011, 2012; Challand 2010, 2011; Clark 2004, 2012; Harb 2009, 2010; Harmson 2008; Kadirbeyoglu and Sumer 2012; Maron 2012; Menza 2012; Saadi 2012)
Based on a comparative approach across the MENA region, the proposed panel focuses on governance and public goods provision with a lens on the micro-level. In the past two decades, economic liberalization and decentralization in particular have become a central focus of the political economy of development. Research on the structure of governance and local social relations is crucial to understand the local political and socioeconomic effects and the effectiveness of national initiatives. How have fiscal crises and liberalization reshaped welfare regimes? How have they reshaped the nature of health, education and other social sectors in the Middle East? What impact have these changes had on the exercise of authority at the local level? What are the economic, social and political ramifications for local communities? What role do diverse non-state actors play in helping people to meet their basic needs?
The questions raised in this panel will contribute richly to policy-oriented and scholarly debates on the Middle East and on the Global South. In the academic literature on welfare regimes, studies of East Asia and Latin America (Brook 2009; Gough and Wood 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Mares and Carnes 2009; Rudra 2008), complement the vast body of research on Europe and North America. Little research on the Middle East adds to this line of work, in part because little is known about the actual state of governance at the local level. This panel brings together scholars with established research agendas on governance and welfare in the region and addresses issues of vital concern to people across the Middle East.
The Arab Spring has increased the political power of Islamic parties. An oft-cited argument holds that the social welfare activities of Islamist organizations have boosted their popular appeal by creating grateful beneficiaries, fostering a perceived commitment to social justice, and burnishing their credentials as relatively uncorrupt and responsive to social needs (Alterman 2000; Bayat 2002; Denoeux 1993; Hamzeh 2001; Harik 1994; Ismail 2001; ?ni? 2006; Roy 1994; Walsh 2006). Yet little systematic scholarly research explores whether this reputation for “good governance” and effective public goods provision is deserved. As Islamic parties play a more active role in running their countries, a major policy question is: will Islamic parties perform better than their predecessors in the delivery of educational and health services and by improving conditions for the poor and the excluded in the labor market? If so, under what conditions do they provide social goods more effectively? This paper examines this question in Turkey. We examine the provision of education and health outputs and their effects on education and health outcomes on subnational units in Turkey since 1990. Econometric results combined with illustrative case studies at the provincial level enable us to assess variation in development outcomes at the subnational level.
Despite having been allowed to participate in institutional politics as a ‘loyal opposition’ party since 1996 (Zeghal, 2005), the Moroccan Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has had to self-limit its political activities in order to be tolerated by the Moroccan regime (Willis, 2004). As a consequence of the regional Arab uprisings of 2011, however, the PJD was allowed to join the official political game at the highest level as it was the only political party that enjoyed a considerable degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Moroccan voters. The PJD’s internal democratic dynamic and the popular support it enjoys are what differentiates the PJD from the rest of the Moroccan political landscape. The role its 'civil society wing' plays in service delivery at the municipal level has been crucial to this popularity. Indeed, particularly since 2009, when the government devolved significant decision-making authority vis-a-vis service delivery to municipal governments, the issue of service delivery has become highly contested with the PJD winning municipal elections based on its promises of and performance in delivering services, including social welfare services. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012 in the town of Kenitra, where the PJD won the last municipal elections and dominates the municipal council, this paper examines the party's promotion and engagement of civil society in order to improve service delivery and the significance of this engagement for the PJD, civil society and municipal service delivery. It argues that the PJD's strategy of engaging civil society in order to advance its agenda is generating contradictory political dynamics. On the one hand, civil society organizations associated with the PJD successfully have worked together with secular associations not affiliated with the PJD in order to help improve service delivery. On the other hand, civil society organizations not affiliated with the PJD argue that they have been excluded from municipal decision-making and municipal funding, generating a confrontational relationship with the party. This contradictory relationship casts doubt on the degree to which the party is engaging in a more equitable distribution of services as compared to previous parties in power and, consequently, on the sustainability of the party's popularity.
This paper explores variation in welfare across diverse populations of Iraq during three time periods 1) the Iran-Iraq War 1980-88, 2) the First Gulf War 1990-1 and 3) the sanctions era leading up to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Using data from a nationally-representative 2003 World Food Programme survey, I will examine rates of stunting – or stunted growth, a primary manifestation of malnutrition in early childhood – to explore the extent to which the costs of international sanctions were borne by particular subpopulations of Iraq.
