Economic and political shifts in Turkey resulting from ongoing liberalizing reforms are producing major social changes, observable in the pluralization of cultural identities, urban development, and the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The contradictions that result from the confluence of these changes have broad implications; my research analyzes these implications for one of Turkey’s most vulnerable populations, the Roma (Gypsies). This paper will interrogate the interface between NGOs and Roma communities and how this both reflects and informs larger processes going on in Turkey. It draws from 14 months of ethnographic research in Turkey, including an in-depth case study of one dislocated Roma community, a review of the activities of several NGOs across Roma communities in three cities, and fieldwork with policy makers and community leaders regarding broader state processes in the area of Roma Rights and the Roman Acilimi (Gypsy Initiative) that was declared by Prime Minister Erdogan in 2010. My research builds on existing anthropological and interdisciplinary work in theories of identity and the cultural politics of liberalization. Recent research traces changes in the perceptions of identity amongst the Turkish Roma over the past decade under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and suggests that there will be major social repercussions for notions of Turkish citizenship if the government decides to recognize the Roma as an ethnic minority (Marsh and Strand 2006), a decision that is heavily influenced by Turkey’s European Union integration process. At the same time, political and economic liberalization is shaping new class formations, generating capital growth, private initiatives, and private property, and restructuring the relation between state and citizen. These processes intersect and are magnified in Turkey’s Roma neighborhoods, where urban renewal projects are dislocating Roma communities and NGO involvement is increasing. This paper addresses the following questions: How do NGOs and recent state initiatives impact the role of Roma in the nation and in the city? How do global rights discourses effect what it means to be ‘appropriately Roma,’ shaping the limits of Roma collective identity and acceptable and effective ways to engage with civil society? I argue that, while the changes resulting from liberalization are typically posed as either positive or negative, the advantages and disadvantages for the Roma are actually produced simultaneously and mutually constitutive. While Turkey’s Roma are being integrated into the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, they are facing the dissolution of their communities, traditional occupations, and cultural life.

The construction sector is the driving force of Turkey’s rapid growth in the last decade which was reigned by single party, namely, Justice and Development Party (JDP). These projects were mostly based on urban settings. However, since 2008, a new phase of construction projects has been initiated by private companies on the rural parts of the northern region of Turkey. These are the construction of hydro electric power plants (HEPP) on more than 100 rivers of the region by the companies which also have the right to sell the electricity to the state generated by the river’s water. The construction of HEPPs has two repercussions for the peasants in the region. Firstly, the commodification of the water previously owned by the public means the peasants’ removal from its use. Secondly, it transforms the river’s water course and therefore devastates the environment which the peasants livelihood are a part. In this regard, the HEPP projects point to a new phase of accumulation by dispossession process since it is part of JDP’s neoliberal efforts to privatize publicly owned goods. In this paper I will focus on the question of the business groups’ influence in the decision making process of both the legalization of the commodification of water resources and the selection of the rivers to be used for the HEPP construction. I will mostly rely on the business groups’ and the state officials’ statements in media in the discussion process of the policy making. For this purpose, I will firstly review the national newspapers as well as the two big business associations’ (MUSIAD and TUSIAD) magazines which cover the issue of HEPP under the energy policy of Turkey. I will also review the books and reports that are produced by the grassroots organizations that struggle against the projects. This discussion will also contribute to the emerging scholarly debate on business and state relations under JDP government

This paper scrutinizes the transformation of the higher education system in Turkey during the last decade in conjunction with the neoliberal policy agenda and protests. Neoliberalism is often understood as a reduction of the discretionary powers of the state and the government in favor of the market forces. I argue that current discussion of neoliberalization of the higher education in Turkey , in contrast, brings about centralization. Higher Education Council is at the center of the debates around this transformation. It was established in 1981 in order to place all higher education institutions under its jurisdiction as a move for centralization and the control of the higher education which was deemed necessary by the military regime at the time. From then on, university rectors are appointed by the president of Turkey based on the suggestions of the Higher Education Council which might not necessarily reflect the votes the candidates won in the university elections. The members of the Council on the other hand are mainly appointed by the President and the government (14 out of 22). A draft proposal for a transformation of the higher education system was prepared by the Higher Education Council in 2011, in reaction to which universities and some NGOs declared their opinions. This led to discussions on the policies of the JDP (Justice and Development Party) government and the role of the universities in the mass media. However, legislation discussions were not the only instances where the role of universities was put on the public agenda. It also coincided with the student protests, excessive use of violence of the police and the Prime Minister Erdogan’s responses that followed the events which focused on the legitimacy of protest as well as government interventions. Consequently this paper approaches the issue of transformation of the higher education system from three foci: state, institutional change and social movements. Framing in Student protests and different versions of Higher Education Legislation proposal drafts will be analyzed. Furthermore, content analyses of the responses from 98 universities, labor unions and NGOs like MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) will be made. These analyses suggest a framework of hegemony construction and coexistence of centralization and neoliberalization.

In my paper, “Outside the Walls of Silivri Prison,” I argue that liminal carceral space is found beyond the boundaries of the prison. The concept of the “total institution” advanced by Irving Goffman (1961) offers a binary understanding of the institution, strictly inside or strictly outside, which does not account for the presence of transitional spaces, such as visiting areas or legal consultation spaces which evince the penetration of the outside within the prison’s walls. Comprised of elements of both penal and free spaces, these locations exist as liminal. In addition to this penetrating effect, it is useful to conceptualize the existence of this liminal carceral space as an extension of the prison outside. The shifting nature of space in Gezi Park and Taksim Square during the summer of 2013 display elements of this liminality, as do cases of political prisoners who maintain public presences (outside) during their periods of incarceration. Turkey, which currently has the world’s highest number of imprisoned journalists, is an important site for this line of research. I have chosen to examine the ongoing Odatv court case involving thirteen Turkish journalists, many of whom have resisted detention by continuing to publish books and articles during their time at Silivri Prison, in Istanbul; through the printed word they reach the outside, which suggests an element of porosity in the walls of the prison, and fluctuations in meaning of carceral spaces. Another aspect of this liminality is the extension of the prison to the outside through the establishment of an atmosphere intolerant of criticism of the state by journalists. The widespread imprisonment of journalists has changed the nature of the outside for “free” journalists, many of whom have lost their jobs (including a massive wave of firings since the beginning of the Gezi Park protests), been compelled to censor their work, or in some other way shared (on the outside) the carceral experiences of their colleagues. This conceptualizing of liminal space contributes to a wider discussion in the burgeoning subfield of Carceral Geography; specifically, I continue to critique the “total institution” which has been challenged by other geographers in recent years. The current policy of mass imprisonment of journalists in the case of Turkey also draws attention to the country’s endangered democratic press, an issue that has been highlighted during the past several months.

Legitimacy is widely recognized as necessary for the resilience and long term success of insurgent revolutions, yet successful revolutionary movements are frequently viewed as illegitimate during the course of conflicts. I examine this paradox in the case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. Using a novel framework for the analysis of legitimacy, this research details how the PKK took advantage of the benefits of legitimacy from various discrete constituencies until the associated expectations became unwanted constraints. Further, this study provides evidence to support the assertion that the resilience and successes of the group are the result of a) their dominant profile in the conflict and b) the legitimacy the conflict’s motivating ideology. This research offers broader insights into the paradox of legitimacy, showing how illegitimacy among discrete constituencies can alleviate constraints, can provide valuable flexibility, and inhibits success only to the degree that it compromises a movement’s base of material support and their broader legitimacy as representatives of the motivating goals of the conflict.