Although Morocco has a long history of decentralization at the municipal (and provincial) level da-ting back to 1960, this contribution will focus on the current decentralization reform at the regional level (the so-called “advanced regionalization” reform). The 2011 reform reduced the number of re-gions in Morocco from 16 to 12, and established directly elected regional assemblies to replace the previously indirectly elected ones, thereby creating a new political arena over which the various ac-tors fight for influence. As opposed to the municipalities, the regions now hold vast developmental responsibilities. Based on interviews with key informants as well as a review of the legal framework and numerous reports, this paper seeks to explore the politics around the main features of the “ad-vanced regionalization” reform in the areas of governance, finance, and regional planning. It also discusses the relationship between decentralization and deconcentration reforms in Morocco. The paper concludes that given the complex legal and institutional backdrop, the developmental impact of the newly created regions and their assemblies is hard to identify. It argues that the way in which the advanced regionalization reform is being designed may in fact constitute a trap for elected representatives. The strong central state involvement in regional planning over which they do not have much control means that the they will most likely not be able to fulfil their electoral promises, as projects will be delayed, or simply not funded. Indeed, the “advanced regionalization” agenda in Morocco could be said to represent an exercise in “upgrading authoritarianism” (Heydemann 2007), as it provides new spaces for political competition through elections, while at the same time maintaining the power of the makhzen, the power structures surrounding the King. The paper’s innovative contribution to exist-ing knowledge lies in showing how this upgrading is achieved through the clever creation and use of legal ambiguities, the launch of a host of competing programs and planning tools, and the establish-ment of more powerful parallel (deconcentrated, sectoral) institutions.

The social contract is the deal between the state and its citizens by which the latter agree the rule of the former in return for deliverables. Over time, the state’s deliverables have evolved from simple law and order to a set of social rights, such as the social contract in North African countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia –in the 1950s and 1960s. State-led development, including state-led industrial development, provided jobs to many, with state provision of health and education and a range of consumer subsidies. Deteriorating economic performance led to the collapse of this model as the state could no longer provide these deliverables. Instead, an ‘unsocial’ social contract emerged under liberalisation in which the state used trade, industrial and other economic policies to favour an emerging group of crony capitalists who in turn provided support for the regime. The growing inequality and diminishing benefits for the masses undermined its sustainability resulting in the Arab Spring. The trajectory of the social contract has differed in the three countries. In Egypt, the ‘unsocial’ social contract is further entrenched. The army is taking the role of a leading business-group using industrial policy to political ends. Its strong engagement in the economy makes it an interested party rather than an impartial arbiter. In Morocco, the King still retains a prime position but has accommodated some pressures for a more inclusive industrial policy in domestic markets, which may lay the basis for a more broadly based social contract. Tunisia is finding its way to an even more inclusive development model, but is still struggling for consensus for a clear economic policy direction and remains threatened by extremist elements. International efforts to support democratic development in these countries need to be conditioned on the differing nature of the ongoing transitions in the social contract.

The paper proposes an explanation of the different configurations and results of the social mobilizations of the so-called Arab Spring in three Maghreb countries: Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. From a comparative perspective, we propose the consideration of the power structure (power regime) to complement the analyses focused on the political system in the analysis of the popular revolts. The research is based on over fifty field interviews with policy-makers and social activists conducted during the period 2013-2019, as well as analysis of primary (speeches, press, social networks) and secondary sources. The three cases chosen correspond to three different typologies of power regime according to the greater or lesser concentration of primary elites, and to the capacity to control different resources (state, capital, coercion, information, ideology, etc.). Our starting hypothesis is that in a dynamic of social mobilization, the structure of the power regime directly influences both the type of response of the regime (strategy) and its possibility of survival (control of resources and capacities), as well as the structure of opportunities and the configuration and dynamics of the social mobilization. Of the three models, the type of power regime in Morocco, concentrated elites but diversified resources, appears to be particularly resistant to changes and threats. On the one hand, the elites, being concentrated and homogeneous, have a great resilience; by accumulating power through diverse resources, they have negotiation capacity if they are forced to make some concessions, and the capacity to use coercion if necessary. In the case of Libya, a power regime with concentrated elites and resources during the rule of Muammar Al-Qhadafi, the response to the mass protests was highly repressive as the primary elites had little negotiating capacity. In this case, the concentration of power resources in a rentier state (state and hydrocarbon sector) left them little room to make partial concessions. With respect to Tunisia, a power regime with diversified elites and resources during the Ben Ali presidency, when social mobilization became widespread, a sector of the primary elites controlling resources other than the state along with other secondary elites considered the possibility to gain power with the fall of the elites governing the political regime, or they could be dragged into losing power with the instability.

Under what circumstances do voters prefer Islamist political parties to other political parties? In multiple elections over the past decade in both Tunisia and Morocco, Islamically-oriented parties have competed against a wide range of other parties. In some, but not all, of these elections, the party with the strongest identifiable Islamic identity has emerged as the party with the most votes (Ennahda in Tunisia and the PJD in Morocco). Using both qualitative and quantitative analysis this paper examines the individual correlates of voting for Islamist parties and tests three main hypotheses: 1) Islamist parties are punished by voters when they are perceived to be ineffective on economic promises; 2) Islamist parties are supported when they are perceived to be more collaborative with other parties; and 3) Islamist parties are supported when they are perceived to be more identifiably Islamic in orientation. These hypotheses are tested through two separate online surveys in Tunisia and Morocco, and by using existing data from recent public opinion surveys. The unique surveys utilized in this paper assess voters' comparative evaluation of competing parties and include survey experiments that prime respondents to think about a specific statement made by the relevant Islamist party. Initial research to date suggests that voters are likely to see Islamist parties as unreliable in economic promises over time but are more willing to vote for Islamist parties when they are seen as collaborative with other parties. These effects are stronger in Tunisia than in Morocco, in part due to the competitive political framework in Tunisia and lower influence on policy outcomes from unelected actors.