Today in Egypt, Islamic education is the subject of much debate. At al-Azhar—the preeminent institution of Sunni learning located in Cairo—contemporary Muslim scholars (‘ulama) argue that modern Islamic education has led to the spread of putative religious extremism. Through a series of reforms implemented at the hands of government reformers and modernist intellectuals, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Islamic education at al-Azhar was transformed in numerous ways. Large lecture halls replaced the intimate locus of the study circle; modern textbooks based on summaries of older religious texts replaced the commentary tradition; and an institutionally bestowed diploma replaced the traditional license issued by individual scholars to their students (Eccel 1984; Nakissa 2019). According to contemporary ‘ulama, these modernizing reforms severed the chains of transmission that ensured that Islamic knowledge was authoritative and transmitted according to sound methods. As a result, a gap emerged between lay Muslims and traditions of Islamic knowledge, leading to the growing influence of Islamists, Salafists, and putative extremists in Egypt and elsewhere in the Islamic world. To counter this trend, contemporary ‘ulama at al-Azhar are calling for the revival of turath (literally, heritage), which refers to the pre-reform practices of Islamic knowledge production and dissemination at al-Azhar. In this paper, I argue that turath denotes an idealized conception of traditional Islamic education, one which connects the political aim of producing “sound” Islamic knowledge and “centrist” Muslims to the educational practices of the ‘ulama. I explicate the pedagogical, ethical, epistemological, and political approaches that constitute turath in the discourses of two prominent proponents of the turath revival: the rector of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyab (1946-) and the former Grand Mufti of Egypt ‘Ali Jumu’a (1952-). ‘Ali Jumu’a has delineated his notion of turath in his published works, while Ahmad al-Tayyab has sought to implement a particular understanding of turath in his reforms of al-Azhar University. By comparing these two views of turath— one that is articulated in texts and the other in institutional reforms—my paper brings attention to the diverse ways that contemporary ‘ulama are redefining practices and discourses of Islamic knowledge transmission. In doing so, it provides new insight into how modern ‘ulama are continuing to constitute and defend their authority in the modern world (Zaman 2002; Zeghal 1996).

The raised interest towards Islam and Muslims, and more specifically towards individuals able to speak for Islam, has led to the emergence of a broad literature on contemporary Muslim thinkers also within the English-speaking academia. The last three decades, therefore, have witnessed the emergence of a progressively distinct field of contemporary Islamic thought in the “Western” academia. This field has been strongly shaped by socio-political context, including government’s interest in promoting specific understandings of Islam. While recent scholarship has explored governments’ role in framing the production of knowledge on Islam and Muslim thinkers in North American and Europe (Mahmood, Aidi, Hafez) less attention has been paid to the agency of academics involved in shaping this field, and the way they negotiate governments’ policies. These scholars, indeed, often opposed governments’ agenda, in some instances using the resources they received to challenge states’ narratives. In this process, they had an important role as gatekeepers by selecting the thinkers to translate and/or discuss in their publications, and by mobilizing and securing resources for these thinkers to enter European institutions. By elaborating Bourdieu's analysis of the role of gatekeepers in the international circulation of ideas (Bourdieu, 2002), the paper investigates the role of academics in shaping the debate over religious authority and knowledge in Islam in the English literature. This will be conducted by exploring the way scholars influenced the distribution of knowledge, resources and ultimately status for individuals emerging in the English literature as “contemporary Muslim intellectuals”.

This paper examines Muslim religious scholars’ (‘ulama’s) use of social media as a new modality of religious education. Several scholars (for instance, see Nakissa 2019; Robert Hefner et al. 2007; Zaman 2002; Zeghal 1996) have examined traditional modes of transferring Islamic knowledge to Muslim students both within and without Muslim-majority countries. Some of them argue that Islamic religious authority has become diffuse in recent decades around the world, and ‘ulama have had to respond in various ways to the “challenges of changing times” (Zaman 2002). The rise of social media has further allowed for a democratization of influence and fame and could have threatened or made obsolete the authority of the ‘ulama in the modern world. This paper explores questions of religious authority in the US and argues that through their use of social media, US-based Muslim preachers are responding to challenging times and are utilizing social media outlets to stay connected to young Muslim followers. The ubiquity and simplicity of social media platforms allow American preachers, like Suhaib Webb and Omar Suleiman, to insert their short, relevant messages on piety and correct religious practice as Muslim youth scroll through their newsfeeds. I use digital ethnographic methods to survey and analyze Webb and Suleiman’s theorizations and arguments on social media about social justice in Islam as a case study, and gauge reactions from followers in the comments sections under the posts on the preachers’ YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram pages. The study thus shows that a nexus between being an Islamic scholar in America and a social activist is possible, something that is not viable in most parts of the Arab world, for example. In a democratic setting, these religious scholars have been able to clearly and publicly articulate their activist beliefs despite sometimes facing backlash from more conservative groups in the US. They view their activism both as a civic duty and as something that is incumbent on every Muslim in emulation of the Prophet Muhammad. The paper thus shows that social media can serve as a new modality of learning about piety and correct Islamic practice, especially during moments of moral crisis and injustice. In these scholars’ posts, they show that there is piety in activism and that activism itself is pietistic.

The upsurge in radical terrorism in Morocco since 2003 has compelled the Moroccan state to intervene forcefully in the public sphere. This multifaceted intervention has included the implementation of national and transnational security measures, as well as efforts to produce “moderate” understandings of Islamic knowledge and practice. As is well documented in secondary scholarship, Morocco has branded itself a “moderate” model of Islam by domestically reinforcing its troika of national Islamic tradition, consisting in the Maliki school of law, the Ash‘ari creed, and the influence of various forms of Sufism (Alaoui Bensaleh 2017). As part of these endeavors, the Moroccan state has also increasingly relied on urban lower middle-class women (murshid?t) as the public face of this project (El Haitemi 2013). In this paper, I analyze the state’s rhetoric regarding the need and importance of training murshid?t in the production of moderate Islam, comparing this rhetoric to the voices of the murshid?t themselves in how they understand their involvement in the state’s project. Based on interviews that I conducted with government officials in Morocco in the summer of 2019, I reveal that the murshid?t understand their role to be going beyond calling Moroccans to moderate Islam (da`wa) in the space of the mosque, as the project was initially conceived. Indeed, I show that these state-sponsored Muslim female agents have moved into academic and religious institutions and private homes, widening their prerogative to include advocacy for the rights of rural women beyond the realm of religious knowledge. Specifically, the focus of the murshid?t has morphed into demanding greater access to education and access to voting for rural Moroccan women. In my analysis of future interviews scheduled in June of 2020 with ten murshid?t, I will explore how these women understand their role as purveyors of the state’s counterterrorism project, as spiritual guides and interpreters of canonical religious texts, and as advocates for the rights of rural women. Through this analysis, I will bring attention to the ways that the murshid?t have fashioned themselves not only as authorities of state-condoned “moderate” Islam, but also of the educational and political needs of rural Moroccan women. Thus, the paper will bring attention to the ways that religious extremism and women’s rights are often tied together in state discourses, as well as to how women themselves can be both agents and subjects in these projects.