Why do some Islamists pick up arms as opposed to others who live under the same conditions? Environmental explanations such as culture, occupation, or poverty cannot differentiate between the two groups. Instead, I draw on the belief system literature and use a cognitive mapping methodology to compare Islamists from the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood and from the formerly violent groups al Jihad and al Jamaa al Islamiyya in Egypt. To ensure that my findings are not specific to individuals who believe in Islam and live in authoritarian countries, I also examine violent and nonviolent non-Muslims from a different environment - members of the Baader-Meinhof group who attacked the German state during the 1970s and German political activists who at the same time decided to not pick up arms. Data were gathered from in-depth interviews in Egypt and Germany. I identify eight different kinds of decisions to pick up arms and make two main claims. First, there are at least three chains of reasoning without which decisions to pick up arms are not possible. These chains refer to 1) attacks observed by the individuals, 2) perceptions of their local political structures, and 3) their private and political activities. Second, decisions to use or not use violence must contain combinations of components from different chains. These combinations create both the possibility to take revenge and to identify a target; and exclude alternative means and goals. The paper concludes with an exploration of the action implications of counterfactual initial conditions and the possibilities of nonviolent Islamists "becoming" violent and vice-versa.

Is it permissible (halal) for Palestinian Muslims to sign a peace treaty with Israel? Would this be legitimate according to Shariah? Nearly fifteen years ago, the leading Saudi scholar Bin Baz ('Abd al-'Aziz b. 'Abd-Allah b. Baz) (d. 1999) issued a famous fatwa affirming the permissibility of such a treaty. In response, the ever-prominent Egyptian jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a counter-fatwa proclaiming peace with Israel to be impermissible (haram). What followed was a back-and-forth debate that captured the attention of the Arab and Muslim world. Bin Baz would make his case by appealing to the concept of maslaha (public interest), the example of the Prophet at the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, and the Qur'anic statement, "But if they incline toward peace, incline toward it as well, and put your trust in God" (8:61). Qaradawi would reject the maslaha and Hudaybiyyah arguments, and would respond with another Qur'anic commandment: "So [believers] do not lose heart and cry out for peace. It is you who have the upper hand: God is with you" (47:35). In the present paper, I shall examine each scholar's legal methodology, specific arguments, and assessment of the facts on the ground. I shall also situate this discourse in relation to classical and modern doctrines of Jihad, including those articulated by contemporary scholars of Islam, particularly Sherman A. Jackson (in his article "Jihad and the Modern World"). I shall demonstrate that while Bin Baz might have been the peacemaker of the two in this particular case, his "just war theory" - as presented in this debate and elsewhere - would be more likely to sustain the institution of aggressive Jihad (and the dar al-harb/dar al-islam worldview that undergirds it). Finally, I shall explore the implications of this debate for Shariah, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and global relations.

This paper examines five internal Jihadi geostrategic arguments and the profound impact different conclusions have on a whole range of tactical considerations. The primary case study is of global jihadists identified with al-Qa'ida. The paper draws heavily on primary sources compiled in the Harmony data project of captured Jihadi documents. The five Jihadi debates examined center on jihad, takfir, hisba, far enemy, and information strategy. The debate over the nature of the jihad focuses on the issue of vanguard, and thus has tactical implications for the use of violence - provoking the state in a Leninist fashion, or constructing a broader social movement. The argument over takfir, made famous in debates between Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri, has profound implications over the geography of conflict and the allocation of resources: lands of non-Muslim occupation or any nominal Muslim regimeg Gerges has well covered the argument over the near v. far enemy; captured documents in Iraq allow us to add greater nuance to this internal argument. Likewise the internal argument over hisba - should resources of the global jihad be directed to issues of internal moralityr Finally, how hip is too hip in the public messaging of jihad The debates between Abu Musab al-Suri and Zawahiri on this issue are instructive. Suri argued for an information strategy that was hip, that reached out and was made relevant to the young generation of jihadis. But by debasing the message, it was countered, the status of the vanguard was undermined. This paper will be a chapter in a book on Jihadi information strategy, to be published by Stanford University Press.