This paper analyzes Kurdish lobbying strategies in both Washington, D.C., and at the European Union level from 2014-2017. Ethnic lobby groups, such as the Kurds, tend to enjoy two promising access points in both the US and the EU system. While the executive branch in the US tends to be closed to lobbying, Congress conveys a sense of openness to lobbying and activist agendas. Most lobby groups establish connections with particular members of Congress to indirectly shape decision-making at the executive branch. And, Congress manages budgetary issues, which encourages lobby groups to advance their desired agendas directly through the legislative branch. In the US, the president plays a particularly decisive role in foreign policy decision-making, which tends to be made behind closed doors. Foreign and ethnic lobbies face complex obstacles to establishing direct access to a closed executive branch. However, Kurdish representatives may try to appeal directly to President Trump through social media efforts and communications. European national governments are also mostly closed to direct influences by ethnic lobbies on foreign policy issues. In the EU system, however, Parliament similarly demonstrates openness to direct lobbying. In fact, Brussels is a particularly important location for Kurdish lobbies because the city hosts the official seats of the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament. While the EU system is complex and requires lobby groups to register, it is not difficult to gain access and establish a network of allies. Finally, all lobby groups with an interest in shaping foreign policy agendas engage in lobbying in the public sphere by organizing cultural activities, political conferences, and media events to increase their outreach. Ethnic lobby groups focus on changing public perceptions about an issue of particular significance to them both in the US and in Europe, and tend to rely on social media and networking tools to achieve their aims This paper examines how Kurdish lobby groups address policies advanced by the Trump administration and its European allies by contrasting them to earlier strategies. In addition, the paper evaluates whether progress made by Kurds in Iraq and Syria will be reversed in light of potential US-Turkish agreements under the Trump administration.

The unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections in November 2016 has brought a potentially new element into the important Kurdish question. The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the new president’s policies towards Kurdish refugees. My paper will be based on my visits to Kurdish refugee camps during December 2016 in northern Iraq, interviews I carried out at that time, internal Kurdish documents, and media accounts, among others, including new material that will surely arise. My paper will begin with a brief introduction to the current international political and legal situation of Kurdish refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) caused largely by the horrific Syrian civil war and ISIS attacks both in Syria and Iraq, especially the genocidal attacks against the Yezidis. The main body of the paper will deal specifically with Trump’s position on the issue and what this might project for the future. On the campaign trail, Trump took a hard-line against admitting Syrian refugees to the US declaring: “If I win, they are going back.” Syrian refugees listened with alarm as Trump called them “terrorists” and incorrectly blamed them for violent attacks in the US and Europe. However, a tough Trump position on admitting refugees to the United States might lead him to give them more support in the Middle East and Europe. Refugees come near the top of Trump’s announced policy of what to do first upon assuming office. Given recent terrorist events and associated refugee issues, many in Congress and the public are also more attuned to refugee issues than is usually the case. During the presidential campaign Trump also declared his solidarity with the Kurdish people on at least three separate occasions. During a talk on the failed coup attempt in Turkey on 16 July 2016, Trump again said he was a “big fan of the Kurds” and expressed hope that Turkey and the Kurds could work together against ISIS. However, during an earlier interview in September 2015, Trump confused the Kurds for the Quds Force, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, but did say that they [meaning the Kurds] “have been horribly mistreated.”

At the time of his election, many Kurds appeared surprisingly optimistic regarding President Trump and his new administration. They appeared to hope that a President expressly intending to upend "the establishment", "international conventions" and "the status quo," might likewise prove willing to upend longstanding American policy towards the establishment of one or more independent Kurdish states. To what extend and under which possible scenarios might a Trump-led United States significantly break with past U.S. policies towards the Kurds? How would support for Kurdish aspirations in one part of Kurdistan impact policies towards the other parts of Kurdistan and the states these areas are located in?

This paper will analyze the underlying factors and options relevant to emerging U.S. policy toward Kurdish issues today. The framework is one of competing/converging interests among divers regional parties: different Kurdish players, both political and military; Turks; Arabs; Iranians; and outside actors including Russia. Based on site visits, interviews, historical trends, media content analysis, survey research, and additional inputs, the paper will offer an original perspective demonstrating how the available options emerge from contrasting ground realities in particular Kurdish lands, and how the likely choices can be better predicted and understood. The overall theme will be to highlight comparisons across Kurdish situations in each major territory: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.