This paper will deal with what might be conceived as the death of American diplomacy toward an Israeli-Palestinian politically negotiated settlement. More specifically, the paper will focus on the role of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in facilitating the proposal made by President Donald Trump, arguing that Netanyahu’s political career—his personality, ideology, and policies—has led to the Deal of the Century, particularly when he was able to work toward that deal with a personal political friend and an ideological twin. Henry Kissinger famously stated that Israel does not have foreign policy, only domestic policy. Under Bibi, Israel does not have even domestic policy. The one and only policy it has is designed to keep its beleaguered prime minister out of the courts and eventually out of prison. The Deal of the Century, a gamble with no real future, might achieve this goal. To make the situation even more bizarre, also the United States has no real foreign policy in the Middle East, especially toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution. The initiatives taken by the US—transferring the American embassy to Jerusalem, withdrawing from the Iran deal, recognizing Israeli annexation goals in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, and finally formulating the Deal of the Century—are designed to maximize Trump electoral chances and saving Netanyahu’s political career. Since this is a panel on “Israel in the Middle East: New Horizons?”, the focus will be on Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Likud-led government.

The Renewed Struggle for Syria – Russia, Iran, and Israel The end of the civil war in Syria and Bashar al-Asad’s victory in his battle fields do not yet assure peace and quiet for the Syrian state. Paradoxically, the approaching end of the Syrian civil war, lead to the renewal of the struggle over control of the state. First, the competition between Russia and Iran over Syria. In addition, the struggle for Northern Syria between the Syrian regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, and between the Turks and the Kurds. Lastly, the perilous tension between Iran and Israel, rooted in Israel’s determination to prevent Iran from obtaining a firm hold in Syria. In any case, in the foreseeable future, and despite the Syrian regime’s military victory on the battlefield, Syria will continue to a source of instability that might spread outside its territory. It will also continue to be a punching bag for its neighbors and for various regional and international players in their struggle with each other for influence and hegemony over Syria.

Contemporary Russia Israeli relations which started after the collapse of the USSR are experiencing its most positive stage. Russia and Israel managed to build and develop very strong relations despite pressure coming from the US and its other allies. Russia’s involvement into all important regional conflicts and processes (Syria, Israeli-Palestinian, Iran nuclear dossier, Libya, etc.) makes it and indispensable partner for Israel and often useful interlocutor. Given the fact that Russia keeps and develops positive relations with all regional actors positions it uniquely and makes it an attractive partner. This research project has three main goals: Examine reasons of the rise of Russia-Israeli relations; Analyze how the changing regional environment affected bilateral ties; Assess challenges and risks for the further development of Russia-Israeli relations. Strategy The project is intended to be policy and academic oriented. It deals with the following issues: Evolution of Russia’s Middle East policy: Moscow becomes a power broker in the region; Russia talks with everyone: maintains working ties with all actors; Russia’s increasing role in the Middle East; Risks and challenges for Russia-Israeli relations: Russia-Iran regional cooperation; Russia-Syria-Iran triangle; US Middle East policy; US-Israeli strategic partnership. The hypothesis of the proposed paper is that Russia-Israeli relations in the region are defined by the nature of their national interests and their understanding of each other. Israel understands and acknowledges Russian role in the region as a stabilizing factor. Moreover, both countries value each other’s ability to be “messengers”/brokers (Russia for Israel communicating with Iran, Hezbollah, etc. and Israel for Russia communicating with the US). That said, the two countries have fair amount of limitations, one of which US policy in the region and US-Israeli alliance. Significance Results of the project might be used for: Understanding the nature of Russia-Israeli relations; Realization of limits and opportunities for Russia-Israeli ties; Create new criteria for analyses of bilateral relations. Primary beneficiaries of the proposed project are foreign policy analysts and policy-makers, NGOs, Russian and foreign institutions, scholars, students. Methodology By methodology we understand those tools and instruments which are required for fulfilling the project. To make project more balanced, the wide range of sources (primary and secondary) will be used: archive materials, analytical articles, interviews with experts and government officials, statistical data, and official documents. Realist paradigm will be utilized as a primary methodological framework for the analysis.

Israel’s relations with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have been improving for many years. Saudi King Faysal famously handed out copies of the anti-Semitic Czarist forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, to his visitors, but today the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, often make positive statements about Israel and the Jewish people. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu paid an official visit to Oman in October 2018. Unofficial meetings are reportedly held often with Saudi leaders. A synagogue now operates openly in Dubai, and EXPO 2020 Dubai will feature a full-blown Israeli pavilion. Qatar will likely let Israelis attend the FIFA World Cup in 2022. The Gulf countries are interested in access to Israeli technology for civil and military use. Never full-fledged supporters of the Palestinians, particularly after the Palestinian leadership supported Saddam Husayn in the Gulf War, Gulf leaders see an opportunity to cooperate with Israel against their common enemy –Iran. With doubts about US commitments to the region getting even stronger, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf will look to increased cooperation with Israel, as well as Russia and China.

Over the years, many external actors strove to gain influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for varying reasons such as political prestige or ideological motives. In the last decade, these actors also included the Arab Gulf states (with the exception of Kuwait), who became increasingly engaged in endeavors for influence in this arena. The study analyzes the motives behind this involvement and examines the Gulf states' policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of their grand foreign strategy. Among the factors that shape this strategy are aspirations for regional influence; ideology, values and political culture; alliances; the Gulf rift of 2017; and reaction to regional trends. For example, the role of the mediator comprises a key element in the Gulf states' political culture and a frequent practice in their foreign policy. In recent years, more and more Gulf states offer mediating small-scale conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Palestinian internal factions. The competition between these countries comprises another formative element in their foreign policy, that usually finds expression in the different involvement tracks and partners over the same arena, as in the case under discussion. Moreover, the competition strengthens what many experts describe as rising nationalism and isolationist agendas in the Gulf today. By surveying official documents and practices of foreign affairs, the paper asserts that the Gulf states' involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena reflects their grand foreign strategy in all examined factors. This examination highlights the changing attitude of the Gulf states towards both Israel and Palestine. It emphasizes the shifting focal points and networks in the region that lead to new opportunities and new challenges for both states.