This paper presents a theory of military insubordination in Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes having witnessed large-scale, anti-incumbent popular mobilization. The aim is to distinguish between different types of insubordination. The Arab Spring serves as an apt empirical laboratory for such an analysis. Conceptually I distinguish between military agents, namely higher officers vs. rank-and-file soldiers, and between military personnel's collective vs. individual action. Based on original empirical research, I identify four types of military insubordination: coups d'état as collective action of officers (Egypt 2011, 2013); mutinies as collective action of soldiers (Yemen 2011, 2014); defection as individual officer action (Tunisia 2011); and desertion as individual action of soldiers (Syria 2011-2012). I advance three theoretical claims: First, domestic shocks are a necessary precondition for individual military insubordination. Second, popular mass uprisings are surprising events and shorten the time horizon for officer coordination of military insubordination. Hence, coups d'état as coordinated action occur only when mechanisms of officer coordination exist prior to the uprisings. Third, mutinies occur if military agents have established horizontal cohesion across army ranks prior to the uprising. This paper is part of a book project and relies on the author's field research in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen as well as on research on the Syrian case conducted in Lebanon and Turkey. An original dataset on coups d'état in Middle East, 2050-2013, complements the paper's empirical foundation.

‘Deterrence’ has been a cornerstone for national security of great powers and eventually, the international security during prolonged decades of cold war. However, following the complex changes in the post cold war era, this notion, called ‘complex deterrence’, has undergone massive changes from theory and political strategy aspects. This study is going to present a comprehensive analysis over a part of complex deterrence under the subtitle of ‘Unconventional Asymmetric Deterrence’ which implies unbalanced relationship between two relatively strong and weak actors. The study contends that the adoption of the unconventional deterrence strategy by an expansionist and revisionist would-be nuclear weak-state cannot be considered as reliable national security doctrine and leads deterrence to fail. This conclusion will be achieved upon literature review of the texts and declassified documents derived from US-Iraq confrontations -during the years between two Persian Gulf wars (1991-2003) as well as the post second war insurgency followed by Iraqi regime’s fall.

Why do civilians support militantism? Traditional explanations for civilian behavior in conflict zones expect civilians to maximize their survival, supporting whichever groups will best protect their interests. However, these explanations ignore social and psychological factors influencing civilian attitudes in conflict zones. I argue that social identity and violence are powerful factors in determining when and under what conditions civilians are likely to support violence in response to state repression, and how that differs from civilian responses to insurgent violence. Understanding why individuals believe militancy is justified first requires understanding individuals’ personal experience with violence and with actors in the conflict. Research on social psychology identifies three ways violence influences attitudes: the character of the violence (structural violence vs. bombing); exposure to violence (did it happen to you personally or to a friend or family member); and the actor committing the violence. I argue that the experiences of violence help shape individual attitudes about militancy. I focus on Palestine – a place where the state has used violence to counter growing unrest, resulting in increasing militancy in some members of the population and a quest for peace in others. I seek to understand this variation. I test my argument using qualitative and quantitative data drawn from an original survey of 1500 respondents as well as 74 life-story style interviews, conducted between Oct and Dec of 2015. I use in-depth semi-structured interviews, large-N secondary data, and an original survey fielded in the West Bank to test my argument and the alternative explanations. My qualitative research traces the mechanisms behind civilian attitudes about militancy. My quantitative analyses test the relationship between instances of violence and political attitudes to demonstrate the generalizability of individual accounts. Whether a population believes an actor’s militant action is justified or whether nonviolence is a superior course of action is central to security policy and the peaceful resolution of civil conflicts. Civilian militancy can lend support to movements or the civilian ‘compliance’ with state forces leading to the dissolution of terrorist groups. Nonviolent resistance provides an alternative, but one not often examined within the context of civil war or insurgency. Militancy and its effect on civil conflict are among today’s greatest security challenges, generating high rates of civilian casualties and leading to state, regional and international instability. Equally, civilians’ rejection of militancy and support for nonviolence or for a negotiated settlement is critical to conflict resolution and lasting, stable peace.

The proposed research explores the implications of detention policies on security and human rights in Israel-Palestine through two primary themes of inquiry. First, the “security question” examines how the Israeli state negotiates between security interests and rights obligations when determining arrest, detention, and interrogation policies and practices. The security thread not only identifies which measures are used (eg, administrative detention, large-scale arrests, enhanced interrogation) but also how the state defines the objectives of such policies (eg, discipline/punishment, prevention, intimidation, intelligence gathering), as well as the state’s strategic, legal, and ethical considerations in formulating detention policies. Second, the “resistance question” assesses how Palestinian detainees employ collective action to challenge detention policies and, at times, influence broader conflict dynamics. The aim of the resistance thread is to examine how detainees organize within prisons (eg alternative institutions, education regimes, communication systems), identify which types of tactics are used for resistance (including, but not limited to, hunger strikes), and identify the aims and impacts of prison-based tactics. Together, the two dimensions illuminate how both the Israeli state and Palestinian detainees ultimately “negotiate” security and rights through respective attempts at regulation/control and resistance. I argue that the prison dynamic can be viewed as a subset of the broader conflict, and with prisons functioning as often-overlooked spaces of political confrontation, mobilization, and at times, compromise and negotiation. Further, I explore how the salience of the issue of political imprisonment might be better leveraged in future negotiations. I consider the issue of prisoner releases as a precondition or incentive for talks, but go further to examine how prisoner (or former prisoner) involvement in negotiations, even indirectly, might lend a necessary legitimacy and credibility to any agreements. This paper is part of a larger research project and is based on interviews (conducted by the author) with former Palestinian prisoners, and former members of Israel’s Internal Security Agency (Shin Bet), Israel Prison Service (IPS), and police intelligence. Insights are also drawn from comparative analysis of the Northern Ireland case study and other protracted conflicts.