The Israeli elections of March 17, 2015, are highly important for a variety of reasons. They have brought to center stage to old conflict between the two large political forces that have dominated Israeli politics since the 1960s. On the one hand, you have a Center-Left bloc of parties—running at this election as the “Zionist Camp”— and headed by a new leader, Yitzhak Herzog and supporting, in principle, a territorial compromise with the Palestinians under Mahmoud Abbas. On the other hand, you have a Right leaning set of parties—describing itself as the “National Bloc”—and led by Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister since 2009 (and prior to that between 1996-1999). To a large extent, the 2015 elections are a test to the leadership of Netanyahu, a leadership that has been characterized by ambiguity, committing publicly to a two state solution (Bar-Ilan speech of 2009) while doing everything possible to prevent such a solution from actually being adopted and implemented. The main goal of my paper is to assess the extent to which the 2015 elections amounts to a real change in the Israeli political landscape or, alternatively, does it reaffirms continuity. The behavior—political statements and actual actions—of the post-election government will be used to determine this question.

Ever since the eruption of the social and political volcano in several Arab countries, the region has been characterized by its instability. Egypt went through two “revolutions,” and currently the regime’s legitimacy is at stake. The overthrow of the first democratically elected Muslim Brothers president following a military coup supported by large segments of Egyptian society casts doubts on the future of Egypt as a stable country. President ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s declaration of war against terrorism conducted by Islamic Jihadists within Egypt and in the Sinai Peninsula requires permission from Israel to allow the entry into Sinai of a large number of ground forces as well as naval and air forces, possibly more than ever before. The outcome of this war may determine the future of the al-Sisi’s regime. The current right-wing Israeli government, motivated by strategic considerations, has hitherto supported Egypt’s war efforts by allowing ad hoc entries of Egyptian forces into Sinai. Will the elections of 17th March in Israel have any impact upon its relations with Egypt? The strategic ties between the two countries have improved considerably since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza. At present, both the Israeli government and Egypt’s regime boycott Hamas and treat him as a terrorist organization. The contemporary process of amelioration of Israeli-Egyptian economic relations (in the fields of QIZ, gas, agriculture, etc.) has continued. Another issue which might be relevant for our discussion is the current process of rapprochement between Egypt and Russia. Russia under Putin has shown great interest in the Middle East. She is currently involved in Syrian affairs, supporting the Assad Alawite regime. The Russian backing is prompted by a number of strategic calculations and interests. These include Russia’s naval and military presence in the Tartus port in Syria, which may serve as a counterweight to the extension of NATO eastward and the show of force of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In this context, are we witnessing a revival of Cold War policies and strategies? If so, can it have any impact upon the Israel-Egyptian strategic peace?

Four years of bloody civil war and war of Jihad have plagued the Syrian state and brought about its de facto disintegration into a number of state-like entities. ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, rules in eastern Syria and western Iraq; the Asad dynasty rules in Western Syria, and Autonomous enclaves ruled by rebel groups hover on the edges of this territory, the most outstanding being the Al-Nusra Front (or Jabhat al-Nusra, "The Support Front for the People of Syria"), established by al-Qaida. Against this background, Israel's dilemma is clear: should it continue to view Bashar as the lesser evil and as a barrier to radical Islam or taking in consideration, his growing dependence on Hizballa and Iran, should seek his removal from power by the rebels. It should be mentioned that in the meantime, Washington is still seeking rebel groups holding moderate views, when there are none, while simultaneously seeking to renew the dialogue with Bashar al-Assad. However, the United States must come to understand that as of now there is no magic instant solution that will lead to a rapid end of the crisis in Syria, the removal of Bashar, and his replacement by a group or groups of rebels acceptable to the U.S. The several alternatives at the moment seem to be: a continuation of the chaos for many more years; or, international support for Bashar, an alternative that Washington refuses to consider

King Salman ascends the throne of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at a time of great regional and domestic challenge. With the respect to the latter, the Islamic State has already carried out several attacks and threatens more. More importantly, regionally the kingdom is surrounded by instability, with Iranian hands everywhere. To the south, in Yemen, the Iranian-backed Houthis have overthrown the pro-Saudi president. To the east, Iran's hands can be seen both in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province and in Bahrain. To the north, a pro-Iranian government in Iraq completes the circle. And there is Iran itself, which continues to move towards an atomic bomb. Not to mention Egypt, with Riyadh throwing its full weight behind the anti-Muslim Brotherhood president, And al-Fattah al-Sisi. Israel sees eye-to-eye with Saudi Arabia on all these issues, and further cooperation can be expected.

The nuclear treaty with Iran will have a number of ramifications for the region in general, and Iran and Israel in particular. It is important to note that the security conception of both Iran and Israel is essentially zero-sum. It is perceived by both parties that what helps the security of the one necessarily harms the security of the other, and vice versa. This has the potential to rapidly escalate confrontations in unforeseen ways. In the long term, a nuclear-armed Iran will enable the country to achieve strategic parity with Israel in the long term. Yet in the short-term, whether or not the deal actually succeeds in preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran is less important than the assumption held by many regional actors that it won't. The fear that Iran will ultimately become nuclear capable is especially acute among Iran's Sunni rivals in the Gulf and in Egypt, who do not necessarily trust American security guarantees. Paradoxically, then, the deal will likely lead to greater nuclear proliferation - the Sunni states will seek parity by developing a weapon of their own, or acquiring one by some other means. Such other means could include, for example, purchasing one from Pakistan. Moreover, the improvement of Iran's international and economic position may have other negative consequences for the region, and for Israel. The elimination of sanctions will be a financial windfall for Iran which will enable it to continue to support, and to enhance its support, its client groups in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, and to pursue new client-patron relationships in other venues as well, for example, the West Bank. It may choose to activate its proxies in an effort to embroil Israel in a series of low to mid-intensity conflicts which will do much to weaken Israel's diplomatic and economic position. Increased funds at Iran's disposal will also have the added effect of enabling it to continue funding the government forces and its allies in Syria, which will prolong the conflict there. There may well be other diplomatic repercussions as well. Israel has famously maintained a 'don't ask-don't tell' policy with regards to its own nuclear capability; Iran may push for 'full Israeli transparency' and then sanctions or disarmament as part of a future "nuclear free Middle East."